The underlying values of German and English contract law by Dodsworth, Timothy J.
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/78788 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
The Underlying Values of German and 
English Contract Law 
 
 
By 
 
 
Timothy J. Dodsworth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy 
(Ph.D.) degree in Law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick, Department of Law 
September 2015 
2 
 
Contents 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 5 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................... 5 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Methodology ............................................................................ 7 
1.01 Framework of the thesis .............................................................................................. 7 
1.02 Hypothesis.................................................................................................................. 10 
1.03 Where does it fit in? ................................................................................................... 10 
1.04 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 17 
1.05 Limitations.................................................................................................................. 19 
1.06 The values .................................................................................................................. 21 
1.07 Summary .................................................................................................................... 23 
1.08 Impact ........................................................................................................................ 26 
Chapter 2 – Introduction to German Law .............................................................................. 29 
2.01 A brief history of the German civil code .................................................................... 29 
2.02 General Norms ........................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 3 – Pre-contractual Duties (Breaking off negotiations) ........................................... 34 
3.01 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 34 
3.02 Freedom from contract and the protection of the will ............................................. 36 
3.03 Culpa in contrahendo ................................................................................................. 39 
Von Jhering’s approach .................................................................................................. 39 
Blameworthy behaviour and the protection of the BGB ............................................... 48 
3.04 Unjust Enrichment ..................................................................................................... 50 
The English approach to restitution ............................................................................... 50 
The German approach to restitution ............................................................................. 56 
Preliminary conclusions ................................................................................................. 57 
3.05 No real intention to contract ..................................................................................... 58 
The German approach to fraud ..................................................................................... 58 
The English approach to fraud ....................................................................................... 60 
Preliminary conclusions ................................................................................................. 64 
3.06 Negligently misleading ............................................................................................... 65 
3.07 Change of mind .......................................................................................................... 66 
The German Approach ................................................................................................... 66 
The English Approach ..................................................................................................... 70 
3.08 Changing the terms .................................................................................................... 73 
The German Approach ................................................................................................... 73 
3 
 
The English Approach ..................................................................................................... 74 
3.09 The Noblemen ............................................................................................................ 79 
The German Approach ................................................................................................... 79 
The English Approach ..................................................................................................... 80 
3.10 Form ........................................................................................................................... 80 
The German approach ................................................................................................... 80 
The English Approach ..................................................................................................... 82 
3.11 Informal Reliance ....................................................................................................... 90 
3.12 Tendering cases ......................................................................................................... 93 
The German approach ................................................................................................... 94 
The English Approach ..................................................................................................... 96 
3.13 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 97 
Chapter 4 – Mistake ............................................................................................................... 98 
4.01 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 98 
4.02 The History of Mistake in Germany ......................................................................... 101 
Savigny ......................................................................................................................... 109 
4.03 The Will Theory in Practice ...................................................................................... 115 
Preliminary conclusion ................................................................................................. 119 
4.04 Mistake as to Terms in German Law ........................................................................ 120 
4.05 Mistake as to Terms – English Law .......................................................................... 123 
4.06 Non-Declaration Mistakes in German Law .............................................................. 128 
Pre-contractual duties and Mistakes ........................................................................... 135 
§§ 433 ff. BGB .............................................................................................................. 145 
4.07 Other cases of mistake in English Law ..................................................................... 158 
4.08 Errors in Calculation – German Law ......................................................................... 167 
The calculation as the basis of the agreement – party intention ................................ 168 
A general duty of good faith ........................................................................................ 169 
Mistake and the duty of good faith ............................................................................. 172 
Fraud and the trust relationship .................................................................................. 173 
4.09 Errors in Calculation – English Law .......................................................................... 173 
4.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 178 
Chapter 5- Unfair Contract Terms ........................................................................................ 181 
5.01 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 181 
5.02 German Law prior to 1933 ....................................................................................... 182 
5.03 German Law after 1935 ........................................................................................... 192 
§242 BGB and Standard Terms .................................................................................... 194 
4 
 
5.04 German Law and the AGBG 1975 ............................................................................ 207 
5.05 German Law: Ex post facto justifications or value based judgments? .................... 208 
The justification of the intervention ............................................................................ 208 
5.06 English Law – Overview ............................................................................................ 213 
5.07 English Law - Interpretation, contra preferentem ................................................... 217 
5.08 English Law - Incorporation...................................................................................... 218 
5.09 Fundamental Breach ................................................................................................ 221 
5.10 UCTA 1977 and the Reasonableness Test ................................................................ 227 
5.11 UCTA and Unequal bargaining power ...................................................................... 231 
5.12 UCTA and Consent ................................................................................................... 233 
5.13 Risk Allocation .......................................................................................................... 236 
5.14 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 238 
Chapter 6 – Change of Circumstances ................................................................................. 240 
6.01 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 240 
6.02 German Law - Impossibility and change of circumstances ...................................... 242 
6.03 German Law – the History ....................................................................................... 244 
6.04 German Law - The Resurrection of ‘Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus’ .......................... 247 
6.05 Reform of the BGB and § 313 BGB........................................................................... 263 
6.06 The German Values .................................................................................................. 265 
6.07 The English Approach: Introduction ........................................................................ 267 
6.08 Common mistake in English Law.............................................................................. 268 
6.09 Frustration in English Law ........................................................................................ 269 
6.10 Temporary and Partial Impossibility in English Law ................................................ 281 
6.11 Cardinal Change in English Law ................................................................................ 284 
6.12 The English Values.................................................................................................... 288 
6.13 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 290 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 293 
7.01 The values ................................................................................................................ 295 
7.02 Values and their context .......................................................................................... 297 
7.03 Consumer-welfarism or Market-Individualism ........................................................ 301 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 305 
English Cases .................................................................................................................... 305 
German Cases .................................................................................................................. 309 
Articles and Books ............................................................................................................ 314 
 
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Herbert Smith Freehills LLP and the University of Warwick, 
School of Law for the funding that made this thesis possible. I will be eternally 
indebted to my supervisor, Hugh Beale, for his incredible support. It is difficult to 
put into words how grateful I am to Hugh for spending countless hours reading 
through my drafts, explaining concepts/ ideas and for believing in the success of 
this research project.   
I would also like to thank my colleagues at the University of Warwick, who have 
been (and will remain) an inspiration to me. I cannot name all but I would like to 
especially thank Rebecca Probert, Christopher Bisping and Sharifah Sekalala.  
This Ph.D. would never have been possible without the support of my friends and 
family. I would therefore like to thank my parents and my brother for believing and 
assisting me. Last but not least I would like to thank Raadiyah for standing by me 
through the late nights, early mornings, highs and lows.  
   
Declaration  
I confirm that the thesis is my own work. I also confirm that the thesis has not been 
submitted for a degree at another university. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Abstract 
This thesis identifies the underlying values of German and English contract law. It 
establishes that to some extent almost all values are reflected in both jurisdictions 
but that in many cases the underlying values compete with each other. The thesis 
identifies the balance of the values in the context of four problem areas namely 
pre-contractual duties of disclosure (breaking off negotiations), mistake, unfair 
contract terms and changed circumstances. The thesis concludes that although 
almost all values are reflected in each system the balance of the values differs 
significantly. This is important and topical because identifying the balance of the 
competing values within a jurisdictions and contrasting these to another jurisdiction 
provides a deeper level of understanding of the courts’ decision-making process. 
The particular questions which the research addresses are twofold, firstly, which 
values are competing within the context of a particular problem, and secondly, 
what weight is given to each value in a given context in contrast to the other 
jurisdiction.  
In order to address these questions a combination of doctrinal and comparative 
research methods is adopted. The focus is on the decisions of the respective 
courts’, but doctrinal elements are also explored through the way in which cases 
were interpreted by academic writers at that particular time, while a functional 
comparative method is adopted. The work does not aim to create its own theory of 
contract or try to engage in the theoretical debate of which universal values 
‘should’ apply.  
The implications of the research findings are that policies at a European level can 
more accurately identify the core underlying values if they firstly identify the 
viability of harmonising areas of contract law and at a national level and evaluate 
potential legislative changes in light of these values. Additionally, identification of 
the values also allows further research on the desirability of the values to be 
conducted.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Methodology 
The main aim of this research is to compare four areas of German and English law 
on the basis of how each jurisdiction balances underlying values with regard to 
several problems that can broadly be characterised as pre-contractual duties of 
disclosure, mistake, unfair contract terms and change of circumstances. The 
comparison will show that although both systems functionally have the capability to 
achieve the same result (and for the most part do so), the underlying values may 
differ even when the same result is achieved or alternatively the competing values 
may be accorded different weighting, leading to a different outcome. 
The introduction to this thesis will first of all set out the assumptions that must be 
made in order to begin creating the theoretical framework within which this thesis 
belongs. It will then establish the hypothesis of this research and explain why the 
research is original. A short literature review will follow which in part will interlink 
with the methodological framework of the thesis. Finally this chapter will explain 
the limitations (i.e. what the thesis will not do) and provide the reader with a brief 
summary of the remaining chapters.  
1.01 Framework of the thesis 
This thesis is built on two basic assumptions. These are, firstly, that German and 
English contract law are aiming to perform more or less the same functions and, 
secondly, that the systems are underpinned by values and that those values 
influence the legislative and juristic decision-making process, and so affect how the 
same ends are achieved.  
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The first assumption is that both systems will use different concepts and 
terminology in order to deal with a particular problem but that in most cases the 
result will be the same.1 It will be shown, and the volume of comparative literature 
provides testament to this, that in the areas considered there is a great deal in 
common (at the very least at a macro level).2 
The second hypothesis that the thesis proposes is that values underlie the decisions 
of judges. Assuming that the rules and regulations have their origin in some value 
judgment by the legislator it would seem like the system is built on values. This 
would encompass for example the efficient exchange of goods as a basic value. The 
assumption is that judges in individual instances are influenced by values and that 
the influence of these values brings about a divergence in the final outcome or a 
convergence in cases where the basic rules in a particular system point to a result 
that the judges seem to feel is manifestly unjust so that they develop the law in 
order to achieve a result that aligns with their reasoning.  
An example of diverging end results may be the famous pre-contractual duties of 
disclosure (Chapter 3) where in the German cases there is a general duty of 
disclosure (though there are restrictions) and in English law there is not. The 
German emphasis (we will see) is on the protection of the invested trust in the 
                                                          
1 Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998) p. 34-
35; Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Reimann & Zimmermann (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006), p. 364-366.; Samuel, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 12;  
2 See below the discussion on the economic theory. See Ch. 1.03 
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relationship (and other values) but the English courts are firmly protecting the 
freedom of contract and the principle of caveat emptor. However, the convergence 
becomes clearer in the case where the English courts will use for example the law 
of joint venture to create a result that reflect the German result. Protection of 
freedom of contract is limited where the court accepts that there is an objective 
relationship of trust.  
In order for this thesis therefore to accomplish its aim it must first assume that the 
values exist (a matter that is fairly uncontroversial seeing as most people would 
accept that they are influenced by some sort of values) and for that reason it is 
believed that it is generally accepted that the law is also underpinned3 by moral, 
religious, philosophical values.4  
                                                          
3 Kennedy, A Law Unto Themselves (29 July 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04bnd0l> 
accessed 26 September 2015 where Justice Michael Kirby (Australian High Court judge) remarks that 
judges are undoubtedly influenced by their values; Worthington, ‘Common Law Values: The Role of 
Party Autonomy in Private Law’ ’ in A. Robertson and M. Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of 
Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Chapter 14, Hart Publishing) (2015); Campbell, ‘Good Faith and 
the Ubiquity of the ‘Relational’ Contract’ (2014) 77 The Modern Law Review 475 Adams and 
Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205; Brownsword, ‘The Law of 
contract: Doctrinal Impulses, External Pressures, Future Directions ’ (2014) 31 Journal of Contract 
law 73; Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona 
Fide Purchase Rules’ (2015) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
4 Even though they seem to be mentioned repeatedly without necessarily providing clear guidance 
on what the values may be and how they operate (or in fact where they come from), just that they 
exist and influence the law making process (e.g. Zimmermann, ‘Characteristic Aspects of German 
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1.02 Hypothesis 
This thesis sets out to confirm the hypothesis that although German and English 
contract law have functionally equivalent mechanisms to deal with a given problem 
and that will (at least at a macro level) achieve similar results, different (or a 
different weighting of) values underpin the two systems which may lead to 
opposing results. The functional approach5 will be used to analyse how the two 
systems approach four different categories of contract law problems and will allow 
a comparison of the legal outcomes to those problems which will assist in 
unearthing the underlying values.  
This thesis derives its originality from three elements: firstly, the approach to the 
comparison of German and English contract law; secondly, by identifying the values 
that underpin the courts’ decisions in both systems; and, thirdly, by showing how 
these values interact in different situations.  
1.03 Where does it fit in? 
From a comparative theoretical framework the thesis will use the functional 
equivalence as the basis for comparison.6 The thesis thereby relies on the work of 
                                                          
Legal Culture’ in J. Zetkoll and M. Reimann (eds), Introduction to German Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2005), p. 22. 
5 The functional approach was selected on the basis that it is the most appropriate approach for 
comparative research, see Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart 
Publishing 2014), p.19-20. 
6 Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998) p.33-
47. 
11 
 
Legrand7, Watson8 and Teubner9 to justify the actual comparison of the two 
systems. It does so based on the discussion of cultural values being the framework 
of the quest for whether or not legal transplants can be effective. In all cases the 
authors have relied on the existence of values and the basis of their work is that 
values continue to exist that either make it impossible10 or possible to transplant.11 
This thesis will therefore build on the idea that these values exist by relying on the 
same method but will not go on to question whether this implies that they can be 
transplanted or not.   
As comparative law matures12 and the fundamental knowledge of the legal systems 
grow there is an increase in the will to understand why another jurisdiction has 
                                                          
7 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants'’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111. 
8 Watson, Legal transplants : an approach to comparative law (Edinburgh : Scottish Academic Press 
1974). 
9 Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergencies’ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review. 
10 i.e. the discussion between Legrand and Watson. (e.g. see Watt, ‘Comparison as deep 
appreciation’ in P.G. Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
2012). 
11 See Teubner who argues that the transplant will irritate the system in a positive way and will then 
(if not rejected) be accepted to become part of the value framework.  
12 The previous immaturity is evidenced by the rise in books published recently on comparative 
methodology and theory (e.g. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method 
(Hart Publishing 2014); Adams and Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 
12 
 
chosen a particular approach. This explains why in the last few years there has been 
a rise in literature/debate on ‘why’ a legal system functions in the way that it 
does.13 The starting point for any literature review must be Markesinis (et al.) ’The 
German Law of Contract’14 and Beale (et al.) ‘Ius commune Case book’15. The main 
focus for Markesinis is to explain the German law of contract to an English audience 
and by comparing it to some of the English cases. The methodology is similar to that 
of this thesis in that it uses functionalism as the basis for comparison. It is a result-
orientated comparison. However, this approach, though in some cases explaining 
the doctrinal basis (and possibly the history of that doctrine), does not focus on 
values or the relationship of values. The cases are therefore chosen on the basis of 
                                                          
(Cambridge University Press 2012); Siems, Comparative Law (William Twining, Christopher 
McCrudden and Bronwen Morgan eds, Cambridge University Press 2014)). 
13 For example: Beale, Mistake and non-disclosure of fact : models for English contract law (Oxford 
University Press 2012); Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of 
Europe (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010); Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of 
Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules’ (2015) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; 
Collins, ‘Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ (2014) 67 Current Legal 
Problems 297; Gullifer and Vogenauer, English and European perspectives on contract and 
commercial law : essays in honour of Hugh Beale (Hart Publishing 2015); Bant and Bryan, ‘Fact, 
Future and Fiction: Risk and Reasonable Reliance in Estoppel’ (2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
1; Rowan, Remedies for breach of contract: A comparative analysis of the protection of performance’ 
(Oxford University Press 2012). 
14 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006). 
15 Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010). 
13 
 
how best to exemplify the particular legal phenomenon or doctrine. In contrast this 
thesis has chosen the cases based on their ability to exemplify the values underlying 
a particular doctrine and the development of those values over time. It also 
determines the origins of those values. The ‘Ius Commune case book’16 similarly 
sets out how the relevant jurisdictions achieve similar results. However, as the book 
is mainly aimed at providing an understanding of the law of contract in different 
jurisdictions it is at the same time not focusing on ‘why’ the result is achieved but 
on ‘how’ the result is achieved. The closest explanation from a value-analysis can be 
found in Hugh Beale’s work on mistake and non-disclosure of facts.17 The focus of 
the research there is on whether or not it would be desirable for English law to 
follow a similar approach to German law and it therefore extracts the relevant 
competing values. The question of whether the values are desirable is something 
that this thesis will avoid addressing mainly on the ground that it could distort the 
explanation of the values itself. However, the approach to identifying the values is 
similar and is built on in this thesis.  
There are then expositions of German law which rely solely on the explanation of 
the system. Zekoll and Reimann provide an introduction to German law and of 
particular interest is Zimmermann’s chapter on the legal culture in Germany.18 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Beale, Mistake and non-disclosure of fact : models for English contract law (Oxford University 
Press 2012). 
18 Zimmermann, ‘Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Cutlure’ in Mathias Reimann and Joachim 
Zekoll (eds), Introduction to German Law (Kluwer Law International 2005). 
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However, in contrast to this thesis the discussion centres on the explanation of the 
German system without the comparative aspect. The focus in both the 
aforementioned books is on understanding the doctrinal and theoretical basis of 
the legal system and not the underlying values. For example the explanation of the 
German culture crosses several areas of law without thereby focussing on particular 
values or the comparison of those values. It therefore poses the question of ‘why’ 
the system is the way it is from a historical rather than a ‘value’ point of view.19  
The question of underlying values in English law has been ongoing but has 
resurfaced as a central topic quite recently. Adams and Brownsword divide the 
courts’ decisions (or in fact the legal system) between formalism, realism, market 
individualism and consumer welfarism.20 Each category contains sub-categories for 
example a market-individualist (realist)21 approach which may or may not become 
apparent when applying a (for example) formalist approach because a formalist 
approach in itself would lead to the same conclusion.22 Adams and Brownsword at 
no point argue (and neither does this thesis) that this idea of market individualism 
and consumer welfarism are entrenched systems of thoughts in some judges but 
                                                          
19 E.g. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996). 
20 Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205. 
21 For example they describe Lord Wilberforce as a market-individualist, realist for his decision in 
Gibson v Manchester City Council [1974] 1 All ER 972. 
22 Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205, p.219. 
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that there will be some attempt to evaluate the direction in which each legal 
systems tends.  
To add to that is the argument put forward by Collins that the system of law is self-
referencing and closed.23 In other words it favours those that know what 
information may or may not be excluded from an examination of the case. 
However, the argument made here is that within certain doctrines (and this is 
exemplified best in contrast to a different legal system) judges/ legislators are 
influenced by more specific values and/or understanding of values. The example in 
Chapter 4, looking at German law, is that of the Daktari Film Case24 where the 
friendship of the parties (though Collins25 argues this is excluded from consideration 
in English law) forms the basis of a duty to disclose information. This is in contrast 
to English law where only if one could define the relationship as one of joint 
venture could any such duty exist.26 There it would seem the definition of ‘good 
business’ differs and understanding is neither derived from a consumer-welfarist/ 
market individualist thinking (though it may lead to the categorisation later) but 
from the underlying values that form the understanding of what is in fact just. In 
other words, the categorisation as consumer-welfarist is a consequence of the 
underlying values and not the cause.27 This means that this thesis aligns with the 
                                                          
23 Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press 2002), p. 41. 
24 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
25 Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press 2002), p. 1-7. 
26 See the argument of this thesis in Ch. 3.07.  
27 Of course once the judges has identified with one of the schools of thought this may influence the 
values.  
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argument of Adams and Brownsword as a causal link between the macro 
identification and the micro influences. It thereby also supports the arguments put 
forward by Collins28 that formalism is on the decline but it adds to the argument of 
why this is the case.  
In all the work of the aforementioned scholars the main focus has been to find an 
overarching system (or value systems) within which the whole of contract law will 
fit. The argument put forward in this thesis is that the values in play in a particular 
case differ depending on the legal problem. These values may well fit into the 
consumer-welfarist or market-individualist category but they provide a more 
detailed explanation of the outcome. This view, it is argued, can only be achieved 
through the comparison between legal systems. This is not to say though that the 
values identified (e.g. reasonable expectations of honest men) might not still fit 
within either the consumer-welfarist or market-individualist category, as the 
conclusion will show.  
More recently Sarah Worthington has picked up on the debate on values.29 She 
discusses in her chapter how far the English courts still protect party autonomy.30 
Party autonomy is identified as one of the key values in this thesis. The difference is 
                                                          
28 Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press 2002), p. 41. 
29 Worthington, ‘Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law’ ’ in Robertson 
and Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Chapter 14, Hart 
Publishing 2015). 
30 Ibid.  
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that this thesis will analyse more than one value and will explain the competition 
between those values.  
1.04 Methodology 
Zweigert and Koetz propose that more often than not the same practical results are 
achieved in different jurisdictions by using different legal rules.31 For this reason the 
thesis starts with a national legal doctrine (e.g. the law of mistake) and develops 
several factual variations. It will, for the most part, leave aside the cases that are 
dealt with in similar ways and will focus on those cases where the outcome is 
different. This is not to say that the thesis will ignore the method by which the legal 
system achieves the result, in fact the way in which the result is achieved (e.g. by 
using ‘good faith’ or ‘culpa in contrahendo’) will provide evidence of the particular 
values on which the courts are relying.  
The aim is not to show how differences of legal structure32 can lead jurists to arrive 
at different conclusions with respect to the facts of cases33 but rather to show how 
the values that underlie the legal method affect the outcome and how these may 
also lead to different conceptual structures.  
                                                          
31 Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), p. 
36-40. 
32 The example used by Samuel, The Foundations of Legal Reasoning (Maklu Uitgevers 1994) , p. 76- 
79 Is that of Read v J Lyons & Co [1974] AC 156 and Dunne v North Western Gas Board [1964] 2 QB 
806. 
33 G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method’ (2014) Hart Publishing, p. 17-
18. 
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The convergence and divergence of the approach on common problems can be a 
source of lessons and solutions in the most basic format but it is the explanation of 
the underlying reasons of the court that sets the thesis apart from other 
descriptions of the law of these countries.34 
The thesis subscribes to the method of functionality35 that aims to look at the 
outcome the legal system aims to achieve by whatever method may seem 
appropriate.36 There is no need to justify that ‘like Hamlet, [it is possible for us] to 
tell a hawk from a handsaw, and to do so without a complete theory of aerial 
predators or an exhaustive inventory of the carpenter’s toolbox’.37 The reason is 
that the argument that the anti-thesis (i.e. that there is no need for a theoretical 
framework because it is common sense) itself is the thesis of comparative method, 
needs neither to be confirmed nor allayed38 because this thesis uses the method of 
structural (functional) comparison and the justification for this approach is 
providing a deeper understanding of the law.  
                                                          
34 This is described as the value contribution to the field of comparative law in Rowan, Remedies for 
breach of contract: A comparative analysis of the protection of performance’ (Oxford University 
Press 2012), p. 1.  
35 K. Zweigert and H. Koetz, ‚An Introduction to comparative Law (3rd Edition) (1998) Claredon Press: 
Oxford, p. 34. 
36 For a similar methodology see S. Rowan ‘Remedies for breach of contract: A comparative analysis 
of the protection of performance’ (2012) Oxford University Press, p, 3. 
37 Weir, ‘Contracts in Rome and England ’ (1992) 66 Tulane Law Review 1615, 1616. 
38 G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method’ (2014) Hart Publishing, p.19-
20.  
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In conclusion this thesis is based on doctrinal research with the theory of functional 
equivalence as the methodological framework.  
1.05 Limitations 
Since this thesis not only looks beyond the English jurisdiction but also beyond 
individual concepts of contract law there are certain limitations and it is accordingly 
important to set out what this thesis will not do. One could argue that because the 
thesis is based on functional equivalents, different concepts could be transplanted. 
However, this thesis will keep a firm lid on the existing debate between Pierre 
Legrand and Alan Watson (and their respective followers)39 by not entering the 
debate on legal transplants and/or the cultural value system that may surround the 
legal construct.40 With Pandora’s (or Legrand/Watson’s) box firmly closed, the focus 
will be on the cultural values that have been expressed within either the academic 
literature and have been reflected in the case law or discussion papers leading to 
legislative change. The thesis will not address whether these values add to the 
debate on the ability to transplant legal constructs.  
                                                          
39 Watt, ‘Comparison as deep appreciation’ in Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2012), p. 82-85. 
40 Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants'’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111, 111; see also Watson, Legal transplants : an approach to comparative law 
(Edinburgh : Scottish Academic Press) 10; Smits, ‘The Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe: Some 
Insights from Evolutionary Theory’ (2002) 31 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
p. 79-99. 
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There will also be no attempt to evaluate the ‘appropriateness’ of the values or to 
engage with the theoretical framework of the values in any wider philosophical 
debate. The purpose of this thesis is to set out the philosophical/cultural/moral 
underpinnings of specific contractual doctrines which have been chosen on the 
basis of their divergence in approach and in some cases outcome.  However, in 
some cases it may be unavoidable to comment on whether the particular value is 
appropriately integrated into the system (or by evaluating the historic development 
of the value, establish that it was not but now is sufficiently protected). 
A key methodological issue for this thesis is how to identify the values and there 
must therefore be a limitation placed on the definition of a value. This partly 
connects with the methodology explained above, namely that the thesis, by using 
the doctrinal research method, thereby is limited to the expression, which may 
include an implied expression, of these values by the legislator or the courts (or a 
reflection of secondary literature that the court/legislator relied on). It means 
therefore that there may well be other moral/philosophical underlying values but 
these will only be taken into account in so far as they are expressed or clearly 
implicit. The reason for this limitation lies in the fact that only articulated values (or 
values that are implicit but clearly visible) can contribute to the evolution of the 
legal doctrine.   
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1.06 The values  
There may be cases that allow the judges to tilt the law and/or make decisions on 
the direction of the law. For example in cases such as Baird Textiles41 it is assumed 
that the courts were making a decision on whether to tilt the law either towards 
competition or cooperation. The end result was to follow the overall theme of 
competition. The thesis will attempt to look deeper at what values the judges were 
actually looking to protect. In this case the basic values has to be that of freedom of 
contract (and with that probably the protection of the individual autonomy). What 
is particularly interesting for this thesis is where these values have come from and 
how they relate to each other in different scenarios. The final conclusion will 
therefore be that there are occasional variations in values but the main difference 
is in fact the weight given to each value in relation to the other competing values.42 
With that in mind, the thesis will also show that in some cases there is a different 
understanding of what a particular value43 (e.g. reasonable expectations) or concept 
may mean (e.g. fraud).44 The important feature of the thesis is that it will aim to 
                                                          
41 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc [2001] CLC 999. 
42 See particularly chapter 3 and 4. 
43 There may even be some controversy within the legal system itself.  
44 The long term nature and the commitment to contracts in characterised in for example the 
principle of culpa in contrahendo being suggested by Medicus to protect parties against unwelcome 
contracts with a right to revoke them if they were caught off guard see Zimmermann, ‘Consumer 
Contract Law and General Contract Law: The German Experience’ (2005) Current Legal Problems, at 
475; or in English law what the meaning of ‘reasonable expectations may actually mean and whether 
that is the foundation of contract law, see Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the twenty-first 
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frame the values in precise terms rather than finding overarching categorisations 
(e.g. paternalism, consumer-welfarism).45 
The values that this thesis has identified in the two legal systems are protection of 
the will of the parties, protection of party autonomy,46 invested trust (either in the 
other party or in the venture), pacta sunt servanda (i.e. the contract is binding), 
equivalence and also nominalism, clausula rebus sic stantibus (i.e. the assumption 
that circumstances will remain the same), protection of society,47 protection against 
unfair gain, risk allocation (whether contractual or by the legislator), protection 
against informational imbalance, protection of the legislative body, protection of 
the parties’ contractual relationship, and the reasonable expectations of honest 
men. The chapters will show which values compete in particular scenarios.48 
                                                          
century (Oxford University Press 2006); Collins, ‘Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing’ (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 297; Collins, The European Civil Code (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p.26; cf. Fried, Contract as a promise a theory of contractual obligations 
(Harvard University Press 1981), p. 74. 
45 E.g. Nathan Oman has theorised that private law is underpinned by ‘honour’ (Oman, ‘The Honor of 
Private Law’ (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 31) or Sarah Worthington begins with the assumption 
that the overall battle in English law is over paternalism and autonomy in Worthington, ‘Common 
Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law’ ’ in Robertson and Tilbury (eds), The 
Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Chapter 14, Hart Publishing 2015) p. 1. 
46 Here there are several meanings attached for example this could go to the parties consent but 
also could be framed in the German terms of self-determination.  
47 Suffice it to say here that there are several meanings that could be attached to this value.  
48 For an overview see the conclusion.  
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1.07 Summary 
The conclusion of this thesis is therefore that there are several values which in 
some cases align and in some cases compete. In most of the instances the values in 
each system are similar but either the understanding of the value is different (e.g. 
protection against fraud – what is understood as fraud?) or the values are given a 
different weighting when they compete which then explains the different results. 
The question that then must be asked is whether we can accept that the values that 
have been identified are not simply errors or random noise49 but represent a 
broader value that underlies more than just that specific decision. This can only be 
answered in the context of the relevant area of law and by ascertaining whether 
there are other decisions that reflect the same or at least similar values. A firm 
indicator is whether the decision has generally been accepted. The thesis also relies 
on the assumption that legal systems will aim to develop one efficient rule to deal 
with problems.50 A second indicator of a permanent underlying value is where the 
decision does not follow the usual doctrinal path and the general rule is then 
overridden by reference to even more general norms (or in English cases by 
reference to construction for example), since judges are unlikely to jeopardise 
                                                          
49 Mattei, ‘Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics’ (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics p.3. 
50 Dari-Mattiacci and Guerriero, ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide 
Purchase Rules’ (2015) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11, 24; also note the point on the 
convergence of legal rules in light of the competition between legal rules put forward by Romano, 
‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’ (1985) Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organizations 1225. 
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certainty and consistency of their decision-making unless they see their 
fundamental underlying values threatened.51  
It is however not only the underlying values themselves that are of interest but also 
the relationship in which the values stand to each other. Take for example the 
freedom of contract and the protection of the parties’ will. Often these two values 
will run in parallel without affecting each other at all but in some cases freedom of 
contract (i.e. the freedom to choose the terms) may be limited because the courts/ 
legislator believe one party’s will is unduly limited by that freedom of contract. This 
relationship of the values to each other may well be further limited by different 
perceptions of legal doctrines. For example in Chapter 4 it will be shown that the 
legal understanding (dare it be said legal culture52) of what constitutes fraud differs, 
which in consequence means that the protection of the parties’ will in Germany 
limits the freedom of contract further than it does in England. The importance 
therefore for this thesis is not only to compare individual values but also to 
compare the relationship between values and the extent to which values compete.    
Chapter two will first provide a brief overview of the changes to the German legal 
system and to some basic concepts, since it is accepted that the thesis is primarily 
aimed at a common law audience. It will also reveal that broadly German contract 
                                                          
51 Brownsword, ‘The Law of contract: Doctrinal Impulses, External Pressures, Future Directions ’ 
(2014) 31 Journal of Contract law 73, 86. 
52 See FN 6 - 8; Nelken, ‘Using The Concept of Legal Cutlure’ (2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 1. 
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law is based on the values of freedom and equality.53 Chapter three will then begin 
with the comparative analysis of the pre-contractual duty of disclosure. A main 
feature of the chapter will be to identify that there are certain values which will re-
appear in other chapters and will also link in with chapter four. For example, 
freedom of contract and protection of party autonomy are accepted as a 
foundational values in both jurisdictions.54 55 These two values can and will in most 
cases align56 but freedom of contract may well be limited if it is regarded as limiting 
the self-determination of those who wish to conclude a contract.57 The chapter will 
                                                          
53 Zimmermann, ‘Consumer Contract Law and General Contract Law: The German Experience’ (2005) 
Current Legal Problems, at 466. 
54In the English case: Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 
205, at p. 208 ff.; Sarah Worthington begins with this presumption in Worthington, ‘Common Law 
Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law’ ’ in Robertson and Tilbury (eds), The Common 
Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Chapter 14, Hart Publishing) p. 1;   
55 In the German case: ‘This development [tightening the control on contracts of suretyship 
concluded by close family members of the main debtor] was initiated by a spectacular decision of 
the Federal Constitutional Court [BVerfGE 89, 214, 233 ] enjoining the Federal Supreme Court, when 
applying open-ended provisions such as §§ 138 (1) and 242 BGB, to pay due attention to the 
guarantee of the autonomy of private individuals, as enshrined in Article 2 (1) of the Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz). See Zimmermann, ‘Consumer Contract Law and General Contract Law: The German 
Experience’ (2005) Current Legal Problems, at p. 468. 
56 Zimmermann, ‘Consumer Contract Law and General Contract Law: The German Experience’ (2005) 
Current Legal Problems, at p. 465. 
57 Ibid, at 465. 
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take a historic view of why German law has decided to include provisions on pre-
contractual duties into the BGB and compares those values to the English approach.  
Chapter 4 will examine the law of mistake. It will focus on cases where there has 
been a mistake as to quality. This area has been chosen as it exemplifies the 
difference in approach and difference in values particularly well. Chapter 5 will 
analyse what the court/legislator in the respective jurisdictions consider to be 
unfair terms. Particularly interesting is the way the German courts take into 
account what they believe to be wider social threats (e.g. monopolies) which are 
not a consideration for the English courts. Chapter 6 will consider cases of 
impossibility and will not be looking to the cases of literal impossibility but will 
focus on those cases where it would be more burdensome to perform the 
obligation and will identify where the respective jurisdictions draw the line. Chapter 
7 is the conclusion. It will set out the balance that is given to each value and which 
values in the relevant jurisdiction is given priority over another. From that micro 
perspective it will then use the comparison of the values, by using the 
categorisation provided by Adams and Brownsword,58 to determine that generally 
Germany (within the four areas that were looked at) veers more towards the 
consumer-welfarist ideology and that English law tends more towards the market 
individualist approach.  
1.08 Impact 
This research has the potential to have an impact on several areas of thinking. 
Firstly, it provides a comparison between four areas of German and English contract 
                                                          
58 Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205 
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law. Andrew Burrows in a recent article provides evidence of how much the 
Supreme Court relies on foreign judgments.59 It is therefore fundamental that there 
should be an informed understanding of all the functional equivalent approaches in 
order to assess whether or not there should be such influence.  
On a more basic level this thesis has both an epistemological and a practical 
function. It provides a broader understanding of the driving factors within our own 
legal system and a practical function in the sense that it helps in developing more 
coherent doctrines/theories either on a European/international level but also on a 
national level. This thesis will help the reader understand why there are different 
rules and mechanisms – a central aim for a comparative lawyer.60 
Understanding the underlying driving force of contract law helps in what 
Brownsword has described as a shift in our understanding of contracts. The 
contract is not anymore seen as the sole ‘deal’; rather, it is a web of contracts that 
make up the totality of the venture. Brownsword61 presents the example of the 
                                                          
59 Burrows, ‘The Influence of Comparative Law on the English Law of Obligations’ in Michael Tilbury 
and Andrew Robertson (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart 
Publishing Ltd. 2015), p. 19-21. 
60 Watt, ‘Comparison as deep appreciation’ in Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2012) 82, p. 86; Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies’ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review p. 11; Dari-Mattiacci 
and Guerriero, ‘Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules’ 
(2015) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, p. 32. 
61 Brownsword, ‘The Law of contract: Doctrinal Impulses, External Pressures, Future Directions ’ 
(2014) 31 Journal of Contract law 73, at 83. 
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shopping centre that is to be opened. A deal is brokered with a major retailer, who 
will attract lots of the customers. Many smaller retailers decide to enter into 
contracts for shops in the retail park on the basis that the large retailer will be 
there. The question is then whether the large retailer could just end their 
contractual relationship without influencing the web of contracts that surround 
their deal. In understanding whether such an approach would fit with the 
underlying values can provide a solid basis for a change in policy if that is seen to 
match the underlying values of the legal systems.  
There is of course also the European level. Understanding which values (and the 
reasons behind those values) underlie particular rules allows for an assessment of 
whether harmonisation of those rules is desirable.  
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Chapter 2 – Introduction to German Law 
This chapter is designed to provide a brief overview of the origin of the German civil 
code, the most important change with regard to the law of obligations and an 
overview of the structure of the German civil code. 
2.01 A brief history of the German civil code 
The German civil code and therefore German law as we know it today did not exist 
until 1900. In the late 15th Century canon law and local legal systems of the 
different kingdoms in Germany prevailed. Local laws would generally take priority 
over any other laws but where there was no local law late Roman law (corpus Iuris 
Civilis) would be used. In the 18th century new legal codes (e.g. Preußisches 
Allgemeines Landrecht, ABGB – Austrian Civil code) were developed that renewed 
Germanic legal thought. As the time for the inception of the German civil code 
came closer two main schools of thought prevailed. The first was the school of 
natural law (with writers such as Thibaut who was in favour of the German civil 
code) and the second was the historical school of law (with writers such as Savigny 
who believed that there was no need for such a code).62 Savigny and Thibaut were 
the two most prominent legal thinkers of their time and were professionally 
opposed.63 Thibaut advocated a unified, simple German civil code.64 He was 
                                                          
62 Foster and Sule, German Legal System and Laws (3 edn, Oxford University Press 2008), p  17-27. 
63 Hattenhauer, Thibaut und Savigny (Verlga Franz Mahlen Muenchen 1973), p. 9; MacMillan, 
Mistakes in Contract Law (Hart Publishing 2010), p. 137. 
64 Thibaut, Ueber die Nothwendigkeit eines allgemeinen buergerlichen Rechts fuer Deutschland 
(Mohr und Zimmer 1814) . 
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influenced in part by the Code Napoleon which outwardly he protested against but 
the ideas of which he would have liked to have seen integrated into a German civil 
code.65 Natural law is based on man-made rational rules and receives its 
legitimation through that same rationality. Savigny opposed Thibaut’s idea to 
abolish the Roman law system in return for a unified German code and favoured 
keeping the status quo.66 The historical school of law that Savigny belonged to, 
defended the idea of the law growing through history. He therefore argued that 
before any attempt could be made to develop a unified code it needed to be fully 
understood in terms of methodology and needed to be cultivated from there.67 
Roman law was to provide the basis. Thibaut died in 1840 and Savigny’s opinion 
was then followed which meant that no unified German civil code was developed.  
Both scholars found their roots in Roman law and even though Savigny’s approach 
triumphed initially, a unified German civil code exists today. It comes as no surprise 
that Roman law had a strong influence on the way in which the German civil code 
was drafted since both scholars, though not directly involved in the process of 
drafting the legislation, held positions as professors of Roman law and were the 
main sources for understanding German law. This thesis will, in some cases, trace 
                                                          
65 Hattenhauer, Thibaut und Savigny (Verlga Franz Mahlen Muenchen 1973), p.40-45. 
66 Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fuer Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Mohr und Zimmer 
1814). 
67 Posch, Grundzuege fremder Privatrechtssysteme: ein Studienbuch (Boehlau Verlag Gesellschaft 
m.b.h. und Co.KG. 1995), p.24-25. 
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the values back to the law pre-dating the German civil code and look at the 
influence these values had on the civil code and legal thought.   
On 1 January 1900 the German civil code (BGB) came into force. It had been in the 
making for over 26 years and signified the unity of the German Reich.68 With over 
100 years under its belt the German civil code seems to have stood the test of time 
but this does not imply that the code has remained the same. On 1 January 2002 
the German law of obligations was modernized with the ‘Gesetz zur 
Modernisierung des Schuldrechts’. There had been some previous attempts to 
modernise the law of obligations but these had gradually faded into the 
background.69 This is not so say that the BGB remained untouched for 100 years. 
The BGB was continually supplemented with for example the ‘Gesetz zur Regelung 
des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen 1977’ (the law to regulate 
standard contract terms).  
After much discussion, a commission70 was asked to restructure the law to make it 
clearer and more modern. After 1995 the idea of a new law of obligations slowly 
faded into the background and was only revived by the necessity to implement the 
                                                          
68 Zimmermann, ‘Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture’ in Zetkoll and Reimann (eds), 
Introduction to German Law (Kluwer Law International 2005), p. 7. 
69See Justiz, Gutachten und Vorschlaege zur Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrechts, vol 1 (1981) ibid Justiz, 
Gutachten und Vorschlaege zur Ueberarbeitung des Schuldrechts, vol 3 (1983) ; for more detail see 
Zimmermann, ‘Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture’ in Zetkoll and Reimann (eds), 
Introduction to German Law (Kluwer Law International 2005), p. 14. 
70 Bundesminister der Justiz, AbschluBbericht der Kommission zur Uberarbeitung des Schuldrechts 
(1992) 
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Consumer Sales Directive71 by January 2002. The modernisation provided an 
opportunity to incorporate into the legislation rules that the courts had developed 
in order to supplement the code (e.g. pre-contractual liability which was transposed 
into § 311 BGB).72  
The main concerns which motivated the intention for the reform in 2002 were (i) 
the integration of specific statutes into the BGB (ii) the incorporation of specific 
contractual relations, which were deemed important enough to warrant special 
attention (iii) general reform of specific types of obligations and (iv) the need to 
adapt the general law of obligations to international developments.73 In addition 
the commission took it upon themselves to integrate the judge-made law which 
had become enshrined in the German law of obligations into the new BGB.74  
2.02 General Norms 
An interesting feature of German law is the structure within which the law of 
obligations operates. The system subscribes to certain overarching norms which are 
                                                          
71 Directive 1999/44/EC  of the European Parliament and Council on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees. 
72 Zumbansen, ‘The Law of Contracts’ in Mathias Reimann and Joachim Zekoll (eds), Introduction to 
German Law (2 edn, Kluwer Law International 2005), p. 185. 
73 Daeubler-Gmelin, ‘Die Entscheidung fuer die so genannte Grosse Loesung bei der 
Schuldrechtsreform’ (2001) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2281. 
74 For example, the pre-contractual duties of disclosure (more specifically the concept of culpa in 
contrahendo) had been developed by the judges by relying on § 242 BGB. The commission created § 
311 BGB in order to provide a new home for the pre-contractual duties, separate from § 242 BGB. 
Chapter 3 will discuss this development in more detail.  
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called ‘Generalklauseln’ (general clauses). These clauses apply to all the 
relationships of private law. The two main general clauses are § 242 BGB – the 
requirement of good faith – and § 138 I BGB – the requirement that contracts 
which are contrary to good morals are void. These provisions are left deliberately 
vague because they are meant to fulfil three roles.75 The first is that they give the 
judges the power to divert from the strict rules of the BGB in the interest of justice, 
where a result would be particularly harsh.76 The second is that it allows the judges 
to develop the existing law where circumstances have changed.77 The third is that it 
allows the judges to ensure that wider political policies are taken into account in 
their reasoning.78 This final role can ensure, for example, that the judges can 
intervene where a contract is contrary to the principle of the social state 
(‘Socialstaatsprinzip’)79 but it has in the past meant that other negative political 
values, e.g. during the national socialist era’ can infiltrate the German legal 
system.80  The general norms are particularly valuable for this thesis in tracing 
                                                          
75 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 22-25. 
76 Ibid, p. 23. 
77 Ibid, p. 24. 
78 Ibid, p. 24.  
79 According to Art. 20 of the German Constitution; ibid p.39; Zimmermann, ‘Characteristic Aspects 
of German Legal Culture’ in Zetkoll and Reimann (eds), Introduction to German Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2005), p. 22. 
80 Whilst the constitution cannot have direct effect on the law of obligations (BVerfGE 7, 198 ) it does 
have indirect horizontal effect. (Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 37-43. 
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values because they are both indicators of legislators’ values and offer an 
opportunity to give expression to underlying values.  
Chapter 3 – Pre-contractual Duties (Breaking off negotiations) 
3.01 Introduction 
The negotiation stage is often an essential pre-requisite to a contract. In some cases 
it may be non-existent or simply take the form of enquiring about the price, 
quantity or quality and in other cases there may be long protracted negotiations 
leading to lengthy contractual documents.81 However, negotiations may for a 
variety of reasons come to an end without a binding agreement being reached.  
Both the German and English system in principle allow the parties to walk away 
from negotiations without further liability under the principle of freedom of 
contract.82 The negotiation stage is designed for the parties to establish whether 
they are in agreement without the fear of being immediately bound (or the fear of 
liability). However, according to the German author von Jhering there are 
circumstances where there should be liability where one party has induced the 
other to incur a loss without entering into a contract.83 The liability arises, he 
                                                          
81 Farnsworth, ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed 
Negotiations’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review, p.219 
82 E.g. Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
83 See his work on the concept of culpa in contrahendo in Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik 
des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek 
des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte) 1861). 
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argued, from the principle of culpa in contrahendo.84 The idea of culpa in 
contrahendo was later adopted by the German Supreme Court to circumvent the 
difficulties of the rather harsh results of the lack of vicarious liability.85 Adopting the 
principle of culpa in contrahendo opened the door for much broader use of the 
principle. The broad approach in Germany, through the introduction of culpa in 
contrahendo, is that a party can be liable for breaking off negotiations in bad faith.86 
A party who is regarded as liable for breaking off the negotiations will have to cover 
the reliance loss incurred in the expectation that there would be a contract.87   
The English approach, which does not rely on culpa in contrahendo, generally takes 
the stance that there is no liability for breaking off negotiations.88 There are 
however some circumstances - for example where fraud is involved or where the 
other party has been unjustly enriched - where the courts are willing to at least 
ensure that the other party does not gain from breaking off the negotiations, and in 
some cases it seems that the courts will stretch the principles to achieve almost the 
same result as the German courts. Where one party is either deliberately (Ch. 3.05) 
or negligently (Ch. 3.11) mislead, English law will impose tortious liability. In all 
other cases, with the exception of the estoppel cases (Ch. 3.07 and 3.08),89 the end 
                                                          
84 Ibid, p.2. 
85 BGH NJW 1962, 31 . 
86 Now contained in § 311 BGB. 
87 § 122 BGB. 
88 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 
89 With the exception of the estoppel cases.  
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result is that the English courts will only ensure that the other party is not unjustly 
enriched.  
The real difference therefore appears in the cases where one party changes their 
mind during the negotiation stage for no reason (Ch. 3.09 and Ch. 3.10). The reason 
for this difference, it is argued in this chapter, is that the German courts have 
balanced the underlying values differently. Both systems agree in principle on some 
form of fault-based liability at the pre-contractual stage and the argument will be 
made that in cases where the other party changes their mind or suddenly increases 
the price (or other conditions) there may well be liability in English law through 
negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation (Ch. 3.08). However, the understanding 
of what is to be viewed as ‘fault’ at the pre-contractual stage differs, which in turn 
means that the German courts are willing to go further in compensating the party 
that has incurred a loss than the English courts are.  
3.02 Freedom from contract and the protection of the will  
There is some evidence to suggest that freedom of contract in itself is understood 
differently in each jurisdiction or at least that the concept is derived from 
alternative approaches. 90  The German approach is based on the autonomy of the 
individual,91 which is grounded in the theory of the will rather than its declaration 
                                                          
90 Micklitz, ‘On the Intellectual History of Freedom of Contract and Regulation’ (2015) European 
University Institute, p.8. 
91 Influenced first through Kant and then Savigny, see Zimmermann, ‘Savigny's Legacy: Legal History, 
Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Science’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review, 576-
605.  
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thereof.92 From this point of view it is easy to see that the freedom from contract is 
an essential element in protecting the party’s autonomy because if the party did 
not have the requisite ‘will’ to enter into a contract then there should not be a 
contract – even though the other may have believed that a contract would come 
about. The English approach, by contrast, views freedom of contract as the freedom 
to engage in economic transactions voluntarily.93 This freedom, viewed from this 
angle, is rooted deeply in the economic culture, i.e. it is free from outside 
interference from, for example, statutes.94 With the exception of consumer 
contracts, in English law freedom of contract means that the parties can generally 
agree on the content of their contractual agreement as they wish.95 Any 
paternalistic overtones96 should be seen as inhibiting that freedom.97 In contrast to 
the German approach, where paternalistic outside influences are welcomed, the 
focus is not so much on the protection from contracts but the protection of 
contracts from ‘outside’ influences. The conclusion at this point must be that, 
                                                          
92 Micklitz, ‘On the Intellectual History of Freedom of Contract and Regulation’ (2015) European 
University Institute, p.15. 
93 Ibid. p. 9 
94  Goff, ‘The Future of the Common Law’ (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
745 
95 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (8th edn, Aspen Publishers 2011), p.85 ff. 
96 Unless there is clearly some defect the contracting process or one of the parties is incompetent: 
Epstein, ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’ (1975) 18 Journal of Law and Economics 
97 The question of whether this is true is left to others to answer but the point to be made here is 
that this is the English understanding of freedom of contract - Brownsword, ‘The Ideologies of 
Contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205. 
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through the protection of the will, the basic starting point98 of finding that a 
contract in fact exists is more difficult in the German cases due to the fact that the 
other may not have the requisite will.99 This conclusion influences this chapter in 
two ways. The first is that there may be instances where the English courts are 
more likely to find that a contract exists100 where the parties were still at the 
negotiation stage101 and therefore award expectation damages for breach of 
contract when the other party refuses to perform, where the German courts will 
only award the reliance interest through devices such as culpa in contrahendo.102 
The consequence therefore is that there is already a difference in value in relation 
to the freedom of contract, namely in a stronger focus by the German courts on the 
freedom from contract. The second is that the English approach delivers a 
difference in outcome when they find that there is a contract, i.e. expectation 
rather than reliance interest.   
                                                          
98 Though Chen-Wishart argues that protection from contract is one of the aims of consideration - 
Chen-Wishart, ‘In Defence of Consideration’ (2013) 31:1 Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 209, p. 214. 
99 For more detail on the will-theory see Ch. 4.02  
100 It is accepted here that this may not be merely an economic freedom that has influenced the 
courts but that it is interlinked with the argument for recognising contracts at the negotiation stage 
to ensure that the parties take responsibility for the expectations that their actions reasonably 
produce in others. However, it does not change the overall argument.  
101 Due to the objective principle, see Smith v Hughes [1871] 6 LR 597 (QB). 
102 See Ch. 3.03 below. 
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3.03 Culpa in contrahendo 
Von Jhering’s approach 
One of the main devices that is used by the German courts to alleviate some of the 
harsh results delivered by the BGB in cases of breaking of negotiations is culpa in 
contrahendo.103 The best starting point to understand the development of the 
phenomenon of culpa in contrahendo is the work of Rudolph von Jhering’s in 
1861.104 Von Jhering’s overarching aim was to tie the then fragmented system of 
German law to that of Roman law in order to build a system of natural 
jurisprudence.105 In relation to the pre-contractual stage, Von Jhering was mainly 
concerned with the loss flowing from the mistake of one party which had to be 
borne by the other party who carried no fault in the mistake.106 Roman law107 
required the parties to have a meeting of the minds and if there was a lack of that 
meeting of the minds, then the contract was held void ab initio. Von Jhering 
describes the problem in reference to a mistake,108 i.e. one of the parties, usually 
                                                          
103 Less so now through the introduction of § 311 BGB (see below). 
104 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861). 
105 See for example his publication: Rudolph von Jhering, ‘Geist des roemischen Rechts auf den 
verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung‘ (Vol. 3) Verlag Breitkopf und Härtel (1865). 
106 Ibid, p. 2. 
107 For more explanation on the development from Roman law to the BGB see Ch. 2.02. 
108 Von Jhering, Geist des roemischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, vol 3 
(Verlag Breitkopf und Haertel 1865), p 2. 
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the buyer, has made a mistake which in turn would have resulted in the contract 
being void ab initio but the seller has incurred an expense. For example A orders 
100 kg of a product but meant to buy 100 lbs. On delivery he rejects the order for 
not being the correct amount. 109  The parties never had a meeting of the minds and 
therefore no contract was ever created. Nevertheless, the seller has to bear the loss 
of transporting the goods and any potential drop in the market. 
The problem that von Jhering had particularly envisaged was the case where the 
simple return of the goods was not sufficient to compensate the seller for his loss, 
where for example the return of the goods may cause them to devalue.110 The 
following example illustrates the problem:111A orders bananas and he is mistaken 
as to the amount – as in the case above. A then rejects the delivery. B would not 
only have to bear the cost of transporting the bananas but would probably have to 
sell them at a discounted rate or might simply have to throw them away due to the 
fact that they are now older. This result is clearly unfair to B who was in the belief 
that a contract had been created; however, the law at that time would have 
                                                          
109 Ibid. p. 39. 
110 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861) p. 4. 
111 This example was created by the author. 
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declared the contract void ab initio as there was no meeting of the minds because A 
had meant to buy significantly fewer bananas.112  
Von Jhering continued to expand this problem into agency law and finds the 
following example113: If Z asks his friend to order a quarter of a box of cigars but the 
friend misunderstands, orders 4 boxes and Z then rejects the delivery, Y, the seller 
of the cigars, then has to bear the loss due to the fact that there was never a 
meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer. As the friend was expressly 
acting as an agent, liability would not have fallen on him. The injustice is apparent; 
the mistake was made between Z and his friend and the seller did exactly as he was 
instructed, yet he has to carry the loss.114 
Von Jhering argued that all these circumstances could be decided on the basis of 
attributing fault or culpa – to use the Latin word.115 In the first example therefore 
the fault lies with the person who confused lbs and kg and in the agency scenario 
the fault lies with the agent, who misunderstood his principal.116 Von Jhering 
thereby shows that fault, even without a contract, could be a ground on which to 
                                                          
112 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861) p.22 ff. 
113 Ibid. p. 36-40. 
114 Although the problem could now be solved on the basis of the agent’s warranty of authority. 
115 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861) p. 36. 
116 Ibid. p. 37 ff. 
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provide compensation.   However, he also describes that a purely fault based 
remedy without an underlying contract could have very serious adverse effects.117 
The introduction of such a rule would mean that anything said or done even in a 
social context could lead to liability. This could range from promising to have dinner 
on the table by a certain time, to promises of good weather. A modern example of 
this could be if M were to ask N for directions and N were to make a mistake, N 
could be held liable for his mistaken directions to M since it was N’s fault that M 
had to spend more petrol to get to his destination – an unreasonable outcome. 
Therefore von Jhering concludes that culpa on its own is insufficient to establish 
liability.118 
However, von Jhering does not entirely move away from a fault-based remedy and 
utilises the idea of a contractual relation. He decides to establish liability on the 
basis of a contractual rather than a tortious one – even though the contract may 
not have come into existence. Von Jhering proposes that the word ‘void’ should be 
analysed in a different light. ‘Void’ is not the absence of any duty, it is just the 
absence of the directly visible contractual duties119. So that in the cases of the 
bananas or the cigars culpa, i.e. the fault of A or Z for not clearly communicating 
what they meant to contract for, combined with the underlying contract, despite its 
being void, creates the liability. 
                                                          
117 Ibid. p. 25.  
118 Ibid. p. 25 - 27. 
119 Ibid. p. 32-35. 
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Von Jhering accepts that finding culpa is not always easy and provides the example 
of a drunk who orders a particular dish for the next day.120 The owner of the 
business takes his order and delivers the dish the next day. The now sober man 
rejects the delivery – the contract being void on the basis of lack of capacity. Here 
culpa lies with the owner of the business, he should have known better than to 
contract with the drunk.121 122 Von Jhering describes a further scenario in which the 
drunk asks a waiter (this time an agent for the drunk) to order him a horse and cart 
and the drunk then rejects the cart, culpa lies with the drunk.123 Culpa here is the 
fact that he brought himself into the state of being drunk and that is the drunk’s 
fault. Interestingly this case may be treated similarly today. If the drunk had been 
so drunk that he was incapable of declaring his intention124 then the agent would 
have acted outside of his authority, making him a falsus procurator. Suffice it to say 
at this point though that the innocent owner of the horse and cart would have had 
redress either against the waiter or the drunk. 
                                                          
120 Ibid. p. 21. 
121 See BGHZ 152, 75 . 
122 This specific situation may be treated differently today as the drunk would have to have been so 
drunk that he would have been incapable of ordering the food. See also § 105 (2) BGB.  
123 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861), p.21. 
124 There is a requirement of two matching ‚Willenserklaerungen‘ – declarations of intent - for a valid 
contract. 
44 
 
The situation becomes more difficult in relation to agency relationships if the agent 
himself makes a mistake. An example may be a confused agent or even a 
malfunctioning telegraph, where the order was correctly given to the agent but 
incorrectly transmitted to the seller. In both cases von Jhering concludes that culpa 
lies with buyer for using the medium.125 The buyer could have transmitted the 
message in person but decided to use a different means of communication – the 
distortion of the message is therefore his responsibility.126  In other words the 
buyer has to bear the risk of using a different medium than personal contact. 
Presumably the situation would change if the seller stipulated that the only way of 
accepting was by using a telegraph. Nonetheless, this means that von Jhering has 
found a viable way of attributing fault. Interestingly, he fails to mention pre-
contractual relations as giving rise to any sort of liability.127 
The obligation which is therefore created is based on ‘culpa’ - fault. Culpa finds its 
roots in the intended contractual relation. One party has suffered a detriment 
because he relied on the representations of the other and/or the objective 
surrounding circumstances that a contract had been or certainly will be formed  - 
                                                          
125 Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Rechts (4th edn, 
F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte) 1861), p. 72 ff. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. p. 43-44. 
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an idea which the Romans had already developed,128 at least in more limited 
approach.129 
The essential element from von Jhering’s approach is that blameworthy conduct 
outside a contract (but within a contractual context) that leads to loss should lead 
to relief for the innocent party. The contractual context that von Jhering describes 
is when the contract turns out to be void. It is unlikely that von Jhering was even 
considering cases where one party had broken off the negotiations and thereby 
caused a loss. The need for von Jhering’s approach arose through reliance on the 
historic school of thought (rooted in Roman traditions)130 and Savigny’s will theory 
which (put simply) causes the contract to be considered void if the other party did 
not have the requisite will to enter into the contract.131  
Whilst von Jhering’s original idea of culpa in contrahendo was not entirely 
transferred into the first German civil code (the BGB) of 1900 it can be said that a 
few basic ideas were adopted.132 More importantly though, and similar to von 
                                                          
128 For more detail on the Roman origins see Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon Press 1996) p. 243-245.  
129 Ibid p. 9. 
130 See Ch. 2.01.  
131 For more detail on Savigny’s approach see Ch. 4.02. 
132 From the BGB of 1900: § 122 BGB – the need to compensate on a reliance basis if the contract is 
void for mistake, § 166 BGB – only the principal’s state of mind is relevant in cases of mistake,  § 179 
BGB – liability of the agent in cases where he does not have the authority of the principal, §§ 307 
and 309 – reliance interest for initial impossibility (see Chapter 5); Cartwright and Hesselink, 
Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 32. 
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Jhering’s approach, the courts developed a fault-based remedy for loss flowing 
from contractual negotiations,133 mainly because the founders of the BGB had left 
much unsaid134. The motivation of the judiciary, in line with von Jhering concept, 
was to provide for situations falling outside those anticipated by the BGB.  
In 1911, culpa in contrahendo received considerable appreciation through the 
‘Linoleum case’135, which bridged the gap in legislation for vicarious liability. The 
claimant entered a shop belonging to the defendant. She had already made some 
purchases in the general shopping complex and now intended to buy a linoleum 
carpet. After looking around she asked a shop assistant for advice and chose a 
particular style which she intended to buy. The shop assistant attempted to fetch 
the carpet she had selected, when he negligently hit two other rolls of carpet 
throwing the claimant and her child, to the ground. Owing to the injuries caused by 
the incident no contract was ever concluded.  
The question put before the court was whether the owner of the shop, who had 
employed the assistant, could be held liable. Had the shop owner been negligent 
himself the problem would never have occurred and liability would have laid in tort 
law. However, German law provided a rather weak system of vicarious liability in 
which the shop owner was only liable if he had been negligent in choosing the shop 
assistant. If he was able to show that he had chosen and supervised the assistant 
                                                          
133 See Ch. 3.07 ff. below. 
134 E.g. now §§ 311; 242 BGB. 
135 RGZ 78, 239 (1911) Linoleum Case . 
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diligently he would not be liable for the assistant’s negligence.136 Most of the other 
legal systems of the world (including England) have opted for vicarious liability of 
the owner of the shop.137 In order to circumvent the harsh results caused by the 
direct application of legislation the court was faced with the challenge of 
circumventing the legislation. The difficulty was that the assistant could be held 
liable on the basis of the ‘Deliktshaftung’ – liability on the basis of his neglect of his 
duty of care but this would probably not have provided the claimant with redress. 
As the shop owner was able to show that he had diligently selected and supervised 
his employee he could only be held liable on the basis of the ‘Vertragshaftung’ – 
the contractual duties - due to the fact that § 278 BGB imputes the negligence of 
the assistant to the owner of the shop so long as there is an underlying contractual 
relationship.138   
The ‘Linoleum Case’139 helped open up the law to a stricter vicarious liability140 but 
it also created a general liability not physically or economically to harm the 
                                                          
136 § 831 I BGB. 
137 Markesinis, A Comparative Introduction of the German Law of Torts (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 
1994), p. 677. 
138 For more details on the effects of § 278 BGB see Markesinis, The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 95. 
139 RGZ 78, 239 (1911) Linoleum Case . 
140 The duty was even further in the BGHZ 66, 51 (1976) Vegetable Leaf Case  where, a daughter had 
accompanied her mother for a day of shopping. They entered a shopping centre with the intention 
of purchasing when the daughter slipped on a vegetable leaf and suffered injury. The problem the 
court was faced with this time was that the daughter was a minor and could therefore not have any 
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interests of parties involved in the negotiation of contracts which eventually lead to 
the incorporation of culpa in contrahendo into the BGB. § 311 BGB codified the 
previous case law to offer protection in cases where the other party breaks off 
negotiations without good reason.   
Blameworthy behaviour and the protection of the BGB 
The idea that § 311 BGB falls back on is that through conduct of one of the parties 
the other party incurs a loss at a pre-contractual stage and that but for the conduct 
of the other party the other would not have incurred the loss. In a scenario where A 
informs B that he may be willing to sell at price X, B incurs cost and A then discovers 
that the market has changed A will not be (and should not be) liable for B’s loss. 
However, in the case where A leads B to believe that they will definitely enter into 
the contract and for that reason B incurs a loss, the German courts have been 
                                                          
contractual connection to the shop – opposed to the woman in BGHZ 85, 315 , where there was a 
direct tortious claim. Nevertheless, the owner of the store was held liable by attributing the 
daughter’s presence to the mother and allowing the mother a quasi-contractual relationship with 
the owner of the shop. The quasi-contractual relationship arose by the mere fact that they had 
entered the shop with the intention of purchasing.140 These cases illustrate recognition of a pre-
contractual relationship which did not go unnoticed by the legislator.  Both RGZ 78, 239 (1911) 
Linoleum Case and BGHZ 66, 51 (1976) Vegetable Leaf Case create a fictitious quasi-contractual 
relationship based on tortious principles, i.e. the avoidance of harm. In this case though it is not 
harm that the other has caused through their actions but harm that they caused through their in-
action. A further mechanism within German law is the contract with protective effective for third 
parties (‘Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter’) which arises from § 311 (2) BGB. Since the 
principle also arises from culpa in contrahendo it will not be discussed separately.  
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willing to provide B with a remedy.141 The differentiation between the cases is that 
the courts have used von Jhering’s analysis that blameworthy behaviour should 
lead to liability, although he meant this to apply to cases of mistake. The argument 
here therefore is that the underlying principle that the courts have been following 
is that A will be liable for reliance damages where B has incurred a loss through the 
blameworthy behaviour of A in a contractual context. In effect it is the protection of 
an informal trust relationship142 or reliance on what A has stated. The addition of 
the contractual context means that the parties must have entered into some form 
of relationship to each other, in the Linoleum143 and Vegetable Leaf144 cases it was 
the entry into the store which brought the parties into a relationship where they 
had to protect the interests of the other party. The liability for blameworthy 
behaviour is limited through other competing values, one of which is the protection 
of the BGB provisions (though it will be shown later that this is also limited by other 
values).145 
 
As indicated at the beginning, the next step will be to look at a simple scenario, 
where one party has conferred a benefit on the other and the negotiations have 
                                                          
141 Now covered by § 311 (1) BGB.  
142 E.g. BGHZ 76, 343, 349 (Failed Shopping Centre case), confirming BGHZ 71, 386, 395: ‘During the 
negotiation of a contract the other party owes, reasoned on the basis of a quasi-contractual trust 
relationship, a reasonable duty to take into account the justified interests of the other party.’  
143 RGZ 78, 239 (1911) Linoleum Case . 
144 BGHZ 66, 51 (1976) Vegetable Leaf Case . 
145 A value which is also prominent in other areas – see Chapter 5 for example. 
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then broken down. It will be shown there that, through one way or another, both 
systems will provide some sort of remedy.  
3.04 Unjust Enrichment 
The solution to different cases, i.e. the tools that the courts use, are the next 
element in the analysis. The first case, centred on the English solution of unjust 
enrichment, will set the baseline for the minimum standard of recovery for the 
party that has incurred a loss at the pre-contractual stage. It will show that both 
systems can, through different mechanisms, solve the following scenario: A has 
entered negotiations with B and encouraged B to provide her with a benefit (for 
example by shipping the goods in advance, or preparing plans for a building 
project).  
The English approach to restitution 
The basic principle of the law of restitution is to provide the foundation for a claim 
where one party has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another.146 The 
general rule is that where one party has gained from encouraging the other to incur 
a loss then they will have to return their gain (but not pay for the other’s loss).147 In 
                                                          
146 Boake Allen Ltd v HMRC [2006] EWCA Civ 25 (HL)As opposed to restitution for wrongs which 
won’t be discussed here. Wrongs for breach of contract would include cases such as Attorney 
General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL), where the courts compensated for the gain.  
147 The existence of restitution, as the basis for a claim, was not formally accepted by the House of 
Lords until 1991 in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL). However, this does not mean 
that cases prior to this went unresolved. As early as 1760, Lord Mansfield (in Moses v Macferlan 2 
Burr 1005) held that if from ‘the ties of natural justice‘ there is an obligation to refund, then the law 
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British Steel148 the plaintiffs were asked to produce steel nodes and the defendant 
sent a draft contract which was rejected by the plaintiff. The negotiations continued 
and all the deliveries of the steel nodes were made on time except for the last one. 
The defendant then attempted to rely on the draft contract but the court held that 
(particularly due to the fact that the claimant had rejected the draft) no contract 
had been formed. Recovery was therefore allowed on a restitutionary basis for the 
reasonable price of the steel nodes that had been supplied. The case in itself is not 
surprising, however, had British Steel produced the steel nodes (which were of no 
use to anyone else as they were made to the plaintiff’s specifications) but not 
delivered them when the negotiations broke down, it would seem that a claim in 
restitution would fail, unless the courts would be willing to circumvent the principle 
of unjust enrichment and focus on the loss of that British Steel had incurred (which 
is highly unlikely). No claim lies in restitution in cases where the claimant, in 
reliance on the statement of the defendant that they will enter into a contract, has 
incurred a loss but there has been no enrichment to the defendant.149 In such a 
case, however, as will be shown at Ch. 3.05 and Ch. 3.06, the claim may lie in 
misrepresentation. 
                                                          
will imply a debt as if there were a contract. He therefore decided to imply a promise to refund the 
money by which the defendant had been enriched. 
148 British Steel Corp v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504 (QB). 
149 However, there may be a claim in fraud, see Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (HL). 
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Even a claim in restitution may be limited if it would circumvent statutory 
provisions. In Sinclair v Brougham150, the question put before the House of Lords 
was whether those who had paid in to the building society were allowed to recover 
their money. As the contract was void for illegality the court held that implying a 
contract,151 and thereby allowing for the repayment (i.e. allowing it to have the 
same effect as a claim in restitution), would be circumventing the purpose of the 
legislation.152 In other words, the purpose of the legislation was to void the 
contracts and therefore implying a contract would be effectively to annul the 
legislation.153 The conclusion that can be drawn from this case is that the limitation 
on a claim in restitution is where it would contravene a statutory provision. 
                                                          
150 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL). 
151 Note that the implied contract theory in restitution cases has since been abandoned (United 
Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 (HL)) though there is some inclination that cases after 
this have used the implied contract theory (e.g. Guiness Plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 (HL), 689 
(Lord Templeman)).  
152 The claim succeeded on a different point of law. 
153 Note though that there have been cases since Sinclair v Brougham where the money has been 
returned. In  Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) the House of 
Lords held that the principle of Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL) did not apply on the basis 
that the swaps transaction was not itself a borrowing transaction. Instead they held that it was a 
future contract which does not involve the lending of money. From this it is now assumed that even 
where a loan is involved the money could be returned on the basis that restitution is imposed by law 
which is different from the contractual obligation to repay the loan (see Virgo, The Principles of the 
Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006)). 
53 
 
In the case of William Lacey154 the claimant had prepared estimates for rebuilding a 
property which had been destroyed during the war. The defendant used the 
estimates to present the plans to the war commission. The plans in turn increased 
the value of the property. Once the war commission had approved the plans the 
defendant informed the claimant that they had chosen a different contractor to 
complete the works when in reality they sold the property to a third party. In this 
case there had never been a contract between the parties. Barry J found that the 
action was based on a quasi-contract and that the courts were able to find a 
promise, irrespective of the intentions of the parties at the time. He placed much 
emphasis on the fact that the work had not been done gratuitously and that it had 
been requested by the defendant. He was unable to see a difference between a 
contract erroneously believed to be in existence155 and work done which was to be 
paid for out of the proceeds of a contract which both parties erroneously believed 
was about to be made.156  An award on the quantum meruit basis for the price of 
preparing the estimates was made.157   
The main point here is, bearing in mind that in 1975 the implied contract theory 
was still prevalent, that Barry J placed the erroneous belief that a contract existed 
                                                          
154 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 923 (QB).  
155 Thereby referring to the judgment of Greer L.J. in Craven Ellis v Canons Ltd [1936] 2 KB 403 (CA), 
410. 
156 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 923 (QB), 939. 
157 In this case the claimant was not allowed to quantify the damages in respect to the professional 
scales.  
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and the erroneous belief that a contract would ensue on equal footing.158 The 
difference between these approaches lies in the fact that the belief that a contract 
exists, which later turns out to be void, is based on mistake, whilst the anticipation 
of a contract is a prediction. If no contract is ever entered into then the prediction 
becomes a misprediction. Rattee J in Regalian Properties159 attempted to draw a 
fine line between a mere misprediction and the situation in William Lacey. In 
Regalian Properties the defendant (LDDC) invited tenders for the development of 
land. Regalian Properties submitted a tender and LDDC accepted their tender 
‘subject to contract’. The fluctuations in the property market and other difficulties 
forced LDDC to re-evaluate the terms on which they were willing to contract. The 
parties were unable to agree on new terms and Regalian Properties brought a claim 
for the fees that had been paid to professionals with regard to the development. 
Rattee J considered the judgment in William Lacey and found that the facts could 
be distinguished. In William Lacey the court had found that a separate agreement 
for the preparation of the estimates had been formed. In this case LDDC had not 
unilaterally decided to abandon the project, as was the case in William Lacey, but 
that there was a genuine disagreement on the price. Rattee J explained that ‘each 
party to such negotiations must be taken to know […] that pending the conclusion of 
a binding contract any cost incurred by him in preparation for the intended contract 
will be incurred at his own risk.’160 A further element of the decision was the fact 
                                                          
158 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis [1957] 1 WLR 923 (QB), 939. 
159 Regalian Properties Plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212 (CD). 
160 Ibid. p.231. 
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that the copyright in the material that had been created by Regalian Properties did 
not pass to LDDC and for this reason the judge was unable to find an enrichment.  
Prior to Regalian Properties, in 1953, the case of Brewer Street Investments161 had 
reached the Court of Appeal. A prospective tenant had requested alterations to be 
made to the claimant’s property in anticipation of the tenancy agreement being 
signed. However, the negotiations broke down because the defendant requested 
an option to purchase at the end of the tenancy, which the claimant was not willing 
to give. The Court of Appeal held that the defendant was liable for the changes on a 
restitutionary basis. Lord Denning asked on whom the risk should fall in such a case 
and concluded that the risk should lie with the defendant.162 Somervell L.J. held 
that due to the ‘defendants own course of conduct’163 the negotiations had broken 
down and for that reason the risk should fall to the defendant.  
This decision is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of enrichment put 
forward by Rattee J in Regalian Properties.164 However, both parties had confidently 
believed that a contract would come about and Barclays Woollen (the defendant in 
Brewer Street Investments165) had requested the work to start even though they 
were not yet willing to agree on the terms the claimant had put forward. The fact 
that the loss occurred, upon the defendant’s request, was sufficient to remove the 
                                                          
161 Brewer Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 428 (CA). 
162 Ibid. at 436. 
163 Ibid. at 434. 
164 Regalian Properties Plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212 (CD). 
165 Brewer Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd [1954] 1 QB 428 (CA). 
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presumption of the fault for the loss from Brewer Street Investments to Barclays 
Woollen. It would seem, at least from the unjust enrichment cases, that apart from 
Brewer Street166, damages will not be awarded for the claimant’s loss but if there 
has been a gain to the defendant then, permitting it was due to their fault, there 
will be restitution for the defendant.  
The German approach to restitution 
Above it was identified that culpa in contrahendo was used in cases167 where one 
party broke off negotiations for no good reason after leading the other party to 
believe that a contract would ensue. After encouraging the other party to incur a 
loss, a better offer from a competitor would not be sufficient. Though assuming 
that there was no culpa because the other party had a good reason to break off 
negotiations (a significant change in the market for example) the German courts 
may have to fall back on the law of restitution covered by § 812 (1) BGB: 
A person who, through an act performed by another, or in any other manner, 
acquires something at the expense of the latter without any legal ground, is bound 
to return it to him. This obligation subsists even if the legal ground subsequently 
disappears or the result intended to be produced by an act to be performed 
pursuant to the legal transaction is not produced.  
In cases therefore where one party has partly or wholly performed their side of the 
agreement in anticipation of a contract, § 812 BGB would require the items to be 
                                                          
166 Ibid. 
167 Which is now covered by §§ 311 and 242 BGB 
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returned.168 The approach, though different in execution, is similar to the English 
approach even if it is used in fewer cases than the English approach due to the 
nature of §§ 311 and 242 BGB. This means that both jurisdictions have a minimum 
protection against one of the parties gaining from the other’s ‘wrongful’ acts.  
Preliminary conclusions 
It is argued that in the English case it is as if damages are awarded on reliance basis 
rather than there being restitution. This would bring them closer to the German 
approach than one may have originally expected. However, overall it would still 
seem that British Steel is the approach that would be taken by the courts, namely 
that once the delivery has been made there is a gain to the defendant and that gain 
should be returned. Were the steel nodes never delivered then the defendant 
would never have been enriched and there would be no claim in restitution. The 
second point to remember is that there is a limitation on claims in restitution, 
namely when the result would be contrary to statutory provisions (though these 
cases are very limited because it seems that there are few statutory provisions that 
would contradict that) or when it is generally considered as ‘part of the risk’.169  
The same approach applies in the German cases though the principle of restitution 
is applied in far fewer cases due to the principle of culpa in contrahendo.170 The 
                                                          
168 Though there is a limitation through § 814, where the party knew that there was no contract, 
hence the need to fall back on §§ 311 and 242 BGB.  
169 See for example Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 
(previously discussed in FN 153). 
170 See above on the argument of enrichment as opposed to loss (CH 3.04). 
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conclusion that can be drawn here is that both systems provide a minimum 
protection against gain through blameworthy behaviour at the negotiation stage. 
However, this principle is limited in cases by the protection of the statutory 
provisions.171  
The exception here though is provided by Way v Latilla,172 though this may be 
dependent on the facts, it shows that the English courts would be willing to limit 
the freedom from contract, namely holding that there was a contract even though 
the parties had not agreed on a price, when the German court would not.173  
3.05 No real intention to contract 
The next scenario involves A leading B to believe that they may enter into a 
contract. However, A never had an intention to enter into the contract and later 
ends the negotiations. In contrast to the unjust enrichment scenario there is now 
evidence of the intention of the party breaking off the negotiations. From the 
scenario above it is clear that the minimum recovery for B in both countries lies in 
restitution. The question is whether B may recover damages.    
The German approach to fraud 
The main case for breach of duty to bargain in good faith (§§ 280 I; 311 II (1) BGB 
(Culpa in contrahendo), as shown above, is the feigning of serious negotiations. The 
necessary requirement lies in the ‘qualifizierten Vertrauensbestand’ - the qualified 
                                                          
171 Cf. § 817 BGB, where the recipient has breached a statute or good morals.  
172 Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759 (HL). 
173 Though the German court would probably (in light of § 311 BGB) award reliance damages or 
would have to fall back on § 632 BGB. 
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trust relationship. The breach of the trust relationship, i.e. the breaking off of 
negotiations, leads to compensation on the basis of the negative interest (reliance).  
One party must have unmistakably led the other party to believe that a contract 
would certainly be formed and that party’s breaking off is seen as a grievous 
infringement of the duty of honest behaviour.174 The most common example is 
intentional misbehaviour.175 Interestingly, as the liability arises from the intention 
of the other party not to contract, the liability can arise before the negotiations 
have even been broken off. This was confirmed by a Court of Appeal176 in Stuttgart 
in 2007.177 The claimant, a Swiss company, entered negotiations for the take-over 
of company AS. The defendant was the sole shareholder of company O, which in 
turn was a consultant to company AS. The idea was that a new company, owned by 
the claimant, was to be founded that would hold all the shares of company AS. 
Many meetings followed and the claimant drafted the documents, developed 
business plans and received the confirmation of the bank to support the take-over. 
The defendant took part in a workshop with company O in which they mainly 
discussed remuneration of the board of director and the financial planning for the 
following years.  Shortly afterwards company AS sent the claimant an email stating 
that they were not willing to continue negotiations due to the fact that the 
defendant was unwilling to participate. The defendant then engaged in 
negotiations with AS directly and ultimately took over the company. The claimant 
                                                          
174 Pfister, Festschrift für Werner Lorenz (J.C.B. Mohr Tübingen 1991), p. 166. 
175 BGH NJW 1996, 1885 (Tax Avoidance Case) . 
176 Oberlandesgericht. 
177 OLG Stuttgart WM 2007, 1743 , 1744 ff.  
60 
 
asserted that the defendant used the information gathered during the negotiations 
to further his own interest and always knew that he would be unwilling to contract. 
The court agreed that if the defendant had always known he was unwilling to 
contract he would have been liable. However, in this case the evidence178 – in 
particular the fact that he had attended the workshop – was sufficient to rebut the 
claim that he had always known that he would be unwilling to contract.179 
The English approach to fraud 
In cases where a statement is made fraudulently, the other party will be liable for 
the loss that the fraudulent statement caused. A statement is fraudulent if made 
with knowledge of its falsity, without belief in its truth, or recklessly.180 In Derry v 
Peek181 the claimant had been induced to buy shares in a company after the 
directors of the company had made statements in the prospectus to the effect that 
they would have the right to use steam engines rather than horses on the tram 
lines – this was seen as a great advantage at the time. The Board of Trade later 
refused to give their consent to the use of steam and consequently the company 
went into liquidation. The Court of Appeal held the directors liable on the basis that 
the directors should have known the statement to be untrue. The House of Lords 
                                                          
178 No doubt if the information was not publicly available he could also have been liable for misuse 
of confidential information. This applies to both the German and the English cases. For more 
information see Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of 
Europe (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010), p.425, 426. 
179 See also the hypothetical case discussed in Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith in European 
Contract Law (Cambridge University Press 2000), p.236-238. 
180 Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (HL), 374. 
181 Ibid. 
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reversed the judgment and held that due to the fact that the directors honestly 
believed the statement to be true based on the belief that the consent of the board 
of traders was virtually certain, there was no ground for a claim in fraud.182 By 
contrast, in Brown Jenkinson183 the claimant, on the request of the defendant, had 
issued a clean bill of lading (even though they knew that the goods were in bad 
condition). When the goods arrived damaged the claimants attempted to rely on 
the indemnity given by the defendant against their loss. The Court of Appeal held 
that as the claimants had issued a clean bill of lading with the intention that it 
would be relied on, the requirements for a claim in the tort of deceit were fulfilled 
(and therefore the indemnity was illegal and could not be relied on). There was no 
need to show that the claimant intended to cause any loss.   
Fraud therefore requires the intention to deceive the other party followed by some 
sort of positive representation. Anything less than a deliberate or reckless act could 
only amount to negligent or innocent misrepresentation (see ch 3.08 on 
‘negligently misleading’). A claim in deceit is commonly brought to provide the 
claimant with a remedy in cases where he has been induced into a contract through 
the misrepresentation of the defendant. It is not limited to such scenarios, as 
shown below, and the claimant will be able to rely on the tort of deceit so long as 
he can show, as Cotton L.J. expressed in Arkwright v Newbould184, that the 
defendant has made a statement to be acted upon by others which is false, and 
                                                          
182 Ibid. at 379. 
183 Brown Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd [1957] 2 QB 621 (CA). 
184 Arkwright v Newbold [1881] 17 Ch D 301 (CA). 
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which is known by him to be false, or is made by him recklessly, or without care 
whether it is true or false, that is without any reasonable ground for believing it to 
be true. The requirement is therefore not that the claimant must prove that the 
defendant intended to cause a loss but he must prove an intention to deceive.185 
Whilst Derry v Peek186 involved the inducement into a contract this does not limit 
the scope of deceit to cases in which a contract has ensued. Richardson v 
Silvester187 addressed a misrepresentation at the pre-contractual stage where no 
contract came into existence. The defendant had publicly advertised for the letting 
of a farm and the claimant, on the basis of the advertisement, incurred expenses 
inspecting and valuing the premises. It then became apparent that the defendant 
never had the power to let the property and had advertised the property ‘to serve 
some purpose of his own’.188  The court held that the claimant hat been deceived.  
In the American case of Markov v ABC Transfer & Storage Co 189 the lessor of a 
warehouse misrepresented to the lessee that the lease would be renewed for a 
further three years even though he had an intention to sell the property. The 
property was sold and the lessee, due to the fact that he had to move on short 
notice, lost an important customer. The court held that this would have not 
occurred had the lessor not deceived the lessee and awarded the lessee damages 
                                                          
185 Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (HL), 374 per Lord Herschell. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Richardson v Silvester [1873-74] LR 9 QB 34 (QB). 
188 Ibid. at 34. 
189 Markov v ABC Transfer & Storage CO. [1969] 76 Wn 2d 388 457 p 2d 535 (SC). 
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for the increase in cost for having to move at short notice and damages for the lost 
profits from one of their large clients which they would have otherwise retained. 
It would seem also that in cases in which the defendant represents to the claimant 
that he intends to contract and he honestly holds that belief190, he is free to change 
his mind. However, upon the change of mind he has a duty to inform the 
defendant. In cases where he fails to inform, a case of fraudulent misrepresentation 
may arise. In Slough Estates191 the claimant was granted permission by the local 
council to develop a site. A third party soon obtained planning permission for a 
different site only three miles away for a similar development and the claimant did 
not believe that both could be run profitably. The defendant assured the claimant 
that a tenancy mix agreement would be enforced by the council against C which 
would reduce the competition to the claimant. Later the council and the third party 
entered into a secret agreement that the terms of the tenancy mix agreement 
would be relaxed but continued to represent to the claimant that the agreement 
was still in force. The claimant therefore alleged that there had been a fraudulent 
misrepresentation and the court agreed that there was a misrepresentation from 
the time that the decision was made to relax the terms of the agreement and the 
claimant had not been informed.  
                                                          
190 Otherwise there would be grounds for a case in fraudulent misrepresentation: East v Maurer 
[1991] 1 WLR 461 (CA). 
191 Slough Estates Plc v Welwyn Hatfield DC [1996] 2 PLR 50 (QB). 
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Preliminary conclusions 
Both systems provide a remedy where A has deliberately mislead B as to his 
intention to contract. While the German courts base their decision on the misuse of 
trust placed in the defendant,192 the English courts base their decision on the 
dishonesty of the defendant. Essentially though, the values in both system are the 
same, namely the protection of the claimant against intentional (and reckless) 
dishonesty at the pre-contractual stage that causes loss. This adds to the section of 
unjust enrichment in that there the claimant will only be able to recover the gain to 
the defendant whereas in this case the claimant will be entitled to all his loss 
naturally flowing from the fraud.  
                                                          
192 E.g. BGHZ 76, 343 (Failed Shopping Centre Case) , 349, confirming BGHZ 71, 386 , 395. This case 
will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 3.11. 
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3.06 Negligently misleading 
A case was decided in the High Court which despite the absence of fraud still found 
liability on a tortious basis. 193 In Box v Midland Bank194 the manager of a bank had 
assured the owner of a pylon factory that a credit would be forthcoming (‘a simple 
formality’). The application was later refused by the head-office and the bank 
argued that their manager had expressed no more than his opinion on the matter. 
However, Lloyd J held that ‘the distinction between fact and opinion has become 
less important since the decision […] in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon195.’ 196 The 
manager’s representation as to the existing policy with regard to applications was a 
statement of fact. It must be noted that Box v Midland Bank is still an isolated 
                                                          
193 There are some obvious advantages to a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation in contrast to a 
claim in negligent misrepresentation in that the claimant will not have to prove a special relationship 
or that the defendant had superior skill or knowledge. The claimant will also be able to recover all 
his consequential losses flowing from the deceit. In Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 
(CA) (at 166) Lord Denning held that the ‘amount should not be limited to losses which are 
foreseeable but to repair the actual damage flowing directly from the fraudulent inducement.’ This 
also extends to the loss of opportunity (East v Maurer [1991] 1 WLR 461 (CA)) which would apply in 
cases in which the defendant had entered into negotiations with the claimant in order to avoid him 
entering into a contract with a third party (See for example the American case of Markov v ABC 
Transfer & Storage CO. [1969] 76 Wn 2d 388 457 p 2d 535 (SC)). If the claimant were then able to 
show that the defendant never intended to enter into the contract, he would be able to claim for 
the lost opportunity of the contract with the third party.  
194 William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 (CA). 
195 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801 (CA) . 
196 William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 391, 399. 
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case197 which is yet to be followed by the Supreme Court but it shows that the 
courts are willing to find liability at the pre-contractual stage about the willingness 
of the party to enter into a contract on the basis of negligent misrepresentations.  
3.07 Change of mind 
In the previous cases the assumption was always that there was some form of 
misrepresentation in that one party was being strung along although the other had 
no intention or was in some way unaware that the other had no intention of 
concluding a contract. In contrast, this section analyses the scenario where A has 
every intention to contract with B and therefore enters the negotiations. B incurs a 
loss in anticipation of the contract. However, A then changes his mind (without 
immediately informing B) and later breaks off the negotiations.  
The German Approach 
German law allows for the parties to break off negotiations or even to change their 
minds during the negotiations.198 This is the parties’ freedom of contract.199 
However, this freedom is limited by a general duty not to break off negotiations 
                                                          
197 A search of Westlaw (13.05.2012) proved that the case had only been cited in three reported 
cases. 
198 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 99. 
199 Ibid. p.100. See also the discussion of freedom of contract in Ch.2. 
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without a good reason200 and once the good reason has arisen there is a duty to 
inform the other party that there has been a change of mind.201 
The difference a delay could make is best shown by the following hypothetical case: 
A, the builder of a shopping mall, enters into negotiations with B, the owner of a 
large chain of stores. B sends A plans of the work to be done to the shopping mall in 
order to meet their specifications and despite not having a signed contract, A starts 
work. Up to this point, as long as B still intends to contract and there has been no 
encouragement by B to start the work there is no liability. No contract has come 
into existence as the parties have to have agreed all material terms for there to 
even be an agreement to agree (pactum de contrahendo).202   
B then hears of a different shopping mall being built in the area and knows that he 
will not be able to build a store in both locations.   B therefore decides to contract 
with the other shopping mall but does not inform A. The ‘vorvertragliches 
Schutzverhaeltnis’- the pre-contractual duty to protect the interests of the other 
party - that was created by the taking up of the serious negotiations allows for the 
breaking off of negotiations as long as there is a good reason. A better offer, or in 
this case a better location, would be classed as a good reason. However, the fact 
that he did not inform A when he changed his mind is classed as a breach of the 
                                                          
200 Bassenge and others, Palandt- Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (74th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2015), §311 
RN 30-34. 
201 Ibid, §311 RN 30-34. 
202 Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2011), p. 93-113. 
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pre-contractual duties203 - there is a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith (§§ 
280 (1); 311 (2) (1) BGB). The breach and consequently the liability under culpa in 
contrahendo, therefore, is the feigning of serious negotiations after he changed his 
mind.204  
Above it was shown that feigning of serious negotiations was the culpable act that 
gave rise to liability, in the hypothetical case it is the actual breaking off which 
provides the grounds for liability. Even though A may have informed B of his change 
of mind within a reasonable time (so as to comply with a)), he is unable to provide a 
reason for the breaking off. The threshold for a good reason is not high, however, 
and so a claim in this category is hard to find.205 This was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal in Hamm which was presented with a case in which a producer had 
negotiated with a band. The producer spent a considerable amount on advertising 
material and the band was aware of this. In the end the negotiations failed on the 
basis of objective differences of opinion about the composition of the band. The 
court held that this was sufficient reason to not trigger liability.206 The court put 
forward a similar reason in the Swiss Take-Over Case.207 The fact that the consultant 
                                                          
203 ‘Aus ihr folgt gleichermaßen die Verpflichtung, den Partner vor einem Irrtum über den (Fort-) 
Bestand einer geäußerten, tatsächlich aber nicht (mehr) vorhandenen endgültigen 
Abschlussbereitschaft zu bestimmen Bedingungen zu bewahren‘. (BGH NJW 1996, 1884 ). 
204 See the similar case in Cartwright and Hesselink, Precontractual Liability in European Private Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 64. 
205 Bassenge and others, Palandt- Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (74th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2015), §311 
RN 32. 
206 OLG Hamm NJW 2008 764 , 766.  
207 OLG Stuttgart WM 2007, 1743  
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wanted to take over the company, despite being directly involved, was sufficient to 
remove any liability from the company.   
An extensive search of the main German commentaries in fact and relevant cases 
revealed only one case where there seems to have been a change of mind which 
the court may have was not based on sufficient reason. In the Failed Shopping 
Centre Case208 the local authority promised that a building permit would be issued 
if the claimant could produce a guarantee for 1.5M DM. The local authority then 
changed their mind and asked for a guarantee of 4.5M DM. The claimant alleged 
that the additional 3MDM were entirely exaggerated. The German Supreme Court 
referred the case back to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeal 
was to decide whether the increase of 4.5M DM was justified or merely a reason 
that had been put forward to mask the fact that the local authority had changed 
their mind without a good reason.209 As this is the only decision which indicates 
that the local authority may have been successful on this basis, it seems that the 
balance is tipped, in this case, towards freedom of contract rather than in favour of 
the protection of the trust (or reasonable expectations) in the relationship of the 
parties.  
                                                          
208 BGHZ 76, 343 (Failed Shopping Centre Case) . 
209 Ibid. p. 351. 
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The English Approach  
Promissory Estoppel  
The principle of promissory estoppel as developed by Denning LJ in the case of High 
Trees210 prevents a party from going back on a promise, even though that promise 
had not been backed up by consideration, so long as the promise was clear and 
unequivocal.211 However, promissory estoppel can only be used as a sword and not 
a shield which means that in the cases of breaking off negotiations (where there is 
no previous contractual relation) promissory estoppel would not apply. 
Nevertheless, the Australian case of Waltons Store v Maher212 involved negotiations 
in which Maher started preparatory building work. Walton Stores had indicated 
that the contract would certainly come about. Maher began building work on the 
project of which Walton Stores became aware just a few weeks after they had given 
their oral assurance.  Walton Stores then had a change of heart and instructed their 
lawyers to ‘go slow’ until they broke off the negotiations completely. By this time 
about 40 per cent of the building work had been completed. The Australian courts 
found that Walton Stores were estopped from going back on their promise, using 
estoppel as a cause of action in itself. It is particularly interesting that Mason CJ and 
Wilson J considered the objection that the use of promissory estoppel in this way 
could outflank the doctrine of consideration. However, they both took the view that 
                                                          
210 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (KB). 
211Per Hailsham L.J. in Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 
741 (HL). 
212Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [1988] 164 CLR 387 (HC). 
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the element of unconscionability in estoppel was a sufficiently distinguishing 
feature. The court therefore held that exchange of contracts had in fact taken place 
(i.e. they were estopped from denying that contracts had been exchanged).213  The 
Australian case shows that it is possible to use promissory estoppel in cases where a 
party changes their mind and does not mention that change of mind to the other 
party.214 However, the English courts have rejected the principle of allowing 
promissory estoppel215 to provide the basis of a claim and it seems unlikely that this 
approach is going to change.216  
 The conclusion that can be drawn at this point is that the German and English 
approach in cases where the negotiations were broken off because A changed their 
mind is different (though there is evidence that the same problem has been treated 
differently in Australia which means that the common law system would have the 
capability of following a similar approach to that of the German system by using 
promissory estoppel but has deliberately opted not to). There is an additional route 
that the English courts may be able to take in cases where the party has changed 
their mind, namely negligence liability. In Box v Midland Bank217 the bank manager 
knew (or should have at least known) from the beginning that the loan would not 
                                                          
213 Ibid. p. 446. 
214 See also though the cases of Valbirn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295 (SC) and 
Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. 
215 Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 (CA), though it may form the basis of a claim in Proprietary 
Estoppel (Wayling v Jones [1995] 69 P & CR 170 (CA)); also see below at Ch. 3.09 and Ch. 3.10 
216Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc [2001] CLC 999. 
217 William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 (CA). 
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be approved by the head office. It may be possible to apply the reasoning in Box v 
Midland Bank by analogy to a case the change of mind scenarios mentioned above. 
The liability would have to arise from the fact that the person that had changed 
their mind had not informed the other party of their decision. However, a difficulty 
is that in Box v Midland Bank the manager seems to have known or should have 
known from the beginning (i.e. they should have known better) which is different to 
a scenario where they did not know any better when they entered negotiations but 
had a change of heart later. Several writers have expressed their doubt about the 
future of Box v Midland Bank mainly because it flies in the face of the English 
approach to look after one’s own interests and not those of another.218 Further 
there is also the general hostility of English courts towards claims for pure 
economic loss219 and also the fact that, as mentioned above, this would limit the 
freedom of contract as an English concept.220 There is even more hostility to pure 
economic loss in Germany,221 however, this seems to be justified on the basis that 
this can be circumvented through the use of § 311 BGB. 
                                                          
218 Markesinis and Deakin, Tort Law (4th edn, Oxford: Claredon Press 1999), at p. 93; Giliker, ‘A Role 
for Tort in Pre-Contractual Negotiations? An Examination of English, French, and Canadian Law’ 
(2003) 52 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly , 978. 
219 Giliker, ‘A Role for Tort in Pre-Contractual Negotiations? An Examination of English, French, and 
Canadian Law’ (2003) 52 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 978. 
220 See Ch. 3.02. 
221 See § 823 BGB. 
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3.08 Changing the terms 
The scenario in Ch. 3.07 has already marked a difference in approach but in those 
cases A in fact broke off the negotiations. In this next scenario A does not end the 
negotiations. Both A and B are aware that there is no contract yet and B is 
encouraged to incur a loss. However, then A decides to significantly alter the terms 
on which they are prepared to contract.  
The German Approach 
In the Tax Avoidance Case222 the claimant had rented the ground floor of a property 
and in the summer of 1989 the defendant bought the property and decided to 
expand the property, divide the property and ultimately sell off the individual parts. 
In 1991 the plaintiff and defendant entered negotiations for the purchase of the 
ground floor. The parties agreed on a price of 750.000 DM. The defendant asked for 
the purchase not to be completed formally until the end of the year for tax reasons 
and the plaintiff agreed.  The plaintiff adapted the property for his use. In 
December of 1991 the plaintiff approached the defendant to arrange a date to 
formally complete the purchase at which point the defendant revealed that he 
would not be willing to sell the property at less than 1 Mil. DM. The court 
acknowledged that generally until the contract has formally been entered into each 
party is responsible for their own expenditure.223 The defendant argued that the 
requirement of form had not been fulfilled (the requirement under § 313 BGB). The 
court held though that by assuring the other party that they would enter into the 
                                                          
222 BGH NJW 1996, 1885 (Tax Avoidance Case). 
223 With reference to BGH NJW-RR 1989, 627 .. 
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contract, that party could not rely on the requirement of form because this would 
be contrary to good faith and so in effect gave way to the contract. The argument 
here is that this is a further example of balancing several values. The first is the 
liability for blameworthy conduct in a contractual context (in this case it is the 
promise that a contract will ensue on specific terms). The second principle is to 
protect the provisions of the BGB in this case the requirement of form (§ 313 BGB) 
which in itself is limited by the protection against misuse of those provisions 
contrary to good faith. The court concluded here that the fact that the defendant 
had put the plaintiff into a position of higher risk of incurring a loss (through 
promising to complete the contract) that this justified an increased duty to take 
into account the interests of the other party.224 The argument would therefore be 
that the relationship of the parties creates an obligation to inform the other party 
that they are mistaken which in itself is a protection of the informal trust, which is 
the ‘blameworthy conduct’ which the courts are protecting the plaintiff against. 
The English Approach 
A similar case to the German case reached the House of Lord in 2008. In Cobbe v 
Yeoman’s Row225, Mr Cobbe, a developer, had been encouraged to incur expenses 
in obtaining planning permission for a development. A representative of Yeoman’s 
Row had orally agreed that he would obtain planning permission to demolish the 
building and build a new development. After that Yeoman’s Row would sell him the 
                                                          
224 This argument is particularly prevalent in the mistake cases where culpa in contrahendo creates 
an obligation to inform the other party of their mistake (see Ch 4.6). 
225 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55. 
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freehold for a certain price. Both parties were aware that there was no contract in 
place. Part of the oral agreement was that some of the houses would be sold and 
that half the proceeds would be handed over. The value of the property increased 
significantly and Yeoman’s Row decided to first ask for £12m upfront and then later 
demanded £20m upfront. Lord Walker226 started by expressing that proprietary 
estoppel is not ‘a sort of joker or wild card to be used whenever the court 
disapproves of the conduct of a litigant who seems to have the law on his side227 
and went on to explain that such an approach would impair the certainty of such 
transactions.228 The judgment in Cobbe shows that the facts that the claimant knew 
of the nature of the transaction and had knowledge and experience of the 
industry229 and that the agreement was subject to contract precluded him from 
succeeding in proprietary estoppel.230 A further difficulty in Cobbe was the fact that 
the terms of the agreement were not clear: ‘They reach[ed] an oral agreement in 
principle’.231 As with the former doctrine of part performance,232 for the court to 
enforce and agreement on the basis of proprietary estoppel, the terms of that 
                                                          
226 Ibid.  
227 Ibid. at [46]. 
228 Ibid.  at [81]. 
229 ‘[H]e ran a commercial risk with his eyes open’ (Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] 
UKHL 55 at [91]). 
230 Cobbe did not leave with empty hands which would have left the defendant unjustly enriched. 
Cobbe was awarded the quantum meruit to cover the value of the services rendered including all the 
expenses he had reasonably incurred. 
231 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55 at [2] per Scott of Foscote L.J. 
232 See for example Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust of Canada (C.I.) Ltd [1986] AC 207, at 224. 
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agreement must be clear and unequivocal. This did not preclude the court from 
awarding damages on a quantum meruit basis for unjust enrichment though.  
The judgment in Cobbe was followed by the recent case of Haq v Island Homes 
Housing Association,233 where Mr Haq had agreed with the Council, subject to 
contract, that he could extend his shop onto the Council’s neighbouring land. The 
signing of the document was delayed and the Council allowed Haq to enter the land 
(by handing over the keys) and extend his property, which he did. The agreement 
went through several stages with several meetings, making minor amendments to 
the draft contract and requesting different plans. Mr Haq was allowed access to the 
property and started building work on the property. The Council knew of the 
building work and noticed that some elements of the work did not conform with 
the plans that had been submitted. Three years after the draft contract had been 
created the council sent Mr Haq the draft documents but failed to execute them. 
Half a year later the Council sold the property to a housing association who were 
unwilling to extend the lease on the terms that had been manifested in the draft 
contract. The court had no difficulty in finding that the council had led Mr Haq to 
believe that the documents would be executed234 but found that no belief had been 
created that the lease had already been granted.235 The fact that Mr Haq was never 
under the belief that there was no need for the signing of the documents ensured 
                                                          
233 Haq v Island Homes Housing Association [2011] EWCA Civ 805 (CA). 
234 Ibid. at [48]. 
235 Ibid. at [50]. 
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that there was no claim in proprietary estoppel.236 The fact that the council allowed 
access to the grounds to extend the property was held to be nothing more than a 
temporary licence and ‘it did not, by the same conduct, waive the requirement that 
the documents should eventually be signed and exchanged, when they were agreed 
in their final form’.237  This judgment falls in line with Lord Scott’s dicta in Cobbe 
that ‘Mr Cobbe did not spend his money and time […] in the mistaken belief that the 
agreement was legally enforceable. He spent his money and time well aware that it 
is not.’238 
However, in the American case of Hoffman v Red Owl Stores,239 where Red Owl 
Stores encouraged Hoffmann to sell his bakery (and confirmed that the amount he 
had put aside for the franchise was sufficient), later increased the price which lead 
to the negotiations coming to an end. Particularly interesting in this case is that the 
court only awarded reliance damages. In fact, at Ch. 3.07 it was suggested that in 
cases where one party changes their mind during negotiations it may be worth 
considering negligent misrepresentation.240 In response to Hofmann v Red Owl 
Stores241 it has been suggested that this may have been a more appropriate 
                                                          
236 Ibid at [73] and [83]  per Lord Lloyd. 
237 Ibid. at [71]. 
238 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55 at [27]. 
239 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis2d 683, 133 NW2d 267 (1965). 
240 By analogy to William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 (CA). 
241 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis2d 683, 133 NW2d 267 (1965). 
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response than to rely on promissory estoppel.242 In fact the result would have on 
the facts been exactly the same. The conclusion that can be drawn at this stage is 
that the English approach is much narrower where the other party knows that the 
form has not been complied with.243 Although promissory estoppel is unlikely to be 
taken by the English courts there is some argument to be made that the same 
result to Hoffmann v Red Owl Stores could be achieved through analogy with Box v 
Midland Bank.244 What can be seen from the above is that the English courts 
recognise fault-based liability to a certain extent (Ch. 3.05, 3.06, 3.07). The 
difference in relation to the German approach seems to be a different 
understanding of what in fact constitutes fault. In the English cases liability is based 
on fraud or negligent misrepresentation which is then limited by the fact that the 
English courts are reluctant to impose liability for economic loss. In contrast the 
German system is starting from the point of view that there is a duty to avoid harm 
to the other and breach of that duty is then considered ‘fault’. The next section will 
draw on parallels between the systems where it would seem that the parties have 
reached agreement but have not (for various reasons) fulfilled the statutory 
requirements of form.  
                                                          
242 Feinman, ‘The Last Promissory Estoppel Article’ (1992) 61 Fordham Law Review 303, 315: 
‘Hoffman can hardly be understood on the basis of promissory estoppel doctrine[...]. [I]t may be 
better understood as a tort case involving negligent misrepresentation of a peculiar kind.’ 
243 For a discussion of Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55 see Goymour, 
‘Cobbling Together Claims where a Contract Fails to Materialise’ (2009) 68 The Cambridge Law 
Journal 37. 
244 William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 (CA). 
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3.09 The Noblemen 
This scenario is rather similar to the above in that both parties are aware that they 
have not entered into a contract yet. However, the reason for not doing so is 
because A has persuaded B that there is no need to formally enter into a contract 
because they are noblemen.  
The German Approach 
In the Christmas Bonus case245 the claimant lived in a house rent-free as part of his 
remuneration as an employee. On two occasions the defendant confirmed that as a 
Christmas bonus the house would be conveyed to him. He assured him ‘upon his 
word as a nobleman’ and that any notarial conveyance was unnecessary. The 
former German Supreme Court held in favour of the defendant. The reasoning was 
that the claimant knew what formalities were necessary and should have known 
better than to rely on ‘a nobleman’s word’.  
German courts clearly distinguish between the case where knowledge of formal 
requirements is present but one party misleads the other into believing the 
requirements have been fulfilled and the situation where despite knowledge of the 
need for formal requirements one party believes and trusts the other that it will 
eventually be taken care of. The difference in approach represents the courts 
balancing of the parties’ interests as opposed to the purpose of the statutory 
provisions, which is to provide certainty, particularly in relation to the sale of land. 
It is for this reason that the actual agreement will only be enforced (contrary to the 
                                                          
245 RGZ 117, 121 . 
80 
 
statutory requirements of §§ 313; 125 BGB) if the result would otherwise be totally 
unbearable. The threshold for being totally unbearable is high in that it must 
destroy or substantially threaten the existence of the party, or the other party must 
have gravely offended against the principle of good faith.246 This, however, does not 
eliminate a claim for enrichment under § 812 I 1BGB.247   
The English Approach 
The English approach must again refer to Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row248 (see above Ch. 
3.08). B’s knowledge that there is no contract is lethal to a claim in proprietary 
estoppel though there is still the possibility of recovery for unjust enrichment (see 
Ch. 3.04 above).  
3.10 Form 
The noblemen scenario showed that there was a similar approach taken in the 
German and English courts in cases where they know that there is a form 
requirement and agree not to comply. However, the case is different when A leads 
B to believe that there is no form requirement at all (and B is unaware of the 
requirement).  
The German approach 
A case came before the German courts in 1965 where a couple had signed a 
document explaining the detailed plans for a house and the way in which the 
                                                          
246 See BGHZ 85, 315 ,318 f. in Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2000), p. 259. 
247 Note also § 818 II BGB. 
248 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55. 
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property was to be financed.249 The document also contained a provision which 
stated that on completion of the building the agreement was to be transferred into 
a legally binding contract for the sale of the property. This was never done and the 
defendant attempted to evade liability by relying on the lack of form. The court 
held that the couple had been induced to sign a contract that they believed 
contained all the valid clauses. The developers on the other hand were, or should 
have been, aware of the fact that the document had no legal force and therefore 
had a pre-contractual duty to inform the couple about the absence of statutory or 
contractual form for the contract.250 Rather than finding that a contract existed the 
courts therefore found that there was a requirement to inform and that this 
requirement then provided a possibility to circumvent the requirement of form.251 
If the buyer is therefore ignorant to the requirements of form and the seller is held 
to have the knowledge of the requirement, then the seller has a duty to inform the 
buyer.252 Generally, breach of a pre-contractual duty leads to compensation on a 
                                                          
249BGH NJW 1965, 812 ; see also BGHZ 6, 330 and BGHZ 18, 248 . 
250 BGH NJW 1965, 812 , 814. 
251 This has also been applied to cases where the other party knew that the contract was illegal. See 
BGHZ 99, 101 for a translation of the case see Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law 
of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p.605 (Case 27). 
252 Note that pre-contractual duties of disclosure will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 4.06. 
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reliance basis.253 However, there may be liability on a tortious basis (§ 826 BGB) 
which will also lead to liability for pure economic loss .254 
The English Approach 
The problem of s. 2 of the Law of Property Act 1989 (LPA 1989) 
The Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s. 2 replaced the Law of 
Property Act 1925 s. 40 as of September 1989. Previously contracts for the sale of 
land that were not supported by writing were enforceable if there had been ‘part 
performance’.  The principle of part performance meant that if the claimant had 
started performing their side of an oral contract in the expectation that the 
defendant would perform their side of the agreement, the court would not allow 
the defendant to avoid his liability of the agreement merely on the basis of the 
statute and would order specific performance,255 giving way to the original 
contract. For example, in Steadman v Steadman256 a payment made by the husband 
to his wife of £100 arrears of maintenance was held to be sufficient to be part 
performance of an oral contract that the wife would transfer an interest in the 
matrimonial home. However, mere preparatory arrangements in view of a contract 
                                                          
253 For a differentiation of the two see BGHZ 99, 101 for a translation of the case see Markesinis, 
Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2006), p.605 (Case 27).  
254 However, the threshold is very high. See Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of 
Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p.99. 
255 Dickenson v Barrow Dickinson v Barrow [1904] 2 Ch 339 (CD); Rawlinson v Ames Rawlinson v 
Ames [1925] Ch 96 (CD) . 
256 Steadman v Steadman Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536 (HL). 
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are insufficient to give rise to part performance.257 The doctrine of part 
performance seems to therefore have been developed to provide the courts with 
the ability to give way to justice in cases in which the defendant was attempting to 
rely on the 1925 Act in order to escape the bargain he had struck.258  
 
The Law Commission reviewed the law on the formalities for contracts for the sale 
of land which lead to the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.259 
The Law Commission decided that the doctrine of part performance had become 
‘very confused’260 and that the doctrine was to be abolished due to the fact that 
estoppel and the law on negligent/ fraudulent misrepresentation were appropriate 
remedies.261 Although s. 2 LP (MP) A 1989262 actually abolishes the doctrine of part 
performance, the Law Commission found that it was inherent in the requirement 
for the contract to be in writing and this has been followed by the courts.263 The 
current state therefore is that s. 2 (1) of the 1989 Act can only be circumvented if it 
falls within s. 2 (5) of the 1989 Act - on the basis of a collateral contract, 
                                                          
257 Clerk v Wright Clerk v Wright [1737] 1 Atk 12 (CC); Cooth v Jackson Cooth v Jackson [1801] 6 Ves Jr 
12 (CC); Daulia Ltd v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd [1978] Ch 231 (CA). 
258 Per Lord Reid in Steadman v Steadman [1976] AC 536 (HL), at 561. 
259 Commission, Transfer of Land: Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc. of Land (Law Com No 164, 
1987). 
260 Ibid. at 5.4. 
261 Ibid. at 5.5. 
262 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. 
263 See Singh v Beggs [1996] 71 P & CR 120 (CA). 
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constructive trust or equitable estoppel - which has given rise to an increase in 
recent case law. 
 
The question of whether proprietary estoppel could be used to avoid s. 2 (1) of the 
1989 Act was first raised in Yaxley v Gotts264. Here it was argued that according to 
Halsbury’s Laws265 ‘the doctrine of estoppel may not be invoked to render valid a 
transaction which the legislature has, on grounds of general public policy, enacted is 
to be invalid […]’. Beldam L.J., chairman of the Law Commission which had made 
the recommendations for the changes to the Act, explained that […] the general 
principle that a party cannot rely on an estoppel in the face of a statute depends 
upon the nature of the enactment, the purpose of the provision and the social policy 
behind it[…]’266 and that therefore proprietary estoppel is not caught by s. 2  of the 
1989 Act. Walker L.J. in the same judgment found a constructive trust rather than 
addressing the issue of proprietary estoppel. Walker L.J. also held that in light of 
Gissing v Gissing267  the ‘two concepts coincide […] in the area of a joint enterprise 
for the acquisition of land’, meaning the concept of constructive trust and 
proprietary estoppel. The judges therefore agree that due to the close link between 
constructive trusts and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, proprietary estoppel is 
included in the exceptions listed in s. 2 (5) of the 1989 Act. 
                                                          
264Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162 (CA) . 
265 Halsbury’s Laws, vol 16 (4th edn), para 962. 
266 Ibid at 191. 
267 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 (CA). 
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Proprietary Estoppel 
With the requirement of form cases it must be assumed that the form relates to an 
interest in land and therefore proprietary estoppel may apply.268 There are two 
circumstances in which the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may take effect. The 
first is in cases of ‘acquiescence’, where the claimant is under a mistaken belief that 
he has an interest in the land and the landowner encourages his belief or stands 
by269 in the knowledge that the claimant is mistaken.270 The mistake has therefore 
arisen from the claimant himself. In the second situation the defendant encourages 
by his conduct271 or representation,272 with the intention that the claimant would 
rely on it,273 the belief in the claimant that he has or will have a legally enforceable 
interest in the land. The belief was therefore created by the defendant rather than 
the claimant. 
For a claim in proprietary estoppel to succeed there must also have been a 
detriment to the claimant. This detriment will often lie in the fact that upon the 
representation or conduct of the other party the claimant has incurred a cost by, 
                                                          
268 If it does not then the only other possibility would be to look to promissory estoppel – see Ch. 
3.07. 
269 Ramsden v Dyson Ramsden v Dyson [1866] LR 1HL 129 (HL). 
270 Willmott v Barber Willmott v Barber [1880] 15 Ch D 96 (CD).   
271 Thorner v Major Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (HL) (where the promisor was a man of ‘few 
words’). 
272 Dillwyn v Llewelyn [1862] 45 ER 1285 (QB). 
273 E.g. Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (HL); Ramsden v Dyson [1866] LR 1HL 129 (HL). 
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for example making changes to the property274 or working for the defendant for 
free.275 Until there has been a detriment to the claimant the representation by the 
defendant can be revoked,276 eliminating a claim in proprietary estoppel.277  
However, that detriment must be substantial, in other words it would be ‘unjust or 
inequitable to allow the assurance to be disregarded’278 and the court will take into 
account any benefit the claimant may have derived from the arrangement. In Henry 
v Henry279 the court weighed the detriment of caring for the promisor against the 
benefit he had received by living in the property for free. 
In Actionstrength Ltd. v International Glass280 the House of Lords held that it was 
important to uphold the purpose of statutory provisions and not to enforce invalid 
executory agreements. Actionstrength, the subcontractor, had not received 
payment and was threatening to withdraw their staff. International Glass agreed 
orally to guarantee the payment of their subcontractor. The subcontractor went 
into liquidation and Actionstrength turned to International Glass for payment. The 
House of Lords held that: 
                                                          
274 E.g. in Dillwyn v Llewelyn [1862] 45 ER 1285 (QB). 
275 E.g. in Gillett v Holt [1998] 3 All ER 917 (CD) or Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (HL). 
276 Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 FLR 806 (CD) . 
277 However, note that in Gillett v Holt [1998] 3 All ER 917 (CD) it was held that after 40 years the 
promises were more than a statement of revocable intention. 
278 Ibidat 232. 
279 Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3 (PC). 
280 Actionstrength Ltd (t/a Vital Resources) v International Glass Engineering IN.GL.EN SpA [2003] 2 
AC 541 (HL). 
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‘for in seeking to show inducement or encouragement Actionstrength can rely on 
nothing beyond the oral agreement of St−Gobain which, in the absence of writing, is 
rendered unenforceable by section 4. […]The result would be to render nugatory a 
provision which, despite its age, Parliament has deliberately chosen to retain.’281 
In Kinane v Mackie-Conteh282 the defendant had encouraged the claimant to 
believe that the signed agreement which purported to secure a charge on a house 
in exchange for a loan was sufficient. The question put before the court was 
whether this was sufficient to circumvent the requirement of s. 2(1) of the Law of 
Property Act 1989 (‘A contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land 
can only be made in writing and only be incorporating all the terms which the 
parties have expressly agreed in one document or, where contracts are exchanged, 
in each’). The purpose of the requirement of formality according to the law 
Commission was threefold. Firstly it was cautionary, to ensure that the maker 
realised was he was doing, secondly, it was evidential and thirdly it was meant to 
ensure that third parties could identify the purpose of the document.283 
The court in Kinane v Mackie-Conteh284 found that a combination of constructive 
trust and estoppel had been established to fall within the exception of s. 2 (5) of the 
Law of Property Act 1989 and Neuberger L.J. 285 stated that S. 2 of the 1989 Act 
                                                          
281 Per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
282 Kinane v Mackie-Conteh [2005] EWCA Civ 45 (CA). 
283 Commission, Working Paper No. 93 - Transfer of Land, Formalities for Deeds and Escrows (1985), 
p 4-5. 
284 Kinane v Mackie-Conteh [2005] EWCA Civ 45 (CA). 
285 Ibid. at [40]. 
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could not be circumvented just because fairness so demanded. He went on to 
conclude that ‘if it is merely a proprietary estoppel, then section 2 (5) may well not 
assist Mr Kinane, and his case would run into the same difficulties as that of the 
party seeking to enforce the guarantee in Actionstrength.’286  
Neuberger L.J. continued to find that ’the essential difference between a proprietary 
estoppel which does not also give rise to a constructive trust, and one that does, is 
the element of agreement, or at least expression of common understanding, 
exchanged between the parties, as to the existence, or intended existence, of a 
proprietary interest, in the latter type of case.287’ Neuberger L.J. therefore used the 
proximity of the doctrine of constructive trust to the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel to include the latter in the exceptions of s.2 (5) and Mr Kinane was 
therefore able to succeed in invoking s. 2(5) of the Act. However, Arden L.J.  took a 
different approach and avoided the assimilation of the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel with that of a constructive trust. She found that ‘[…] s. 2 (5) plays a role 
similar to that of part performance, although it operates more flexibly than that 
doctrine.288’ In comparison to Neuberger L.J., Arden L.J. found that proprietary 
estoppel fell within s. 2(5) of the Act. However, the uncertainty created through the 
abolition of the doctrine of part-performance is not the only hurdle the claimant 
will have to overcome in succeeding in a claim of proprietary estoppel.  
                                                          
286 Ibid. at [45]. 
287 Ibid. at [51]. 
288 Ibid. at [32]. 
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To exemplify the difference, in 1990 the case of JT Developments289 came before 
the Court of Appeal in which Mr and Mrs Quinn owned a coffee shop. The lease 
came to an end and the landlord served a notice. The Quinns failed to serve the 
counter-notice but in a telephone conversation the landlord promised that the 
lease could be extended on the same terms as were also applicable to the 
landlord’s other properties. Mr Quinn then carried out improvements by installing a 
new kitchen and the court held that the terms were sufficient enough to give rise to 
proprietary estoppel. In this case the landlord had only led Mr & Mrs Quinn to 
believe that a new lease would be created, not that a new lease was in place. 
However, two points must be noted in this case. The first is that the court was not 
yet faced with the restrictions of s.2 Law of Property Act 1989 and secondly that the 
terms on which the lease was to be extended were clear.  
It would therefore seem that the English courts have moved away from allowing 
the form requirement to be circumvented in line with the purposes set out by the 
Law Commission. This comes down on the one hand to certainty but also to the 
protection of the statute, a value that has been more prominent in the German 
cases than in the English. In fact at this stage it could be argued that the protection 
of the statute is merely incidental because it requires the same action to be taken 
by the courts as inserting certainty into the law. The protection of the statutory 
provisions reappears in the next section.  
                                                          
289 JT Developments Ltd v Quinn JT Developments v Quinn [1991] 62 P & CR 33 (CA).  
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3.11 Informal Reliance 
This case is similar to the form cases in that the parties have not complied with the 
formal requirements in order to transfer land. However, the difference is here that 
the party relied on an informal assurance that an interest in the land would arise.  
The German Approach 
In the ‘Farm Inheritance Case’290 the owner of the farm had promised it to his son if 
he continued to work on the farm. The son worked on the farm for many years and 
returned to it on his father’s request after completing his army duties. In the last 
few years before the father’s death there had been some disagreement between 
the son and his parents which led the father to amend his will. Upon his death, the 
father’s will stated that the farm should be transferred to the daughter. The court 
acknowledged that a fundamental principle was that the father was able to 
distribute his belongings in the way he saw fit but that in this case the fact that the 
son had informally relied on his statement and incurred a loss (in this case the fact 
that the other children went to university, he left the military etc.) meant that this 
result was contrary to good faith.291 The court further held that although the 
transfer of land usually requires the contract to be in writing in this case there was 
no need due to the surrounding factors. The principle that the son has incurred a 
loss through the blameworthy behaviour of the father remains the same (the 
blameworthy behaviour in this case being the fact that he did not give effect to his 
promise). The competing values though are slightly different in this case: on the one 
                                                          
290 BGHZ 12, 286 . 
291 Ibid, at 304. 
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hand there is the requirement of form in the BGB (see the Tax Avoidance Case292 
below) on the other hand there is the principle that the father should have the 
freedom to distribute his assets as he wishes. This final point is in fact similar to that 
in the Failed Shopping Centre Case293 where the courts were protecting the 
autonomy of the party to enter (or not enter) into the contract. The reliance of the 
son on the father’s promise though overrides both the final considerations. It could 
here be argued that that by making the promise to his son the father entered into a 
quasi-contractual relationship with his son that meant that he had to take into 
account his interests. 294 
The English Approach 
In 2009 the House of Lords was confronted with the case of Thorner v Major295 
where the uncle, by his conduct, had represented that an interest in the property 
would arise. The court took a less strict approach to the requirements of the 1989 
Act and thereby followed Dillwyn v Llewlyn296 and Re Basham.297  
A distinction between commercial and domestic claims was made by Lord Walker in 
Cobbe298 where asserted that ‘in the commercial context the claimant is typically a 
business person with access to legal advice and what he or she is expecting to get is 
                                                          
292 BGH NJW 1996, 1885 (Tax Avoidance Case) . 
293 BGHZ 76, 343 (Failed Shopping Centre Case) . 
294 See § 815 BGB. 
295 Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (HL). 
296 Dillwyn v Llewelyn [1862] 45 ER 1285 (QB). 
297 Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498. 
298 Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (HL). at [68]. 
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a contract. Mr Cobbe was also a property developer with substantial knowledge of 
the market, which would support the theory that as long as the parties are aware of 
the legal position they will not have redress to promissory estoppel.  
Nevertheless, it does leave the mystery of the decision in JT Developments v 
Quinn.299 In Haq v Island Homes300 Mr Haq had used his solicitor throughout the 
transaction. Mr & Mrs Quinn did not. They relied on the statements by the landlord 
which could provide evidence that they did not have sufficient knowledge of the 
process.  
Despite not being the decisive factor, it would seem that the court will take into 
account the fact of whether the parties were acting within a commercial setting, 
with access to legal advice or industry specific knowledge. It can therefore be 
argued that as long as it can be shown that the parties did not have access to legal 
advice and did not have experience of the market, but relied on the statement of 
the other party, they may have redress to proprietary estoppel. 
Though proprietary estoppel only applies to cases involving property, there is a 
similar approach to that taken by the German courts. The restriction on the 
circumvention of the Law of Property Act is an indication that the English courts are 
supporting a similar value to the German courts, namely the protection of the 
statutory provisions. However, it also seems that the English courts are restricting 
the scope of contracts and thereby restricting the form requirements in order to 
                                                          
299 JT Developments v Quinn [1991] 62 P & CR 33 (CA). 
300 Haq v Island Homes Housing Association [2011] EWCA Civ 805 (CA). 
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give way to the opposing value, namely reasonable reliance. Reasonable reliance in 
these cases seems to equate to what in Germany has been termed ’trust 
relationship’. These two values will appear in later chapters so for the moment it 
will suffice to bear in mind the balance that both jurisdictions are striking between 
protecting the effect of the statutory provisions301 and protecting reasonable 
reliance (or the trust relationship).    
The conclusion that can be drawn from Ch. 3.08 - 3.11 is that the English courts, in 
protecting the statutory requirements of form, are narrower in their approach. This 
means that in cases where there is a requirement of form the German courts have 
been more willing to refuse the party relying on the requirement to do so on the 
basis that they are protecting the aim of the statutory provisions. 
3.12 Tendering cases 
Tendering cases have been provided with their own section because they seem to 
pose quite a distinct problem. In most tendering cases there is quite a significant 
investment in the preparation of the tender documents and in contrast to simple 
negotiation cases there is an expectation that the tenders will be considered if they 
have complied with the formal procedures.302 Tendering cases reappear in Chapter 
4 but there the discussion centres on mistakes in the tender documents which is 
                                                          
301 Note that later ‘protection of the statutory provisions’ will have different connotations. 
302 See below the cases of BGH NJW 1993, 520 (Oolitic Stone Case) for Germany and Blackpool and 
Flyde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA) for England. 
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linked to the decisions here in terms of the binding nature of tenders that have 
been submitted.303  
To set the scene, the central question in the cases is whether entering into the 
tendering process creates any obligations on the parties or whether the party that 
has called for tenders is free to either dismiss or not even consider tenders.  
The German approach 
In the Oolitic Stones case304 the plaintiff was invited to submit a tender for the 
delivery of stones that was limited to 6 tenderers. Three tenderers responded. The 
first was the plaintiff, who made an offer according to the specifications of DM 
237,430.65. The second was Messer who submitted a tender that did not 
correspond to the type of stone requested in the tender with an expert’s report on 
the suitability of the stones for the project. The final tender was incomplete. The 
contract was awarded to Messer and the plaintiff argued that the defendant had 
not complied with the terms and conditions of the tender, and that Messrs should 
not have been considered. The court agreed and awarded the claimant the positive 
interest.305 In the more recent Hospital Sale case306 the Court of Appeal in Munich 
(OLG) explained that in tendering cases a trust relationship is created which means 
that (a) there is an expectation that a party’s tender will be considered and (b) that 
                                                          
303 See Ch. 4.9 
304 BGH NJW 1993, 520 (Oolitic Stone Case) . 
305 The decision was approved in the later case BGHZ 49, 77 – although it failed on a different point 
(lapse of time). 
306 BGH MDR 2008, 736 (Hospital Sale Case) . 
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the parties will be informed if circumstances of the tender change during the 
process. Though the BGH reversed the decision of the OLG on the ground that the 
decision not to use the tenderer had already been made before the circumstances 
had changed, they confirmed that the tender process can lead to a trust 
relationship.  
In conclusion, the German approach is that if the party is able to show that they 
would definitely have been awarded the contract had the correct procedures been 
followed then they will be compensated in line with the positive interest.307 The 
inference thereby being that they are no longer protecting the reasonable reliance 
on pre-contractual statements but that they are in fact protecting the expectation 
that the pre-contractual statement created. It was shown above that one of the 
reasons that the courts would not hold that a contract exists (or award the positive 
interest) is that culpa in contrahendo is not aimed at creating a duty to contract – 
Kontrahierungszwang – but will protect the reliance. The rationale would be that 
had the party wanted to sufficiently protect their expectation interest then they 
should have entered into the contract. This is further supported by the approach in 
the tender cases on the basis that there is no more the party could have done to 
ensure that a contract would be formed i.e. they correctly submitted the tender 
that should have won.   The second conclusion is that the pre-contractual duties 
arise from a trust relationship between the parties. 
                                                          
307 For an explanation of the positive and negative interest see Mehren, International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law: Remedies for Breach of Contract, vol 07 (Mohr Siebeck Verlag 1976), p.31. 
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This conclusion is interesting because it shows that the freedom of contract (here 
specifically the freedom not to be bound by a contract) is balanced against the trust 
that is created by entering the tendering process. If the expectations that the 
invitor creates (which it seems is ‘the trust’) are not met then the court will find 
blameworthy behaviour. We see a similar approach in the English cases but based 
on other values.   
The English Approach 
The main English case in this area is Blackpool and Flyde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool 
Borough Council308 where the tenders were supposed to be received by 12 o’clock. 
The plaintiff placed the tender documents in the letter box at 11 o’clock but the 
letter box was not cleared by the council staff at 12 o’clock and as a consequence 
the tender was marked as having been received late. The tender was therefore 
never considered. Lord Bingham held that the council were in breach of a collateral 
contract. The contract was to consider the tender application and the defendants 
were in breach of that contract.309 The result would have been the same in 
Germany. However, the English courts ensured that this judgment was limited to 
the facts of this case (mainly on the grounds that there were few tenderers and the 
fact that the procedure had been made clear by the invitor). Lord Bingham held […] 
where, tenders are solicited from selected parties all of them known to the invitor, 
                                                          
308 Blackpool and Flyde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA). 
309 ‘[…], counsel for the club was in my view right to contend for no more than a contractual duty to 
consider. I think it plain that the council’s invitation to tender was, to this limited extent, an offer, 
and the club’s submission of a timely and confirming tender an acceptance.’ […]. 
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and where a local authority’s invitation prescribes a clear, orderly and familiar 
procedure […] the invitee is in my judgment protected at least to this extent: if he 
submits a conforming tender before the deadline he is entitled, not as a matter of 
mere expectation but of contractual right, to be sure that his tender will after the 
deadline be opened and considered in conjunction with all other conforming 
tenders[…].’ 
The English approach does not seem to go quite as far as the German in that the 
German courts were willing to interfere with the decision making process so long as 
the expectation had arisen on the basis of trust between the parties. The English 
courts balance the freedom of contract (just as the German courts) against the 
other party’s expectations but not from the trust relationship but from a 
contractual right.   
3.13 Conclusion 
This chapter set out by drawing the base-line at unjust enrichment (Ch. 3.04). It is 
clear that in cases where negotiations are broken off that the party that has 
benefitted from the breaking off of negotiations in both systems310 will at the least 
have to return the gain. In addition both systems provide additional mechanisms 
for the parties to recover their losses in cases where the negotiations are broken off 
due to the fault of the other party. The important conclusion that can be drawn 
though is that the definition of ‘fault’ differs in both systems. In Germany the 
underlying principle is to avoid harm to the other party at the pre-contractual stage. 
                                                          
310 Though the German courts have no need to rely on the principle of unjust enrichment due to 
other devices.  
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This is based on the fictional trust relationship between the parties which means 
that in cases where the party changes their mind, changes the terms, convinces the 
other party that all requirements of form have been completed, or breaks off 
negotiations for no reason, he will be liable for the negative interest (but which will 
include economic loss). Fault is therefore the neglect of the interests of the other 
party. 
In the English system, on the other hand, fault must (in the absence of proprietary 
estoppel cases) be negligent misrepresentation (and here it was shown that the 
principle can be stretched) or fraud. The courts in tortious cases are particularly 
reluctant to impose liability for economic loss. The underlying principle in the 
English cases therefore is that they will not impose liability for fault at the stage of 
breaking off negotiations. By therefore using the tortious devices liability for pure 
economic loss is limited. Only in cases where the courts can find a separate contract 
(and this again goes to the definition of ‘fault’) will the court provide a remedy in 
tendering cases. The conclusion therefore is that the difference in the underlying 
understanding of what fault is leads to the scope of the fault principle in English law 
being narrower than that in German law.    
Chapter 4 – Mistake  
4.01 Introduction  
This chapter shows a certain continuation of themes from the last chapter. This will 
apply in two ways: the first is from a doctrinal point of view in that pre-contractual 
duties are in some cases used by the German courts to fill the gaps in the law of 
mistake in order to achieve the desired result. The second way in which the themes 
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are continued is that certain understandings, for example as to the definition of 
fraud, which differs between Germany and England, reappear. 
Similar to the previous chapter there are several underlying values/theories that 
underpin both jurisdictions and which lead, one way or another, to the same result, 
for example  economic theory, risk allocation, the will theory and certain exceptions 
(e.g. in cases of joint venture).311   
The aim of the chapter will first be to explain the basis of the German approach, 
from the approach taken by the Roman law theorists through to Savigny’s will 
theory. The development will show a reliance on the autonomy of the individual as 
a principle and therefore reliance, in terms of perspective, on the mistaken party, as 
opposed to the English approach where the reliance is on the objective theory and 
the objective expression of assent. The different approach to mistakes then 
ultimately leads (for example through the relationship of § 119 (1) BGB and § 122 
(1) BGB where the non-mistaken party was unaware of the mistake) to different 
results. From those values alone the conclusion can be drawn that the history of 
mistake has influenced the approach to mistake and thereby injects certain 
fundamental values, e.g. the party’s will, the autonomy of the individual, into the 
reasoning.  
The second aim will be to unravel the reason for the different understanding of 
fraud and dishonesty in the context of mistake (and also pre-contractual non-
disclosure). These values may not necessarily be reflected in the BGB and Ch. 4.8 
                                                          
311 Though note that these values/theories are in some cases limited by different values.  
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(using calculation errors as an example) will show the other methods German 
courts have employed to reach the desired result. The fact that the statutes may 
not have represented the desired law also proved a willingness to fudge the strict 
theoretical approaches in order to achieve results which turn out to be similar to 
the results achieved by the English courts.  
The final aim of the chapter will be to highlight a new underlying value which will 
also reappear in chapter 6, namely the protection of society as a whole. The historic 
context will provide some indication that certain foundational cases occurred 
during a time that was particularly receptive to the idea of protecting society as 
whole. The value itself will be sub-divided into firstly discouraging harmful 
behaviour (i.e. requiring information to be disclosed which has been acquired in a 
way that is wrongful – a shared value) and protection of the individual against 
generally harmful behaviour or unbearable results (and thereby protecting 
society).312  
The conclusion will be that there are several underlying values in the German and 
English approaches. Some of these values/ theories (e.g. the objective theory of 
assent, protection against informational imbalance and freedom of/from contract) 
are similar but are used to a different extent. Other values are much more 
pronounced in one system and almost non-existent (or at least not expressed) in 
the other (e.g. protection of society or protection of the BGB).313  
                                                          
312 See Ch. 4.6 and Ch. 4.10. 
313 Ibid. 
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4.02 The History of Mistake in Germany 
The starting point for the German history of mistake has to be Roman law.314 In 
ancient Roman law only the declaration, rather than the intentions of the parties, 
counted.315 Later, reflected in the writings of Ulpianus, it becomes apparent that for 
a valid contract there must be consent and that if the parties are not ad idem then 
there is no consent.316  The main categories that emerged were the error in corpore 
(where the purchaser assumes he is buying the Cornelian estate and the buyer is in 
fact selling the Semporian estate – dissens as to the subject matter of the 
contract),317 error in pretio (where the parties are not ad idem as to the price), 
error in negotio (where the parties did not agree on the nature of the transaction), 
the error in persona (where the party is mistaken as to whom he is dealing with) 
and finally the error in substantia (where wine is sold as vinegar or bronze as 
lead).318 The final category is what seemed to provide the Roman lawyers with 
some difficulty319 and, as will be shown later, still provides a similar difficulty today. 
                                                          
314 See for example Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 1998), p. 145. 
315 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996); p. 587. 
316 Ibid p. 588. 
317 There are three scenarios that could be envisaged here but to the Roman lawyers the distinction 
did not seem to matter); ibid; p. 590. 
318 MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Hart Publishing 2010), p. 18-26. 
319 Marcellus believed that the mistake was irrelevant but Ulpian disagreed - Zimmermann, The Law 
of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon Press 1996); p. 593. 
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In cases in which the error fell outside the categories the contract remained valid 
and the parties were left without a remedy.320 The Roman approach therefore did 
not really provide a logical theoretical framework for the law of mistake but it does 
provide a useful categorisation of the different types of mistakes.321  
Grotius was the first to attempt to find an underlying theory to the law of 
mistake.322 He based the mistake on the ‘promissio’ – the promise. Grotius was of 
the opinion that the contract could only be void if its underlying condition turned 
out not to exist.323 Grotius had to acknowledge though that the underlying 
condition was based solely on the party making the promise and would cause 
difficulties in relation to the reliability of the promise. He would therefore allow 
compensation against the party who had caused the mistake or who had not 
expressed themselves enough as to avoid the mistake, however, still expressing the 
problem of mistake as one of the fault on the part of the promisor.324 Pufendorf 
expanded the theory of Grotius in that he distinguished between the ‘Promissum’, 
                                                          
320Ibid; p. 590. 
321 MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Hart Publishing 2010), p.14. 
322 See the account of Diesselhorst, Die Lehre des Hugo Grotius vom Versprechen (Boehlau Verlag 
1959), p. 91-105. 
323 See the account of Haupt, Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom Irrtum beim Rechstgeschaeft seit der 
Rezeption (Verlag Hermann Boehlaus 1941), p. 26-29. 
324 According to Catharine MacMillan Grotius’ theory is impossible to apply because the reasons for 
his theory have been omitted (MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Hart Publishing 2010), p. 35). 
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the unilateral promise by one party and the ‘Pactum’, the bilateral promise.325 It 
was in relation to the ‘Pactum’ that Pufendorf (unlike Grotius) differentiated 
between error in motive and error relating to the object of the promise.  
It was Thomasius326 in 1730 who argued that dolus – fault – lies with the promisor if 
he did not express the conditions underlying the contract or did not with sufficient 
clarity explain the conditions of the contract. An error in motive, i.e. in the motive 
for entering into a contract, is irrelevant, whether found to exist before or after the 
agreement, so long as it had not been made a condition.327 Thomasius further 
argued that even a mistake relating to the object of the agreement is only then of 
importance, i.e. can lead to the contract being void, if it had been specifically made 
part of the agreement. Thomasius therefore advocated the theory that mistakes 
were generally irrelevant: ‘error in dubio semper nocere debet errant’. In fact it 
would seem that Thomasius was incorporating the mistake into the contract by way 
of a condition which would then lead to a breach of contract (rather than a mistake) 
and with that approach he did not really move far beyond what Grotius and 
Pufendorf had already suggested.  
                                                          
325 See the account of Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, 
p. 85. 
326Thomasius, Instutiones Jurispurdentiae Divinae (Scientia Verlag 1730); see Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung 
de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, p. 86. 
327 See the account of Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, 
p. 85. 
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After Thomasius three strands of the theory of mistake developed. Coccejus and 
later Hufeland, Jacob and Bauer advocated that a contract was generally void if 
there was no consensus between the parties.328 It was therefore irrelevant whether 
the fault for the dissent lay with the party who had erred or whether the error had 
been created by the non-erring party. An interesting side note is that Bauer, who 
later came to claim that the mistake would have to be visible to the other party and 
would have to be proved by the party in error, was one of the teachers to Savigny, 
who will be discussed shortly, during his student days in Marburg.329  
The second strand was developed by Titius and Heineccius.330 Only if there was 
proof of fault by the non-erring party in creating the mistake, would the contract be 
void for mistake. Gundling, as part of the third strand, advocated that the contract 
could only be classed as void for mistake if the declaration mistake or mistake as to 
substance had been fraudulently or negligently caused by the non-mistaken 
party.331 In cases where only one of the parties was mistaken, the mistake could 
only be legally relevant if it related to the main purpose of the contract and the 
                                                          
328 Ibid. p.85. 
329 Ibid. p.85. 
330 See the account of Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis 
zum BGB (Boehlau Verlag 2000), p.267 – 270. 
331 See the account of Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, 
p. 90 – 91. 
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mistaken party, according to Gundling, would always have to compensate the other 
(even without fault), except if the other party knew of the mistake.332  
In 1756 the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis (CMBC), took a more 
conservative view. It followed the principle of error nocet erranti, the error harms 
the mistaken person.333 It only considered a one-sided mistake as to the content to 
be legally relevant if the non-mistaken party had caused the mistake fraudulently or 
negligently and the mistake related to a fundamental element of the contract.334 If 
the mistake related to the essence of the contract and was caused by the other 
party, the contract could be rescinded.335  Although the code did base the error on 
a lack of the party’s ‘will’336 there is no evidence to suggest that a one-sided error 
                                                          
332 Gundling, Schwehre Lehre, XXI, p.236 in ibid, p. 90 – 91. 
333 According to Schermaier the CMBC follows the approach taken by Thomasius. See Schermaier, 
Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB (Boehlau Verlag 2000) , 
p.351; Cf Wieacker, Privatrechtsgescheichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
deutschen Entwicklung (Jurisprudenz in Einzeldarstellungen) (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1996), p. 
237. 
334 Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis IV, I, § 25::’Ad 3tium giebt der Irrthum keinen 
hinlaenglichen Fug zur Annulierung einer Convention, ausgenommen unter folgenden zwey 
Requisiten: Erstlich muss er sich in einem Haupt-Umstande ereignen, anerwogen blosse Nebendinge, 
soferne sie nicht aussdruecklich in Bedingniss gebracht sind, diessfalls nichts zur Sache thun. 
Zweytens muss solcher nicht von einem Dritten, sondern von dem gegentheiligen Compaciscenten 
selbst Dolo vel Culpa veranlasst seyn, sonst faellt er mehr dem Irrenden, als einem anderen zur Last.  
335 Ibid III, 1, § 17. 
336 Ibid IV,1, § 25: ‚Nichts ist dem Consens und freyen Willen mehr entgegen, als Zwang, Betrug und 
Irrthum.’ 
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(e.g. an error in declaration) could lead to the contract being rescinded.337 As a 
consequence of the approach of referring to the main element of the contract, the 
mistake as to substance could only be legally relevant if it was an essential 
characteristic of the main element of the contract and they mistaken party had 
been misled by the other party, and this is evidenced in the approach taken by the 
ABGB much later.338 
The Badische Landrecht (BLR) of 1809 took a slightly different approach.339 It stated 
that the mistake could be a ground for invalidity of the contract unless the mistaken 
party had caused the mistake (see below).340 The BLR therefore returned to the 
principle that the dissent was the focal point of the doctrine of mistake and 
therefore denied the differentiation between the individual mistake by one party 
and the bilateral mistake, first proclaimed by Pufendorf (and partially seen in the 
CMBC above). Hellfeld in 1779 argued that in a bilateral mistake the contract should 
be void so long as the mistake related to an essential element of the contract 
(essential negotii), on which the will of the contracting parties was mainly set.  In 
                                                          
337Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB (Boehlau 
Verlag 2000), p.351; Cf. Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 
81, p. 90 ff. 
338 See § 871 ABGB. 
339 Art. 1110 Badisches Allgemeines Landrecht 1809: ‘Nur derjenige Irrthum macht den Vertrg 
nichtig, der das Wesen der Sache oder die Eigenschaft des Vertrags betrift, hingegen keineswegs 
derjenige, der nur die Person angeht, mit welcher man uebereinkommen will, es waere dann, dass 
Ruecksicht auf eine bestimmte Person die Haupt-Ursache der Uebereinkunft waere.‘  
340 Art. 1110a ibid: ‘Auch derjenige Irrthum entkraeftet den Vertrag nicht, der selbstverschuldet ist‘.  
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contrast in cases where the bilateral mistake did not relate to the essential 
elements of the contract, despite the mistake being bilateral, the contract would 
continue to exist. The BLR therefore took a strict approach (similar to the CMBC) to 
mistake by only allowing the dissensus mistake and there would only be a dissensus 
mistake if it was not caused by one party for example not inspecting the goods 
when he could have.341 
Whilst Gundling had related the unilateral mistake (as to content) to whether the 
other party had fraudulently or negligently caused the mistake, Hellfeld accepted 
the principle of fault (‘dolus’) more widely. 342 This meant that where Gundling had 
not seen any possibility for the mistake in a bilateral error to be relevant, Hellfeld 
allowed the one-sided mistake, so long as the mistaken party had not brought the 
mistake upon himself, i.e. he had not self-induced the mistake, and the non-
mistaken party knew of the mistake.343 This shift in thought, namely that the 
mistaken party must be ‘at fault’ for their mistake becomes apparent in the 
following case: if the non-mistaken party had no knowledge of the mistake (and did 
not induce it) and the mistake was not self-induced, Hellfeld would consider the 
mistake legally relevant but Gundling would not.  
                                                          
341 See Art. 1110a ibid. 
342 Later developed by Von Jhering, Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und 
deutschen Rechts (4th edn, F. Maucke (accessed via: Digitale Bibliothek des Max-Planck Institut für 
Europäische Rechtsgeschichte) 1861). 
343 See the account of Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, 
p. 103. 
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The system by Hellfeld was later adopted by scholars such as Bauriedl344 and 
Weiss345, as well as Glueck, Liekefett and Koechy.346 In 1817 Thibaut, inspired by 
Roman law, proclaimed that the contract would only be void in cases of a dissent 
between the parties (quia consensus deficit). This meant that Thibaut saw particular 
difficulties with the one-sided error which the other party was unaware of. Motives 
by the parties remained irrelevant except in cases in which the motive had been 
expressly made part of the contractual arrangement or one of the parties wrongly 
believed that he was required by law to enter into the contract. However, Thibaut 
was the first to discuss mistakes as to quality in the context of an error in motive 
and to differentiate between dissensus mistakes and the one-sided mistake.347 
The law of mistake therefore has undergone a bit of a rollercoaster ride, with the 
focus remaining on the dissens of the parties for most of the time. Only with 
Pufendorf did the idea of the motive surface, which was then combined by 
Thomasius with the fault aspect. The final approach advocated by Hellfeld seems to 
mainly rely on the fault element but he also differentiated between the one-sided 
mistake and dissensus. In all these cases the foundation of the law of mistake 
                                                          
344 Bauriedl, Theoretisch-praktischer Commentar ueber die Pandecten nach Anleitung des 
Hellfeldschen Lehrbuchs, vol 1 (Bayreutg 1789), p. 186-188. 
345 A further teacher to Savigny during his time in Marburg.  
346 According to Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, p. 
122-125. 
347 Though it is not really sure why he did that in light of the fact that he does not allow the one-
sided mistake unless it has been caused by the others fault (See ibid, p. 108). 
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seemed to be the ‘dissens’. It is Savigny who questioned this approach with a wider 
approach to the will-theory.    
Savigny  
Thibaut348 was the starting point for Savigny’s approach.349 Savigny differentiated 
between the mistake relating to the object (or essence) of the contract and the 
error in motive.350 Generally, Savigny held the error in motive to be irrelevant. He 
then further divided the mistake relating to the essence of the contract into ‘legally 
relevant’ (wesentlich) and ‘not legally relevant’ (unwesentlich).351 Mistakes which 
he regarded as being legally relevant were cases of a dissent as to the identity of 
the matter of the contract, mistake as to the quantity which also included the price 
(here he made further qualifications), mistake as to the existence of the matter of 
the contract and mistakes as to the identity of the other contractual party.352 
The error in declaration according to Savigny was disturbance of the natural 
relationship between the will and the declaration. This divergence leads to an 
incorrect appearance of the will.353 In consequence, this automatically nullifies the 
declaration. Savigny then established that the error in declaration was an unreal 
                                                          
348 Ibid, p. 140. 
349 Though also note the relationship between Thibaut and Savigny in Ch. 2.1. 
350 Savigny, System des heutigen Roemischen Rechts, vol 3 (Veit und Comp 1840), p. 242. 
351 Ibid, p. 336ff. 
352 For a brief overview of Savigny’s work see Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ 
(1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, p. 114 -126. 
353 ‘(…) vielmehr sind sie schon ihrem Wesen nach als verbunden zu denken.’ Savigny, System des 
heutigen Roemischen Rechts, vol 3 (Veit und Comp 1840), p.258. 
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(‘unechter’) error, as the error was not the positive reason for the voidability. It was 
the absence of the will which was the negative reason for the voidability.354  
It is from here that Savigny developed the differentiation between error in 
declaration and error in motive.355 In the case of the error in motive there was no 
disturbance of the natural relationship between the will and the declaration – they 
were the same.356 However, the will itself was based on a mistake and for this 
reason the mistake could not be legally relevant.357  Despite this change in 
approach Savigny decided to uphold the general approach to mistakes by dividing 
them into errors in negotio, in persona, in corpore and in substantia even though he 
was aware of the fact that the error in substantia was not consistent with his 
differentiation between the error in declaration and the error in motive.358  
After Savigny had already differentiated the error in declaration from the error in 
motive in relation to the mind-set of the erring party, Zitelmann continued this 
                                                          
354 ‘Sie ist also stets von einem Irrthum begleitet, aber dieser ist noch der positive Grund des Schutzes, 
welcher dem Irrenden gegen Nachteil gewaehrt wird, sondern dieser Grund ist ganz negative, die 
blosse Abwesenheit des Willens, wodurch allein dieser Nachteil begruendet werden koennte.’ ibid 
p.263. 
355 Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, p. 115. 
356 Ibid. 
357 ‘Der Irrtum an sich hat in der Regel gar keine Wirkung(…)’ Savigny, System des heutigen 
Roemischen Rechts, vol 3 (Veit und Comp 1840) p.114. 
358 Particularly as the error in substantia often did have the conforming will and declaration. See 
Kramer, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 1 (6th edn, C. H. Beck 
2012) § 119 Rn 2. 
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theory and declared the error as to the qualities of the subject matter was equal to 
the error in motive and therefore not legally relevant.359  
Luig argues360 that Savigny’s theory of the legally relevant mistake is based on 
whether the other party was able to recognise the error. However, Noda361 points 
out that in contrast to the ABGB - the Austrian civil code that based their approach 
on Gundling’s analysis - where the error in calculation was only legally relevant if 
the error could or should have been known by the other party, for Savigny, an error 
in calculation was always an error in declaration and the contract was to remain 
valid except that the erroneous amount was to be substituted by the correct 
amount. Nevertheless, Savigny places much emphasis on the requirement for 
objective proof by the erring party to show that he really erred. In other words a 
mere mental reservation was not a legally relevant error because the party would 
not be able to prove he had erred and only the objective proof would be considered 
sufficient.362 In contrast to previous writers Savigny did not differentiate between 
mistakes that had been made by one of the parties or both parties.  
With the emergence of Savigny’s theory, that the will of the parties was the 
foundation of a contract, the approach to mistake changed. Zitelmann picked up 
the fundamental idea of the will theory and the first proposal for the BGB followed 
                                                          
359 Zitelmann, Irrtum und Rechtsgeschaeft: eine psychologisch-juristische Untersuchung (Duncker & 
Humboldt 1879),  p. 433. 
360 Luig, ‘Savignys Irrtumslehre’ (1979) VIII Ius Commune 36, p. 46. 
361 Noda, ‘Zur Entstehung de Irrtumslehere Savignys’ (1989) 16 Ius Commune 81, p. 123.  
362 Ibid, p. 126. 
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his proposal in that errors as to the quality of the subject matter were classed as 
not legally relevant (§ 102 first draft of the BGB), just like an error in motive. Error 
in declaration was also classed as not legally relevant in cases in which the mistaken 
party was grossly negligent (§ 99 (1) first draft of the BGB). In cases of mere 
negligence (§ 99(2) first draft of the BGB) liability was based on fault (in accordance 
with von Jhering’s theory363) with the exception that if the other party knew or 
should have known of the mistake (§ 99 (3) first draft of the BGB), the error would 
be classed as legally relevant. 
The second proposal of the BGB also followed a less dogmatic approach. Instead of 
the agreement being invalid in cases of a legally relevant mistake, the party could 
challenge the agreement.364 It therefore moved away from the contract being 
considered void, to the contract being considered voidable.365 This move provided 
the mistaken party, in cases of a legally relevant error, with a choice to either affirm 
the contract or to rescind the contract.  
The drafters of the second proposal were unwilling to find that an error as to 
motive was never legally relevant and therefore decided that it should be left open 
for legal science to potentially characterise the error in persona and in corpore, and 
                                                          
363 See Ch. 3.03.  
364 Mugdan, Die Gesammten Materialien zum Büergerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, vol 3 
(R. v. Decker 1899), p.  220-222. 
365 Ibid, p.  220-222. 
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in particular in qualitate as errors in mistake.366 They left it open by adding § 119 (2) 
BGB which states that 
‘An error as to those characteristics of a person or thing which are regarded in 
business as essential is regarded in the same way as an error as to the content of a 
declaration.’    
Von Jhering in his theory on culpa in contrahendo identified how a mistake that 
made the contract void meant that the person least at fault would end up carrying 
the burden of the mistake.367 The route taken by the BGB is a less direct reliance on 
the fault principle368 in that it is not the party that made the mistake who needs to 
be at fault – he is liable under § 119 (1) BGB. The fault element is considered in 
relation to the non-mistaken party under § 122 BGB. The fault principle is therefore 
whether the non-mistaken party should have warned the mistaken party and is 
therefore at fault. The consequence would then be that the mistaken party would 
not have to compensate the non-mistaken party.  
The result is that the BGB imposes a duty on the party rescinding the contract to 
compensate the other for their losses sustained relying on the validity of the 
contract. Looking back to Savigny’s original ideas, the mistake was purely based on 
                                                          
366 Ibid, p.246. 
367 See Chapter 3.03. 
368 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996), p. 587. 
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the subjective view of the party making the mistake.369  The first version of the BGB 
took a very subjective view and was criticised.370 The combination of the criticism 
and Boerner’s idea of the objective causality, 371 i.e. the objective analysis (rather 
than the subjective) of whether the other party would have entered into the 
agreement,372  lead to what is now § 119 BGB. This has meant the integration of the 
subjective criteria (i.e. was the mistake the reason to conclude the contract) and 
the objective criteria (i.e. would it have been reasonable for the mistaken party not 
to enter into the contract) into the law on errors of declaration. The compromise 
being though that the other must be compensated for their loss in reliance on the 
declaration (unless they knew or should have known of the mistake § 122 (2) BGB). 
This historical analysis has shown that the discussion has generally focused on what 
the Romans identified as consensus ad idem. Originally it seem that only objective 
mistakes would be considered legally relevant. Even Pufendorf’s error in motive 
relied on the objective identification of the error. Savigny’s idea to base the mistake 
                                                          
369 Though there was a need to objectively prove that there was a mistake (see above). 
370 See particularly Leonhard, Heinsheimer and Enneccerus, Gutachten und Vorschlaege zum 20. 
Deutschen Juristentag, vol 1 (1981), at 11.2.3.3 and 11.2.4.2. 
371Börner, ‘Gegenvorschlag zum 20. Deutschen Juristentag’ ’ in Gutachten und Vorschläge zum 20 
Deutschen Juristentag, vol 1 (1981), at 11.3.2.2 and 11.4.1.1. 
372 Dernburg summarised the principle as: ‘Der Irrthum muss naemlich von solchem Gewicht sein, 
dass man nach Auffassung des Verkehrs und nach der Erfahrung annehmen kann, der Irrende haette 
das Geschaeft nicht abgeschlossen, wenn er das Sachverhaeltnis gekannt haette’ see Schermaier, Die 
Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB (Boehlau Verlag 2000), FN 
396. 
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on the subjective intention of the party changed the perception of what consensus 
ad idem was – i.e. a subjective dissens. This idea, combined with the element of 
fault, led then to the balance of §§ 119 and 122 BGB.373 The next section will show 
though that the reliance on the will-theory brings with it some fundamental 
conceptual and practical problems.  
4.03 The Will Theory in Practice 
Savigny’s will theory fits in well with the strong protection of the autonomy of the 
individual in German law.374 The private autonomy of individuals is expressed by 
the German phrase of ‘Selbstgestaltung durch Selbstbestimmung’ – ‘self-design 
through self-determination’ which leads to the conclusion that should there be any 
flaw in the process of self-determination, then the declaration loses the main 
                                                          
373Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p.265; Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen §§ 90 - 124; §§ 130 - 133 (Allgemeiner Teil 3) (14th edn, 
Sellier de Gruyter 2014) § 119 RN 2. 
374 In fact the German constitution protects the autonomy of the individual: Art. 2 Grundgesetz: ‘(1) 
Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Recht anderer 
und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetzt verstößt. (2) Jeder hat das 
Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit. Die Freiheit der Person ist unverletzlich. In diese 
Rechte darf nur auf Grund eines Gesetztes eingegriffen werden. Translation: (1) Every personal shall 
have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. (2) Every person shall have the 
right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be 
interfered with only pursuant to a law.’ See also Ch. 2.02 on general norms and their relationship to 
the German constitution.  
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reason for the legal effect of the declaration.375  Stepping back for a moment from 
the idea of mistake, the protection of the will must begin earlier in the contracting 
process, something that Savigny also discussed.376 So what happens if the party 
never had the intention of entering a contract at all? The famous ‘Trier Wine 
Auction’377 example comes to mind, where the buyer attends a wine auction and 
during the auction waives to a friend. The auctioneer interprets the waiving as the 
highest bid. On the basis of the will theory there can never have been a declaration 
since he never ‘willed’ to make any such declaration. In other words there would be 
no contract and therefore no reason to compensate the auctioneer under §122 
BGB.  
The difficulty with the approach in the Trier Wine Auction378 case is that objectively 
there seemed to be a declaration and the other party (just as in von Jhering’s 
examples) may have expended money on the belief that there was a contract. In 
the Bank Guarantee Case’379 the bank sent a letter to a firm, confirming that it had 
guaranteed the debts of one of their customers. The firm then attempted to 
enforce that guarantee against the bank and the bank had to admit that they had 
provided an incorrect statement of fact and that they had no subjective intention of 
                                                          
375 Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen 
§§ 90 - 124; §§ 130 - 133 (Allgemeiner Teil 3) (14th edn, Sellier de Gruyter 2014); § 116 RN 3. 
376 Savigny, System des heutigen Roemischen Rechts, vol 3 (Veit und Comp 1840), p. 258. 
377 Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010), p. 453-454. 
378 Ibid.  
379 BGHZ 91, 324 (Bank Guarantee) . 
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entering into a contract. The court held that even if the party did not intend to 
consent to enter into the contract he will be held to have expressed his consent if 
he knew or should have known that the other party would (and in fact did) believe 
it to be valid consent.380 This fits well with the analysis of von Jhering of fault at the 
contractual stage. The proof of fault was that they must have (or should have 
known) that their statement would be received as consent and are therefore bound 
by the contract. The objection that could be raised here is that the will is not 
adequately protected. This is when § 119 BGB provides the protection of the parties 
will in that the moment the other party notices that they have made a mistake they 
can rescind the contract. If the other party has incurred a loss through the reliance 
on the statement (back to von Jhering) the mistaken party will have to compensate 
for the reliance loss through § 122 BGB. The court’s argument therefore was that 
the private autonomy of the individual was sufficiently protected by § 119 BGB 
because the self-design is not only predicated on the protection of the will of the 
individual but also on the trust of the other party.381  In contrast then to the Trier 
                                                          
380 Ibid, at 71: ‚Eine Willenserklärung liegt bei fehlendem Erklärungsbewußtsein allerdings nur dann 
vor, wenn sie als solche dem Erklärenden zugerechnet werden kann. Das setzt voraus, daß dieser bei 
Anwendung der im Verkehr erforderlichen Sorgfalt hätte erkennen und vermeiden können, daß seine 
Erklärung oder sein Verhalten vom Empfänger nach Treu und Glauben und mit Rücksicht auf die 
Verkehrssitte als Willenserklärung aufgefaßt werden durfte […]‘. 
381 Ibid, at 70: ‘Das Recht der Willenserklaerung baut nicht nur auf der Selbstbestimmung des 
Rechtstraegers aud; es schuetzt […] das Vertrauen des Erklaerungsempfaengers und die 
Verkerhssicherheit […]‘. 
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Wine Auction case382 it seems like the courts have moved away from the strict 
application of the will theory on the basis that the private autonomy is protected 
through the law of mistake.  
The bank guarantee case383 also added a second layer to the law of mistake. They 
held that the contract could only be rescinded if the erring party brings the error to 
the attention of the other party without delay. The court therefore concluded that 
§ 119 (1) BGB could not apply in this scenario due to the delay (two weeks) 
between the party knowing that they were mistaken and informing the other of the 
mistake. The reason was that according to § 121 (1) BGB the bank had a duty to 
rescind the contract without undue delay and had failed to comply.  
Coming back to the actual mistake cases, where it is clear that the mistaken party 
meant to make a declaration but did not mean to make that declaration and the 
other party knew that, the joint will (rather than the declaration) will prevail. In the 
Rubel case384 a loan had been provided in roubles but was to be repaid in marks. An 
error was made in calculating385 the exchange rate and the wrong amount was 
entered into the contract. The court held that the parties clearly meant to contract 
on the basis of the actual rate on that day and it was therefore a case of falsa 
                                                          
382 Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010), p. 453-454. 
383 BGHZ 91, 324 (Bank Guarantee) . 
384 RGZ 105, 406 (Rubel Case) a similar case is LG Kleve WM 1991, 2060 (Dinare case) . 
385 Note Ch. 4.8 on the errors in calculation. 
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demonstration non nocet.386 This principle is generally used to rectify agreements in 
which both parties did not express in the contract what they actually meant. In the 
‘Shark Meat’ case387 for example the buyer and seller thought they were 
contracting for the sale/purchase of whale meat when they used the word 
‘Haakjoeringskoed’, the Norwegian word for shark meat. The court held that the 
parties had really meant to contract for whale meat and amended the document 
accordingly. This principle of falsa demonstration non nocet, though not part of § 
119 BGB, serves to demonstrate the supremacy of the will over the declaration of 
the will.  
Preliminary conclusion 
Ch. 4.2 showed how the will theory developed and later became entrenched in the 
BGB. There is therefore the historic and dogmatic reasoning for the existence of the 
principle as a fundamental part of the German system and therefore a fundamental 
element of the legal thought (and as such a value). However, the balance between 
impeaching on the other’s rights (as was shown in Ch. 4.2 as the limit of the 
individual’s freedom) and protecting the reasonable reliance seems to have been 
struck through the notion of ‘fault’. The understanding of what fault is seems to 
have developed out of the principle of culpa in contrahendo as developed by von 
Jhering. It is the reliance of the non-mistaken party on the declaration of the other 
                                                          
386 This does not apply to all cases of error in calculation. Compare for example RGZ 101, 107 (Silver 
case)  or BGHZ 139, 177 . 
387 RGZ 99, 147 (Shark Meat Case) .  
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that must be protected when there is no contract or when there has been a 
mistake.388   
The conclusion therefore must be that the protection of each party’s will is a 
fundamental value (expressed through principles such as falsa demonstration non 
nocet). However, each party’s will is not protected equally, as it would seem that 
the emphasis in the German cases is the protection of the mistaken party’s will and 
the non-mistaken party’s will (to contract) is only protected as to the reliance 
interest. A further value which is expressed through the protection of the will is the 
autonomy of the individual (expressed through the strong protection from 
contracts). Ch. 4.4 will look at the specific instances in which § 119 (1) BGB is used 
and the relationship to § 122 BGB. It will confirm the conclusion that the focus is on 
the protection of the will and the need for the reliance based compensation of the 
non-mistaken party as a consequence.  
4.04 Mistake as to Terms in German Law 
§ 119 (1) BGB encompasses two types of mistake. The first is the mistake in 
declaration389 and the second as to the content of the declaration.390 In cases 
where there is an error in declaration the mistaken party knows what they want to 
say/write but does not actually say/write that. Examples here included cases where 
                                                          
388 Mistake at this stage is only meant to encompass the mistake in declaration and the mistake as to 
content (not the mistake as to quality or motive).  
389 ‘Wer bei der Abgabe einer Willenserklaerung […] eine Erklaerung dieses Inhalts ueberhaupt nicht 
abgeben wollte[…]‘. 
390 ‘Wer bei der Abgabe einer Willenserklaerung ueber deren Inhalt im Irrtum war […]‘. 
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the mistaken party places the decimal point in the wrong place.  In this case A 
would be able to rescind the contract under § 119 (1) BGB but would be liable to B 
for any reliance damages under § 122 BGB (unless the non-mistaken party knew of 
the error - § 122 (2) BGB). It was also shown in Ch. 4.3 that in cases where the non-
mistaken party knows what the mistaken party meant to say the court may rectify 
the contract through falsa demonstratio non nocet.391    
In cases where there is an error as to the content the person making the 
declaration knows what they are saying/ writing and has every intention to 
say/write it. However, they believe the word to mean something else. An example 
in this case would be where A states that they would like to sell apples but in fact 
believes the word apple to mean pear. In this case A would be able to rescind the 
contract under § 119 (1) BGB but would be liable to B for any reliance damages 
under § 122 BGB.392 393 
In the toilet paper case394 the assistant principal of a school ordered 25 gross rolls of 
toilet paper. The order form contained many detailed provisions and one of these 
                                                          
391 Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010), p.452 -456. 
392 See for example LG Hanau NJW 1979, 721 (Toilet Paper Case) , where the seller did not know that 
the word ‘Gros’ had a special meaning. 
393 It should be noted that this does not include cases in which the mistaken party deliberately does 
not read what he is signing. Exceptions apply where the mistaken party has a rough idea but the 
document is something entirely different (I believe I am signing a phone contract when in fact it is a 
sale contract for a car).  
394 LG Hanau NJW 1979, 721 (Toilet Paper Case) . 
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stated that ‘gros’ meant 12 X 12 which meant that she was ordering 3600 rolls of 
toilet paper. The assistant principal meant to order 25 large = ‘gross’ rolls, ’gross’ 
being the German word for large. The court held that the defendant was mistaken 
as to the meaning of their declaration and that therefore the school can avoid the 
contract. Of course the school would have had to compensate the company for 
their reliance on the statement under § 122 (1) BGB. However, the court held that 
the claimant knew or should have known of the mistake. Firstly because of the 
spelling error with the word ‘gros’ and secondly because of the surrounding 
circumstances (i.e. a small school would not need 3600 rolls) and therefore the 
school was not liable for the reliance loss (§ 122 (2) BGB). The principle of falsa 
demonstration non nocet cannot be applied to this scenario because it would bind 
the non-mistaken party to a contract that they had never agreed to. In line with the 
argument put forward in Ch. 4.3 this would be imposing a will on the party that 
they did not have and would therefore be limiting the autonomy of the non-
mistaken party, contrary to the protection from contracts.  
In both circumstances, error in declaration and error as to content, the will of the 
mistaken party is protected through § 119 (1) BGB. More importantly the mistaken 
party is protected from a contract that subjectively they did not mean to enter into 
whether this was known to the other party or not. § 122 (1) BGB softens the blow 
for the non-mistaken party who relied on the declaration but only to the reliance 
interest and only if they did not know and ought not to have known of the mistake. 
In cases like the Toilet Paper case395 the interesting factor is that the court held they 
                                                          
395 Ibid. 
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should have known of the mistake. This in turn creates an obligation on the non-
mistaken party to ensure that the mistaken party has not made a mistake. In other 
words in the Toilet Paper Case396 the company should have asked the assistant 
principal whether she really intended to order 3600 rolls of toilet paper. This is a 
point that will be picked up later in Ch. 4.10, the error in calculation section but for 
now it indicates that the German system expects the interests of the mistaken party 
(to a certain extent) to be taken into account by the non-mistaken party. 
4.05 Mistake as to Terms – English Law 
The approach to mistakes as to terms in English law hinges on whether the other 
party knew (or in some cases ought to have known) of the mistake. It would seem 
that the relevant factors in the decision of the courts are first whether the mistake 
was known or whether it merely should have been known to the reasonable man. 
The second point is whether the contract was written or oral. The final point then 
relates to whether the contract should be rectified or whether the contract should 
be set aside. The first fundamental difference to the German approach is that 
consensus between the parties is measured objectively. In Smith v Hughes397 
Blackburn J held: 
If whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable 
man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, 
and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man 
                                                          
396 Ibid. 
397 Smith v Hughes [1871] 6 LR 597 (QB).  
124 
 
thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to 
the other party’s terms.398    
However, the line is drawn where the other party knew of the mistake as to terms. 
In Hartog v Colin Shields399 the mistaken party mixed up ‘per pound’ and ‘per piece’ 
making the product significantly cheaper. The court held that there was a mistake 
as to the terms and that the other party had ‘snapped up’ the offer. The contract 
was therefore void. It is clear that the English courts are thereby protecting the 
mistaken party from being taken advantage of by the party that noticed the mistake 
and attempted to take advantage of it. 
In Northern Ireland, in the case of Ulster Bank v Lambe,400 the plaintiff had sent an 
offer for €155,000 when in fact they meant to make an offer for £155,000. The 
court enforced the contract for £155,000 on the basis that the other party knew of 
the mistake.  
Chitty argues401 that there is an indication that if the other party should have 
known that the other party was mistaken as to the terms of the contract (at least in 
cases where the contract was oral or made by an exchange of written 
                                                          
398 Ibid. p. 607. 
399 Hartog v Colin & Shields [1933] 3 All ER 566 (KB); see also Chwee Kin Keong and others v 
Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502 (CA). 
400 Ulster Bank Ltd v Lambe [2012] NIQB 31 (QB). 
401 Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) at 5.076. 
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communications), there will also be relief for the mistaken party.402 This would 
include cases in which there was a reason to suspect that there has been a mistake 
and the non-mistaken party failed to query this with the mistaken party.  In fact the 
argument is that if B realised that A had made a mistaken (and it was clear what A 
meant) then B should not be allowed to rely on the outward appearance of what A 
said. B is therefore the one that should have known403 that he was agreeing to 
whatever A might have meant.404 Whether or not this approach is correct405 or will 
be adopted it shows that there is much less of a protection from contracts (part of 
the argument in the German cases) in the English approach than in the German 
approach.  
The approach may be different in written agreements. In the case of Ypatia 
Halcoussi406 the claimant had sent an offer of U.S. $100,000 in full and final 
settlement ‘of this dispute’ including interest and costs. In making this offer they 
                                                          
402 Per Mance J. in OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers Plc [1996] CLC 722 (QB); Centrovinicial Estates v 
Merchant Investors Assurance Co [1983] Com LR 158 (CA). 
403 See also Toulson L.J. in Daventry DC v Daventry and District Housing Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1153 
(CA). 
404 McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (2008) 124 Law 
Quarterly Review 608. Cf. Davies, ‘Rectifying the Course of Rectification’ (2012) 75 The Modern Law 
Review 412. 
405 See also the argument in Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 (30th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) at 5 -128 ‘it 
is undesirable to allow A to go behind a document it has signed save in exceptional circumstances 
amounting to dishonesty, or something close to it, on B’s part. 
406 Olympia Sauna Shipping CO SA v Shinwa Kaiun Kaisha Ltd (The Ypatia Halloussi) [1985] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep 364 (QB). 
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had not noticed that there was a further balance of $74000 outstanding. The court 
discussed whether the agreement could be rectified and held 
‘[…] it must be shown that Mr Halcoussis had actual knowledge of the defendants’ 
mistake at the time the telex agreement was made. This cannot be shown. One can 
imagine that Mr Halcoussis was amazed at his own good fortune. He may have 
wondered if the defendants had overlooked this claim. He may even have thought 
that they had. But he cannot be shown to have had knowledge of their mistake, 
even if a mistake be assumed, the less so since the telexes represented no departure 
from anything which had previously been agree or even assumed.’ 407 
The court went on to conclude that ‘[…] where rectification is ordered on the 
ground of unilateral mistake, the effect is to impose on the non-mistaken party an 
agreement which, at the time of executing the written instrument, he did not intend 
to make.’ 408  
The court therefore refused to enforce an agreement where the other party may 
have assumed that there was some sort of mistake but was unaware what that 
mistake may be. In this case it seems from what the courts were arguing that there 
was no duty to question whether there had been any sort of mistake. If the other 
party had actual knowledge of the mistake then the court will rectify the 
contract.409 At this point it seems that the German and English courts agree on the 
                                                          
407 Ibid. p. 371. 
408 Ibid.  
409 Agip SpA v Navigazione Alt Italia SpA (The Nai Genova and The Nai Superba) [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
353 (CA). 
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approach. Anything less than actual knowledge will not suffice for rectification. 
However, there seems to be some evidence that English courts will go further in 
cases where the non-mistaken party either knew that there was a mistake but not 
what the mistake was or where the non-mistaken party ought to have known of the 
mistake but only in cases of an oral contracts or contracts made by the exchange of 
written communications.  
However, a further point must be made about the threshold for what is considered 
the other party ‘ought to have known’. In OT Africa Lines v Vickers plc410the mistake 
was made between $155,000 and £155,000. Here the court held that it was 
reasonable for the other party to assume that they might increase their offer and 
therefore offer £155,000.  
He [the defendant] thought that it was only when he was on his way home by taxi 
for Christmas, that he allowed himself the luxury of considering why Vickers might 
have preferred to offer sterling. I see nothing strange about that, nor anything to 
require him to take the unusual course of enquiring whether Lovell White Durrant 
meant what they said. Why Vickers chose to make the offer they did was irrelevant, 
while the hard business of considering and deciding whether to accept the offer was 
in progress. 411 
The statement, it is argued, provides more insight into the decision of the courts. If 
the defendant was required to question whether the other party may have made a 
                                                          
410 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers Plc [1996] CLC 722 (QB).  
411 Ibid. at [174]. 
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mistake then this may interfere with the actual business transaction. The point the 
court seems to be making is that not only is anything less than actual (or wilfully 
shutting their eyes)412 knowledge insufficient but it is also a distraction from the 
business deal.     
The conclusion that can be drawn from mistake as to terms is first that there is less 
of an emphasis on the protection of the autonomy of the individual, i.e. a 
protection from contracts, in English law than in German law. Hence in cases where 
the other party ought to have known of the mistake the door is still open for 
allowing the written contract to be rectified. Further, the threshold in the English 
cases for when the other party ‘ought to have known’ seems to be higher this may 
be due as will be discovered in Ch. 4.6 and Ch. 4.7 to the different understanding of 
‘fault’ when it comes to making the other party aware of their mistake. 
4.06 Non-Declaration Mistakes in German Law 
§ 119 (1) BGB dealt with the errors as to content and the mistakes in declaration 
which in the English law are dealt with as mistakes as to terms. There are two more 
main types of mistakes. The first is mistakes in motive, the example413 here is of the 
father who goes to a wedding shop to buy a wedding dress ignorant of the fact that 
the wedding has been called off. He is therefore mistaken as to the motive for 
entering into the contract. The second type of mistake is the mistake as to quality. 
This was discussed above in relation to the table that the buyer thought was made 
                                                          
412 Ibid. per Mance J.  
413Rothoeft, System der Irrtumslehre als Methodenfrage der Rechtsvergleichung (Mohr Verlag 1968), 
p.229 FN7. 
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of gold or the property that the buyer believes to be bigger than it is. Mistakes as to 
quality are now covered by § 119 (2) BGB that provides: an error as to those 
characteristics of a person or thing which are regarded in business as essential is 
regarded in the same way as an error as to the content of a declaration.’414 
The drafting commission of the BGB thought it better not to define what ‘essential 
in business’ was to mean and thought they should not try to jump ahead of legal 
science.415 This approach was later met with significant criticism and has been 
described as a ‘tour of mystery’.416 The drafters of the BGB thereby proclaimed that 
an error as to a characteristic was in certain circumstances to be classed as an error 
in declaration but left open the question of what those circumstances may be.  
The use of § 119 (2) BGB also needs to be considered in light of its time. In and 
around 1911 several cases were decided on what constituted an essential 
characteristic, for example the borders of the property,417 the size and location,418 
the development potential (i.e. could they build on the land and whether it could 
be used commercially)419 and the rights associated with the property.420  It was also 
in 1911 that the government decided to introduce the so-called 
                                                          
414 §119 (2) BGB. 
415 Mugdan, Die Gesammten Materialien zum Büergerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, vol 3 
(R. v. Decker 1899), p.238. 
416 Raape, ‘Sachmaengelhaftung und Irrtum beim Kauf’ (1949) 150 AcP, p. 501 
417 RG Recht 1912 Nr. 2797 . 
418 RG Warnrspr. 1911 Nr. 368 ; RG Warnrspr. 1912 Nr. 205 . 
419 RG Warnrspr. 1911 Nr. 172 . 
420 RG Recht 1912 Nr. 1273 . 
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‘Reichsversicherungsordnung’, which was the social insurance code for the German 
Reich. This implies that the mode of thinking at that time was very much focused on 
assistance by the state for the ‘less fortunate’, the idea of society as a whole 
working towards a common aim. It is difficult to assess in what way this may have 
influenced the courts in their decisions but the fact that there were several cases 
that decided that there had been an error as to an essential characteristic does 
indicate some influence. In the context of § 119 (2) BGB it justified a more 
paternalistic approach and direct interference with the contractual risk allocation, 
which laid the foundation for a broad interpretation of an essential characteristic.   
The courts have taken a number of approaches attempting to provide guidance on 
§ 119 (2) BGB. The first step for the Supreme Court was to approach the ‘essential 
characteristics’421 and it decided that these should not only include natural 
characteristics (i.e. made out of wood) but also characteristics which could, in the 
normal course of business, have a general influence on the value of the object (e.g. 
it is 100 years old). However, the Supreme Court also added a limit (which cannot 
be found in the wording of the BGB nor in the comments of the drafting 
commission), namely that upon entering into the contract it was clear to the other 
party that the characteristics were essential to the other party (i.e. if it was not 
already objectively essential to the buyer).422  
                                                          
421 RGZ 64, 264 (269); Kramer, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 1 
(6th edn, C. H. Beck 2012); §119 RN 102. 
422 RGZ 64, 264 (269) . 
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The Supreme Court added a further group of cases that could be solved by § 119 (2) 
BGB. In the Indebted Property Case423 where the buyer was mistaken as to the value 
of the property due to miscalculation of the debts associated with the property, the 
court held that only in cases where the characteristic had a direct influence on the 
subject matter of the contract was the error to be classed legally relevant. In other 
words, circumstances which only indirectly influence the mistaken party’s 
perception are not relevant. In the later Altitude Case424 the buyer had purchased a 
piece of land to build a house. It later turned out that the altitude of the piece of 
land did not agree with the buyer’s health. The court held that §119 (2) BGB did not 
apply as the buyer’s mistake did not relate to essential characteristics. The essential 
characteristics had to ‘generally relate to the appreciation of the subject matter of 
the contract’ 425and would therefore have to be usual within that context. Unusual 
characteristics would have to be specifically brought to the other party’s attention 
and would therefore be part of the contract.  
Kramer criticises the ‘direct – indirect’ approach taken by the court. He questions 
the viability of this approach as it is difficult to define any exact boundaries.426 This 
also explains427 why in most cases the courts have preferred to stretch the principle 
                                                          
423 RGZ 149, 235 (Indebted Property) . 
424 BGH DB 1972, 479 (Altitude Case) . 
425 Ibid. p. 481. 
426 Kramer, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 1 (6th edn, C. H. Beck 
2012); §119 RN 103. 
427 Particularly in relation to the errors in calculation discussed above at Ch. 4.09.  
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of § 119 (1) BGB428 in order to avoid the problems associated with interpreting § 
119 (2) BGB.429 This is presumably why the German Supreme Court moved to the 
‘usual – unusual’ (to a third party) approach. Effectively the courts thereby 
interpreted § 119 (2) BGB to mean that the error must relate to an objective 
characteristic that is regarded as essential in business.430  
The courts have confirmed that being able to build on property,431 being able to use 
property for business purposes432 and any special tax implications433 were to be 
considered characteristics essential in business. The value of an object, however, is 
not considered a characteristic under 119 (2).434 If the mistaken valuation of the 
object was due to a misjudgement of an essential characteristic of the object then 
the error is classed as legally relevant. For example, if a painting is sold as being 
painted by Picasso and the buyer later discovers that it was not painted by Picasso 
and is therefore worth less, the fact that the picture was sold as being painted by 
                                                          
428 A practice which is condoned by Kramer (Kramer, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen 
Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 1 (6th edn, C. H. Beck 2012); §119, RN 103). 
429 Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB II (4th edn, Springer Verlag 1992); §24 – 2a. 
430 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p.298. 
431 BGHZ 34, 32 . 
432 RGZ 61, 84 , 86. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Kramer, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 1 (6th edn, C. H. Beck 
2012) § 119 RN129. 
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Picasso is considered an essential characteristic.435 This is, however, not always the 
case. If the seller states that he believes that the painting may have been painted 
by Picasso and it then turns out that it was not painted by Picasso this is not 
considered an essential characteristic as the buyer would be seen as taking the risk.  
The reverse of this problem seems to have caused the German courts some 
particular difficulties. In cases in which A sells a picture he believes to be worthless 
to B and it later turns out to be a lot more valuable the courts have considered 
different approaches. Flume was quite clear on this problem that the additional 
value should be attributed to the person to whom it belonged when the discovery 
(of the additional value) was made.436 
The court in Munich437 stated in a case in which the seller had no knowledge that 
the drawings had been made by Lucas Cranach that it was typical in relation to art 
objects that they were sold for a price one day but then sold the next day for twice 
the price and that therefore a claim based on § 119 (2) BGB would have to fail.  
However, the German Supreme Court decided438 to expand the theory set out in 
the Ming-Vase case,439 where an inexperienced seller had sold two vases from the 
Ming Dynasty at a very low price and the age was considered an essential 
                                                          
435 E.g. BGH NJW 1988, 2597 . 
436 Fleischer, ‘Konkurrenprobleme um die culpa in contrahendo: fahrlaessige Irrefuehrung versus 
arglistige Taeuschung’ (2000) 91 AcP, p. 40. 
437 OLG Muenchen, SeuffArch 1910, 181 . 
438 BGH NJW 1988, 2597 . 
439 RGZ 124, 115 . 
134 
 
characteristic, that a mistake by a seller as to the value of the object due to a 
misjudgement of an essential characteristic could be legally relevant. Similarly, in 
the Duveneck- Leibl case440 a drawing was sold that the seller believed to be painted 
by Duveneck. The buyer later took the painting for restoration and discovered that 
the painting was by Leibl. This significantly increased the value of the picture. The 
seller then claimed for the return of the painting on the basis of § 119 (2) BGB that 
he had made a mistake as to an essential characteristic of the painting.  The court 
agreed that the mistake in the authorship of the picture was a characteristic that 
would be considered essential in business under § 119 (2) BGB.   
However, in the Mozart Notebooks case441 a party mistakenly sold an item they had 
meant to keep. The plaintiff claimed that she had separated her notebooks into two 
piles (one for sale and one not for sale) and that somehow some of the notebooks 
from the ‘no-sale’ pile had got mixed up with the sale pile. The court held that there 
was no error as to what was being sold (§ 119 (1) BGB, i.e. the ‘sale pile’ of 
notebooks and there was also no error as to characteristics (§ 119 (2) BGB), as the 
value or age do not constitute a characteristic within the meaning of § 119 (2) BGB, 
nor was there an error as to the ownership. There was therefore only an error as to 
the value of the object which was considered irrelevant by the courts. Also, the 
court refused to find that there was any duty on the buyer to disclose the value of 
the objects (§ 123 (1) BGB) on the basis that the nature of the flea-market is to 
                                                          
440 BGH NJW 1988, 2597 . 
441 AG Coburg NJW 1993, 938 (Mozart Notebook Case) . 
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sometimes sell items under value (i.e. not to make a profit). This final point of when 
pre-contractual duties arise will be discussed in more detail below.  
In those cases in which the court has held that the characteristic of what is being 
sold leads to a mistake that is legally relevant it would seem as if the other party 
could have always prevented the situation. For example in the case where the land 
could not be used for business purposes or where there were additional tax 
implications, it could always have been solved by the other party making these 
circumstances clear.442 The hypothesis could therefore be here that the German 
courts are in fact creating a duty on the non-mistaken party to ensure that the 
other has all the relevant information that may be important for their decision. It is 
this hypothesis that will be tested by looking first at the relationship between the 
pre-contractual duties and the law of mistake.  
Pre-contractual duties and Mistakes 
The initial use by the German courts of culpa in contrahendo was to deal with the 
negligent misrepresentation cases and not in fact mistake cases.443 As was 
explained earlier, § 123 BGB only deals with cases where there has been deceit, 
which requires a (subjective) ‘wilful’ act. In cases where information was evaluated 
wrongly, for example, § 123 BGB could not be used. In cases where there had been 
a negligent misstatement, however, the court found a way to get around this 
stringent requirement of § 123 BGB by creating a general duty to warn the other 
                                                          
442 Assuming that they knew of the other’s intentions but as the court has already held that the 
characteristic has to be objectively essential in business this must be assumed. 
443 For a more detail introduction to culpa in contrahendo see Ch. 3.03  
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party of their mistake.444 A duty of disclosure may arise where the information was 
requested445 or where it is of overwhelming importance to the other party446 or 
where there is a relationship of trust.447 The last two categories are particularly 
interesting. It is not only a duty to ensure that the information provided is correct 
but also a duty to actually speak out. The duty, so the court, arises from the 
underlying duty of good faith in the contracting process.448 The fact that the other 
party did not speak out when they should have warned the other party of their 
mistake is considered fraud under § 123 BGB.  
Logically, culpa in contrahendo (as was shown in ch 3.03) should lead to liability in 
damages but it seems clear that in these cases the court is allowing the mistaken 
party to avoid the contract.449 It therefore seems to be filling the gap between § 
119 (2) BGB and fraudulent misrepresentation cases.450  It is conceivable that in a 
case where one of the parties has made a mistake as to a non-essential 
characteristic, they did so because the non-mistaken party neglected their pre-
                                                          
444 A duty of disclosure may arise where the information was requested (BGHZ 74, 383, 392 ) or 
where it is of overwhelming importance to the other party (BGH NJW 1980, 2460  or where there is 
a relationship of trust (BGH NJW 1992, 300 ,302)). 
445 BGH 74, 383, 392 . 
446 BGH NJW 1980, 2460 . 
447 BGH NJW 1992, 300 . 
448 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) , at 23. Cf BGH NJW 1971, 1795 (Liquid Chemicals Case) , 
1799. 
449 E.g. BGH NJW 1985, 1769 ; BGH NJW 1993, 2107 . 
450 Beale, Mistake and non-disclosure of Facts- Models for English Contract Law (Oxford University 
Press 2012), p. 57. 
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contractual duty to inform them of their mistake. On the 1.04.1981451 a case 
reached the German Supreme Court where the seller had explained to the buyer 
that he would sell him an airplane at the same price he bought it for (i.e. at the 
cost-price). The parties agreed on the details of the sale and inserted a price into 
the contract that the buyer believed to be the cost-price. The seller, however, had 
changed his mind and decided to sell the aeroplane for a profit. Only once the plane 
had been delivered did the buyer notice that the price he had paid corresponded to 
the retail price rather than the cost price. The court held that this was not a mistake 
under §119 (2) BGB but that it was a breach of the pre-contractual duties.452 The 
seller should have informed the buyer that he had changed his mind and was going 
to sell at a higher price. The court thereby shied away from holding that the price 
was a characteristic considered essential in business under §119 (2) BGB and 
preferred to solve the problem via the breach of pre-contractual duties.   
For example in 1971 a case reached the German Supreme Court where the claimant 
had ordered a truck for the transportation of chemical liquids. 453  The defendant 
had proclaimed that this type of truck was about to be entered into serial 
production. The contract stipulated that any claims for faulty material were limited 
to six months and that all other claims were excluded. After an accident in Italy the 
                                                          
451 BGH NJW 1981, 2050 . 
452 E.g. BGH MDR 1976, 565 where knowledge of a change in planning by the council had to be 
disclosed, BGH NJW 1979, 2243  where the current use of the property needed authorisation from 
the authorities and that had not been obtained, OLG Nuerenberg MDR 1983, 665 where the seller 
knew that it would be impossible to get insurance for the horse in future. 
453 BGH NJW 1971, 1795 (Liquid Chemicals Case) . 
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claimant discovered that the truck was unable to carry the weight of the full tank 
and that if it was filled to the maximum weight, i.e. ¾ of the tank, the sloshing of 
the water inside the tank would cause the truck to sway dangerously. As the 
contract excluded any remedy apart from faults in the material and the truck had 
been delivered according to the contractual specifications, the court was unable to 
find that there had been a breach of contract. However, the court found that there 
had been a breach of good faith as the seller should have informed the buyer of the 
fact that the truck would not be able to safely transport chemical liquids, 
particularly as the buyer had mentioned that the main purpose of the truck was to 
transport liquid chemicals. 
A seller therefore has a duty to disclose defects of the product he is selling.454 For 
example,455 if a car has had an accident the seller is required to disclose the nature 
of any previous damage.456 However, this excludes minor damage – except if the 
buyer specifically questions whether there had been any damage.457 In cases of 
severe defects the seller is under a duty to inform the buyer of any suspicion he 
may have458 or of any suspicion he may have of the defect occurring in the future459 
                                                          
454 Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2007); § 123 RN 5b.  
455 BGH 29, 148 . 
456 This would now fall under § 434 BGB but also consider the discussion below on the conflict 
between culpa in contrahendo and § 434 BGB. 
457 BGH 74, 383, 392 ; see the first category above. 
458 Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2007); § 123 RN 5b  
459 See BGH NJW 1993, 1323 ; Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 307. 
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– turning a blind eye is therefore not sufficient to escape liability.  This extends to 
cases where one party enters into an agreement in which payment is due in the 
future, to disclose any financial difficulties.460  
The Liquid Chemical Case461 showed that the courts considered the purpose for 
which the item was sold as an essential element of the contract (something that is 
now covered by § 434 BGB). The court, however, dismissed the notion that there 
was a particular relationship of trust – the third category of cases.  
If the parties have a particularly close connection, such as being family members, 
then the court is likely to find a pre-contractual duty of disclosure.462 This also 
applies if the parties have been in a long-term and trusting business relationship463 
or if there is a long-term contractual relationship.464 In the Daktari Film case465 the 
courts held that there was a special long-term relationship between the parties. 
The defendant transferred his rights in TV shows to the plaintiff and was to receive 
half of the earnings if a licence was granted to other companies. The plaintiff then 
agreed with the defendant to waive the rights for the participation in the earnings 
in return for a lump sum of money. The plaintiff knew at this time that they had 
                                                          
460 BGH NJW 74, 1505 . 
461 BGH NJW 1971, 1795 (Liquid Chemicals Case) . 
462 Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2007); § 123 RN 5c . 
463 BGH LM Nr 25 zu  § 242 BGB . 
464 as long as the parties have had a personal relationship. See Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches 
Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2007); § 123 RN 5c. 
465 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
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been offered a large sum by a large broadcasting company which far exceeded the 
lump sum they had offered the defendant. The German Supreme Court held that 
due to the special long-term relationship (described as similar to ‘friendship’) the 
plaintiff had a duty to inform the defendant of the upcoming deal due to the fact 
that they had relied on the plaintiff’s market assessment.466 The court further 
concluded that the fact that the parties had worked towards a common aim of 
marketing the film and that the plaintiff had no knowledge of how the TV station 
was distributing the film rights467 or which offers had already been made, 
strengthened the argument that there was a duty to disclose the offer.468   
It is not only the relationship between the parties which may cause a duty to inform 
to arise. If one of the parties has a special position in the economy, for example 
bankers, second-hand car dealers469 and sellers who display themselves as being a 
professional in the particular field,470 a special duty to inform arises. For example, 
the seller of water-softening equipment must inform the buyer that the relevant 
                                                          
466 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p.310. 
467 Note that Koetz argues that the defendant would have been in a good position to find the truth. 
Koetz, European Contract Law, vol 1 (Oxford Claredon 1997), p. 201. 
468 As a side comment it may be important to mention that in the proceedings the claimant had 
declared that the defendant, during their last meeting, had made it clear that the film was very 
difficult to market and that there would be almost no profit. This claims could not be substantiated.  
469 See also § 311 (see particularly Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. 
Beck Verlag 2007); § 311 RN 66). 
470 BGH NJW RR 89, 504 . 
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authorities recommend not to use water-softening equipment in private homes, for 
health and environmental protection reasons. This applies even if the seller believes 
that there is no or little risk to health.471 It seems that the argument put forward by 
Koetz - that the cases are based on an assessment of which party is in a better 
position to establish the defect - holds up well.472  
The courts have imposed quite extensive obligations to inform in cases of the sale 
of land,473 for example, where the seller has a suspicion that the house may be 
damaged due to house longhorns (a particularly damaging beetle),474 however, the 
seller does not have a duty to inform the buyer that the house is likely to be 
infected by dry rot if the buyer is aware of the presence of the reasons that cause 
dry rot.475 Further duties exist if the land has been used as a storage facility for 
chemicals,476 if it is going to be declared a nature reserve,477 or if the land is not 
sufficiently protected against flooding.478 Looking at the broader picture,479 the 
                                                          
471 Ibid. 
472 Koetz, European Contract Law, vol 1 (Oxford Claredon 1997),  p. 199 -203. 
473 Note that many of these cases would now be treated by § 434 as a defect.  
474 KG NJW RR 89, 972 . 
475 BGH NJW RR 03, 772 . 
476 BGH NJW 95, 1549 or LG Stuttgart NJW RR 03, 1315 . 
477BGH NJW RR 99, 280 . 
478BGH NJW RR 90, 847 . 
479 However, note that Markesinis alludes that the principle is ‘utterly vague’, Markesinis, Unberath 
and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), 
p. 307-310. 
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court seems to impose a general duty of disclosure on the seller of land in cases in 
which the history may cause significant increase in cost (e.g. the removal of 
chemicals) or future events which may make the land unusable for the purpose for 
which the buyer is purchasing the land (e.g. no permission to use the house for 
living480) where the seller knew or had a suspicion. On the other hand, the court will 
not impose a duty of disclosure where the information merely regards the 
reputation of the land,481 or there is no risk of damage (e.g. previous use as a gas 
plant).482 It is not limited to the land though and may include the protection of the 
other’s reputation. In the Thor Steinar Case483 the defendant wanted to lease a 
shop to sell textiles in a famous ‘Hundertwasserhaus’. The defendant wanted to sell 
items of the brand ‘Thor Steinar’ which had open links to the radical right-wing 
parties. The court held that not releasing this information in advance was contrary 
to § 123 (1) BGB.484 The defendant should have known that the information was of 
vital importance to the plaintiff.485  
                                                          
480 BGH NJW RR 88, 1290 . 
481 BGH NJW RR 92, 334 . 
482 BGH NJW 94, 253 . 
483 BGH NZM 2010, 788 (Thor Steinar Case) . 
484 Although it is reasoned on the basis of fraud the fraud is justified on the basis that they breached 
their pre-contractual duty to inform deliberately.  
485 Note though the case LG Hamm NJW-RR 2000, 1183 where the fact that the property was going 
to be used as a brothel did not have to be disclosed. (the decision is generally regarded as 
questionable: Westermann, Grunewald, Maier-Riemer (Editors), Erman BGB Kommentar, (2011) 
(13th Edition) Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt;  § 433 RN 24). 
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Further examples of the duty to inform apply where a company is sold that has 
significant debts486 (the same applies in cases of the sale of a house in which the 
tenants have a history of paying rent late487). However, if the seller simply does not 
believe in the success of the buyer’s business venture or the business he is selling 
there is no duty of disclosure.488  
There is of course the argument that really what the courts are doing is providing, 
as close as possible an environment of perfect information. According to Hein Koetz 
these cases can be analysed on the basis of whether the information was freely 
available (and therefore on the basis of the economic analysis has any value) and if 
so then the other party should provide the information to allow the other party to 
make an informed decision.489 Here it is argued, in line with the argument of Hein 
Koetz, that firstly this cannot be explained on the basis of the protection of the will 
(there is no will at the time, since the person had not thought about it) but more 
importantly that it is promoting a positive duty of assistance towards the other 
party. This was particularly prominent in the Daktari Film case490 or in the Thor 
Steinar Case.491 
                                                          
486 BGH RR 1989, 306, 307 . 
487 BGH NJW RR 99, 882 . 
488BGH NJW 88, 3205 . 
489 Koetz and Schaefer, Judex oeconomicus (Mohr Siebeck 2003), p. 199-203. 
490 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
491 BGH NZM 2010, 788 (Thor Steinar Case) . 
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The above discussion has shown that the courts are going beyond the mere 
protection of the will and are in fact taking a flexible approach to pre-contractual 
duties and mistakes as to quality. Upon closer inspection it seems that the 
surrounding circumstances of the case can lead to an increase in the duty to 
provide information prior to the contract (or point out a mistake). In the Daktari 
case it was the dependence of the mistaken party on the non-mistaken party, in the 
Thor-Steinar case it was the ignorance of the building owner. It seems then that the 
subjective state of mind, position and possible detriment has to be taken into 
account by the other contracting party in determining whether or not they should 
release information. 
It is difficult with the pre-contractual duties to establish what exactly the courts are 
protecting. Later it will be shown that the German courts go further than the 
English courts in requiring the duty of disclosure. In contrast to the analysis of Hein 
Koetz it is not the economic analysis that can explain this approach492 and the 
simple articulation of caveat vendor does not really seem to explain an underlying 
philosophy. The judgment in the Daktari Film Case493 suggests that a line was 
crossed at which the buyer could and would expect the other party to assist them in 
                                                          
492 Koetz requries that two elements must be fulfilled. First the information must be ‘productive’ in 
the sense that it is important to the decisions. That, he concedes, was the case here. However, the 
second requirement that the information must be ‘free’, Koetz argues, was not fulfilled. He argues 
that allowed the TV Company approached them, this was achieved because they had spent time and 
money building a system of customer contacts (see Koetz and Schaefer, Judex oeconomicus (Mohr 
Siebeck 2003) p.178-180). 
493 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
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their decisions. It is almost as if the court is acknowledging a different type of 
business model which is further validated by the Thor Steinar Case494. It would 
seem therefore that even in cases where the parties are not particularly close but 
the nature of the contract would mean that they will have to work together in 
future the principle applies. Is it therefore that the courts in fact are dividing 
between one-off contracts where it is efficient to rely on the caveat emptor 
principle and then contracts where either the parties have developed a trust 
relationship or will have to develop a trust relationship where it may be more 
efficient for both parties to ensure that the other has the full information?  
Not all the cases can be subsumed under these categories and so cases such as the 
Liquid Chemicals Case495 seem to have fallen into the mix when in fact they should 
have been dealt with under § 434 BGB but could not because they were not 
included under the old § 459 BGB. 
§§ 433 ff. BGB 
German law takes a systematic approach to the analysis of a legal problem in the 
sense that the provision which is to be applied must be in line with the overall 
norm. Under the umbrella of the general norm there may be general provisions, so 
called ‘Generalklauseln’ and there may be exceptions to the general provisions, the 
so called lex specialis. § 242 BGB for example is classed as ‘Generalklausel’, which 
cover a wide range of situations in contrast to the lex specialis which is supposed to 
provide legislation for specific scenarios. The lex specialis, §§ 433 ff. BGB, takes 
                                                          
494 BGH NZM 2010, 788 (Thor Steinar Case) . 
495 BGH NJW 1971, 1795 (Liquid Chemicals Case) . 
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precedence over the general provisions but in turn must be interpreted narrowly.496 
In other words, whilst the special provisions take precedence over the general 
provisions they are only to apply to a very specific set of facts. For example, the 
provisions of the German Commercial Code497 would take precedence over the 
general provisions of the BGB. Any gaps that have not been covered in the 
Commercial Code will be filled by the general provisions of the BGB.  
Before the reform of the law of obligations 
The law relating to the non-conformity of goods prior to the reform of the law of 
obligations was covered by (what was then) §§ 459 ff. BGB (and is now covered by 
§§ 433 ff. BGB). §§ 459 ff. BGB was interpreted according to the objective theory,498 
which meant that if the object did not conform to what would normally be 
expected of the object of sale then there was a defect. What was then § 459 BGB 
would be considered the lex specialis and therefore excluded access to culpa in 
contrahendo (the general norm)499 unless there was a gap which had not been 
covered by the lex specialis.500 There were three difficulties with  § 459 BGB which 
                                                          
496 Horn, Einfuehrung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtspilosophie (4th edn, C. F. Mueller Verlag 
2007). 
497 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB). 
498 Bergjan, Die Auswirkungen der Schuldrechtsreform 2002 auf den Unternehmenskauf (Duncker & 
Humblot 2002), p.137. 
499 BGHZ 60, 319 (Lake-Side Property Case) confirmed in , BGHZ 88, 130 at 134 and BGHZ 96, 302 at 
311. 
500Bergjan, Die Auswirkungen der Schuldrechtsreform 2002 auf den Unternehmenskauf (Duncker & 
Humblot 2002), p.245. 
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lead the courts to refer back to culpa in contrahendo, the short limitation period, 
the fact that ‘in the contract’ was used literally and the remedies available. § 459 (1) 
BGB stated:501  
‘The seller of a thing warrants to the purchaser that, at the time when the risk 
passes to the purchaser, it is free from defects which diminish or destroy its value or 
fitness for its ordinary use or the use presupposed in the contract. An insignificant 
diminution in value or fitness is not taken into consideration. (2) The seller also 
warrants that, at the time the risk passes, the thing has the assured qualities.’  
The courts were quite clear on cases of mere negligent failure by the seller to 
inform the buyer of the non-conformity, because any claim arising from culpa in 
contrahendo was barred if it related to a defect within (what was then) §§ 459 ff. 
BGB502 and there was no gap in the law which could give rise to culpa in 
contrahendo. This was confirmed by the courts503 as well as the commentators. 504 
                                                          
501 (1) Der Verkäufer einer Sache haftet dem Käufer dafür, dass sie zu der Zeit, zu welcher die Gefahr 
auf den Käufer übergeht, nicht mit Fehlern behaftet ist, die den Wert oder die Tauglichkeit zu dem 
gewöhnlichen oder dem nach dem Vertrag vorausgesetzten Gebrauch aufheben oder mindern. Eine 
unerhebliche Minderung des Wertes oder der Tauglichkeit kommt nicht in Betracht. 
502 BGHZ 60, 319 (Lake-Side Property Case)  confirming RGZ 135, 339 , 346. 
503 Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen 
§§ 90 - 124; §§ 130 - 133 (Allgemeiner Teil 3) (14th edn, Sellier de Gruyter 2014)§ 459 RN 
19;Westermann (ed), Erman BGB Kommentar (13th edn, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 2011);  § 276 RN 
114. 
504 Note, however, that not all commentators agreed with this choice – see below for further details. 
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In essence, the courts were attempting to prevent claimants using culpa in 
contrahendo to undermine the values of the implied terms of the BGB, particularly 
of (what was then) §§ 460 BGB505 (in combination with § 477 BGB506, where the 
limitation period was set to 6 months, or 1 year for land).  
The courts would draw a complicated distinction between what was covered by § 
459 (1) and (2) BGB. The differentiation was between the ‘Beschaffenheit’, the 
nature of the object, and the ‘zusicherungsfaehige Eigenschaft’, an assured 
characteristic of the object. § 459 (1) BGB will therefore only cover physical/ 
chemical attributes of the item compared to what was promised in the contract.  § 
459 (2) BGB covered the assured characteristic but only in so far as it is impliedly or 
expressly covered in the contract.507 However, if the circumstance was such that 
the defect did not fall within the ‘assured character’ of the object of sale, i.e. did 
not fall within (what was then) § 459 (1) BGB, culpa in contrahendo could be 
                                                          
‘505 A seller is not responsible for a defect of quality in the thing sold if the purchaser knew of the 
defect at the time of entering into the contract. If a defect of the kind specified in 459, par 1 had 
remained unknown to the purchaser in consequence of gross negligence, the seller is responsible, 
unless he has guaranteed that the thing is free from the defect, only if he had fraudulently concealed 
it. ‘ 
506 ‘The claim for cancellation or reduction and the claim for compensation on account of the absence 
of a promised quality are barred by prescription, unless the seller had fraudulently concealed the 
defect, in the case of movables in six months after delivery; in the case of land in one year after the 
transfer. The period of prescription may be extended by contract. […].’ 
507 BGHZ 52, 51 , at 54 where the court held that the implied assured characteristic of a contract to 
buy rabbit meat was that it could be sold.   
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applied. In the Dryer Case508 the claimant had wanted to convert his shop to a 
laundromat. He saw an advert by the defendant and enquired as to the use of the 
machines. The defendant came to the claimant’s store and sold him several 
washers and a dryer. It transpired that the dryer needed to be connected to an 
oven of a particular size and that the claimant’s oven was too small because the 
chimney could not extract the smoke. The court held that the size of the oven was 
not an assured characteristic under § 459 (2) and that therefore the short limitation 
period of 6 months could not apply. However, the defendant had a pre-contractual 
duty to warn the claimant of the requirement for the size of the oven.  
The differentiation became important for judges to be able to use culpa in 
contrahendo and exclude the provisions of (what was then) §§ 459 ff. BGB. This 
meant that the courts were forced to draw a rather complicated and confusing line 
between the two.509 It is not the aim to analyse each definition the court provided 
but it would seem the courts considered anything directly part of the object a 
characteristic (therefore (what was then) §§ 459 ff. BGB applied) and any other 
element (e.g. the relationship to the surroundings510) became an assured 
characteristic (and (what was then) §§ 459 ff BGB would not apply, allowing the 
courts to access culpa in contrahendo).511 
                                                          
508 BGH NJW 1985, 2472 (Dryer Case) at 2473.  
509 See for example in ibid. at 2473. 
510 An example could include being able to build on the property BGHZ 34, 32 , at 41. 
511 Haeublein, ‘Der Beschaffenheitsbegriff und seine Bedeutung fuer das Verhaeltnis der Haftung aus 
culpa in contrahendo zum Kaefrecht’ (2003) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 388, p. 389. 
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The second main difficulty with § 459 BGB was that it stated the defect had to 
destroy its value or fitness for its ordinary use or the use presupposed in the 
contract. The problem here seems to be that in cases where it was for example not 
possible to build on the land this could not be seen as a ‘defect’ case because it was 
not in fact in the contract. In the Ultrasonic Case512  where a doctor had bought a 
device which was free from technical defects. The sellers had advertised that the 
device was particularly useful for the use in a particular type of healing method. It 
later transpired that the healing method itself had no effect on patients at all.  § 
459 (1) BGB did not apply because the machine functioned the way it was supposed 
to. Also § 459 (2) BGB did not apply because the device did what it was supposed to 
according to the particular healing method. The court held that the third difficulty 
was the limited range of remedies for breach of § 459 BGB. According to § 462 BGB 
‘[…] the purchaser may demand annulment of the sale (i.e. cancellation), or 
reduction of the purchase price (i.e. reduction).’ However the claimant may well be 
seeking damages which breach of § 459 BGB could not deliver. These three reasons 
seem to have caused the courts to resort to culpa in contrahendo and narrowly 
read § 459 BGB.513  
Haeublein stated that the main argument for the judiciary’s unclear and difficult 
differentiation was to be found in the attempt to circumvent, what were 
                                                          
512 BGHZ 16, 54 (Ultrasonic Case) – for a translation of the case see Beale and others, Contract Law: 
Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010), p. 483-485. 
513 Though note that the normal remedies of termination or reduction in price will only apply if the 
court finds that it was an assured characteristic.  
151 
 
considered to be the harsh results514 of (what was then) § 477 BGB, which could 
occur in cases in which defects of the product only became apparent much later. As 
§ 477 BGB limited the action to 6 months after delivery, the more complex 
transactions in which a buyer for example had purchased machinery where the 
defect did not become apparent until much later, would leave the seller at an unfair 
advantage.515  
After the reform of the law of obligations 
The main question is whether the reform of the law of obligations either provided a 
clearer divide between culpa in contrahendo and (what is now) §§ 433 ff. BGB, in 
other words whether the legislator has provided a better definition of what a 
characteristic is, and/or whether the legislator has excluded the applicability of 
culpa in contrahendo or has allowed culpa in contrahendo to continue to apply 
alongside §§ 433 ff. BGB.   
§ 434 BGB reads: 
‘The thing is free from material defects if upon the passing of the risk, the things had 
the agreed quality. To the extent that the quality has not been agreed, the thing is 
free of material defects: 1. If it is suitable for the use intended under the contract, 2. 
If it is suitable for the customary use and its quality is usual in things of the same 
kind and the buyer may expect this quality in view of the type of the thing. […]’ 
                                                          
514 With the limitation period being (in most cases) just 6 months. 
515 See for example the BGH NJW 1985, 2472 (Dryer Case) . 
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Clearly, Parliament was aware of the difficulties particularly as they claimed in the 
commentaries to the draft legislation that ‘due to the integration of liability for 
breach of warranties into the general law in relation to the impairment of 
performance and the general conformity of legal consequences’516 (which includes 
the amendment to the limitation periods) that the difficulty had almost 
disappeared.517 The first aspect which confirms that there has been a significant 
change is that now the limitation period set by (what used to be) § 477 BGB has 
been replaced by the significantly longer limitation periods set out in § 438 BGB. 
The consequence is that there is no need for the courts to look to culpa in 
contrahendo to circumvent the short limitation period of § 477 BGB. The second 
aspect relates to the division between culpa in contrahendo and §§ 433 ff. BGB.  
It would seem that the legislator broadened § 434 BGB. It does not though seem to 
have put an end to the use of culpa in contrahendo. Three schools of thought have 
developed from here.  
The three approaches 
The three schools of thought were summarised in the 2009 ‘Asbestos Case’518 . The 
first is that §§ 434 ff. BGB and culpa in contrahendo exist alongside each other, each 
                                                          
516 ‘Einbeziehung der Sachmaengelhaftung in das allgemeine Leistungsstoerungsrecht mit der 
weitgehenden Uebereinstimmung in den Rechtsfolgen […].’ 
517 See Bundestages, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts 14.05.2001 – 
14/6040 ; p. 210 – 216. 
518 BGHZ 180, 205 (Asbestos Case) . 
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having their own use and require an entirely different set of facts.519 This view has 
been promulgated by the Muenchener Kommentar,520 Emmerich521 and 
Haeublein522 and reflects the approach taken by the courts in the Dryer Case.523 This 
follows the court’s differentiation between character and assured characteristics, 
put forward before the reform of the law of obligations. It allows the courts to fall 
back on culpa in contrahendo in cases where §§ 434 ff. BGB would not provide an 
appropriate (or any) remedy in the court’s eyes. Haeublein in particular argues that 
§§ 434 ff. BGB only exclude culpa in contrahendo in relation to the delivery of a 
faulty item524 but that a duty to disclose may arise independently.525 The argument 
is that liability for non-disclosure under culpa in contrahendo is the breach of a duty 
which influenced the decision-making process of the buyer and is therefore not 
necessarily linked to the delivery of a faulty item.   
The second view claims that culpa in contrahendo has been entirely replaced by the 
provisions of §§ 434 ff. BGB and that his even applies to cases in which the seller 
deliberately deceived the buyer. A view that is proposed by commentators such as 
                                                          
519 Ibid. 
520 Emmerich, Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, 2012), § 
311 RN 143. 
521 Emmerich, Das Recht der Leistungsstorungen (6th edn, Verlag C. H. Beck 2005); § 7 RN 35 
522 Haeublein, ‘Der Beschaffenheitsbegriff und seine Bedeutung fuer das Verhaeltnis der Haftung aus 
culpa in contrahendo zum Kaefrecht’ (2003) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 388 RGZ 55, 369 , 391. 
523 BGH NJW 1985, 2472 (Dryer Case) . 
524 Hereby referring to § 433 I (2) BGB. 
525 Or equally items which are not fit for purpose (§ 633 (1) and (2) BGB).  
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Staudinger/ Matuschek-Beckmann526, Medicus527, Roth528 and Palandt/ 
Weidenkaff529. 
The third view is that §§ 434 ff. BGB covers all situations except for cases where the 
seller has acted deliberately, in which case the argument is that the seller is not 
worthy of protection in any way and therefore culpa in contrahendo cannot apply. 
This would then be caught by the fraud provisions under § 123 BGB.  This would 
also include cases where the other party remained silent when they would have 
had a duty to speak out. 530 This position has been put forward by commentators 
such as Erman/Grunewald531, Jauernig/Berger532 and Huber/Faust533.  
                                                          
526 Staudinger, J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch: Staudinger BGB - Buch 
2: Recht der Schuldverhaeltnisse (2004), § 437 RN 67. 
527 Medicus, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB (10th edn, C.F. Mueller 2010), § 311 RN 58. 
528 Roth, ‘Anmerkung - Arglistige Täuschung bei einem Mangel  ’ (2006) JZ 1026, 1026-1028. 
529 Bassenge and others, Palandt- Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (74th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2015) § 437 
RN 51a and 51b. 
530 Westermann, Grunewald and Maier-Riemer (eds), Erman BGB Kommentar (Verlag Dr. Otto 
Schmidt 2014), Vor § 437 RN 29 with reference to § 433 RN 24 which refers to BGH NJW 1995, 46 
and BGH NJW 1995, 2160 .  
531 Westermann (ed), Erman BGB Kommentar (13th edn, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 2011);  Vor § 437 
RN 29.  
532Jauernig/Berger, Kommentar- Buergerliches Gesetztbuch (14th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2011);  § 
437 RN 34. 
533 Huber and Faust, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung- Einfuhrung in das neue Recht (2002) Ch. 14 RN 29. 
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The court in the Asbestos case,534 where a 1980’s building was sold and the buyer 
was not informed by the seller that it contained asbestos, firstly confirmed that the 
German parliament had not specifically decided whether or not culpa in 
contrahendo was to be included and secondly that the third approach, i.e. that 
culpa in contrahendo was excluded except in cases where the seller had 
deliberately not informed the buyer, was their favoured approach.  
This decision falls in line with the pre-2001 decisions which generally presumed that 
(what was then) §§ 459 ff. BGB was only to be overridden in cases in which the 
seller deliberately did not inform the buyer. Within this context there are two 
factors which must be highlighted. The first relates to the requirement of a 
deliberate action or non-action by the seller. It has to be remembered that so long 
as the seller knows of the defect or had a suspicion of it, the presumption is that 
the non-disclosure was deliberate.535 As it was shown above, this presumption can 
be quite difficult to rebut, where for example a car dealer sells a car which the 
previous owner had claimed was free of any accident the court held that the sales 
person should have at least had a suspicion. It could therefore be presumed that 
cases where the seller negligently fails to disclose a particular fact (which the courts 
consider necessary to be disclosed), they could imply that the non-disclosure was 
deliberate because the seller should have known if they had correctly checked. The 
courts are thereby continuing to claim that the only way to circumvent §§ 433 ff. 
BGB is if the seller deliberately did not disclose the facts/defects but then lowering 
                                                          
534 BGHZ 180, 205 (Asbestos Case). 
535 Palandt and Henrichs, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (66th edn, C. H. Beck Verlag 2007); § 123 RN 11. 
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the bar for what would be considered ‘deliberate’ in order to allow claims for 
negligent non-disclosure. In this example it would mean that the seller who had 
negligently not checked whether the car had previously been in an accident would 
be deemed to have deliberately not disclosed the fact that the car had been in an 
accident. 
This is also not the only way to circumvent the provisions of §§ 434 ff. BGB. Looking 
back to the difficulties mentioned by Haeublein, which Parliament had argued were 
now obsolete, an interesting set of cases has appeared.  
In the 1973 Lake-Side Property Case536 the property was surrounded by a hedge 
which to an outsider would seem to demarcate the property. However, the 
property did not reach as far as the water because the last stretch of land had been 
rented from a third party. This was also clear from the plans which were included in 
a bundle. The court held that the case fell within (what was then) §§ 459 ff. BGB 
and therefore excluded any access to culpa in contrahendo.  
In the 2011 Wood-Fence Property Case537 a property surrounded by a wooden 
fence which also contained 15m2 of the neighbour’s land, had been sold. The buyer 
had been under the impression (due to the fence) that all the land was included, 
even though the plans had correctly represented the property. Here, the court held 
that whilst §§ 434 ff. BGB barred any access to culpa in contrahendo this was not a 
case about the characteristics of the property itself (the neighbour’s land could 
                                                          
536 BGHZ 60, 319 (Lake-Side Property Case) . 
537 BGH NJW 2012, 846 (Wood-Fence Property Case) . 
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hardly be a characteristic of the property) and therefore §§ 434 ff. BGB did not 
apply, allowing for a claim for non-disclosure under culpa in contrahendo. In other 
words the courts re-introduced the differentiation between a characteristic and an 
assured characteristic. 
The reason for the court’s reluctance to remove the possibility of accessing culpa in 
contrahendo could be seen as lying in the fact that if the buyer has not discovered 
the defect within 2 years (exceptions apply for land) he would have no claim under 
§§ 434 ff. BGB.538 If we consider the example of the car sale, where the car has 
previously had an accident and the seller is aware of this but decides not to inform 
the buyer, the buyer is unlikely to want to sell their car within the next two years 
and therefore unlikely to discover the defect. Nevertheless, in claiming that the 
seller did not inform him correctly of the defect, the buyer could circumvent the 
provisions and would therefore have at least a further year to make a claim.  
However, it is important that culpa in contrahendo does not allow for general 
circumvention of the provisions of §§ 434 ff. BGB the reason is that § 437 BGB first 
allows the seller the opportunity to correct any defects539 and allowing the buyer to 
directly claim for the contract to be rescinded under culpa in contrahendo would 
open the flood gates for buyers to get out of unfavourable contracts by relying on 
minor defects.  
                                                          
538 See § 438 BGB. 
539 See § 437 (1) BGB. 
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The values of §§ 434 ff. BGB 
A key point which must be considered with §§ 433 ff. BGB is that it introduces 
external values into the contract. Previously the argument had been that the 
analysis by the courts of the contract is based on the will of the parties and that 
culpa in contrahendo though also going further was giving way to that will (or 
protecting it). However, §§ 433 ff. BGB imposes a supposed will on the parties 
which in fact could be argued is quite far from allowing the will of the parties to 
form the basis of the contract (or the expression of the will). §§ 433 ff. BGB it is 
argued here is therefore the introduction of external values into the contract which 
the law sees as the foundation of every will (or only in some cases it is the 
foundation if taking the grey list into account). In other words the legislator has 
decided that in a world where the parties are of equal bargaining power these 
would be the terms that they would have agreed on.  
4.07 Other cases of mistake in English Law 
The approach to mistakes of any other kind than a mistake as to terms is quite clear 
in the English approach. It is the principle of caveat emptor expressed in Smith v 
Hughes540 that remains the foundational principle of mistake in English law. The 
decision in Smith v Hughes541, where the buyer believed he was buying old oats 
when in fact he was buying new oats, held that there was no relief for the buyer 
because he was only mistaken as to the quality of the object which was not a term 
of the contract. The court therefore held that there had not been a relevant 
                                                          
540 Smith v Hughes [1871] 6 LR 597 (QB). 
541 Ibid. 
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mistake.  Similarly in Tamplin v James542 the buyer believed that he was purchasing 
a larger piece of property than he was actually purchasing and the court provided 
no relief for mistake. It is not clear from the judgment whether this was deemed to 
be a mistake as to the terms or as to the substance.543 
There are three key points that need to be considered though in addition to the 
principle of mistake. The first is that in cases where German law has resorted to 
mistake, English law has the possibility of using misrepresentation.544 If the seller 
has in any way made a misrepresentation,545 even if he did not know the truth546 
(and even if he had no reason to know it) and that misrepresentation induced the 
buyer into the contract, the court will provide relief for the innocent party. If 
therefore the seller in the wine-vinegar case made a representation that the bottle 
contained wine, even if he truly believed the bottle to contain wine, the court 
would provide relief for the buyer.547 
The second is that where in the sale of goods cases the previous §§ 433 ff BGB 
failed the ‘not fit for purpose cases’548 and therefore resorted to mistake, culpa in 
contrahendo or § 242 BGB, the English courts would have the Sale of Goods Act 
                                                          
542 Tamplin v James [1880] 15 Ch D 215 (CA). 
543 A possible reason for this is that it does not seem to matter in terms of the outcome.  
544 This has already been discussed in the context of pre-contractual duties in ch. 3.03 ff. 
545 For more detail on the approach in misrepresentation cases see ch. 3.06. 
546 Redgrave v Hurd [1881] 20 Ch D1. 
547 Note however that the relief would be rescission or on the basis of reliance damages. 
548 See Ch. 4.6 above.  
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1979549 to fall back on. The only problem there is that the Sale of Goods Act does 
not cover cases involving land.   
The third is the difficulty in relation to mistakes that occur due to the non-
disclosure of information and the balance between the autonomy of the individual 
and the symmetry of information, as for example in the House damaged by 
longhorns example550 above or the Daktari Film551 case above, are symptomatic for 
the different values that underlie the German and English system. In the English 
case of the Harriette N552 the parties had compromised on the amount of 
demurrage that would have to be paid. The seller was mistaken as to when the ship 
had completed unloading. The buyers decided not to inform the sellers of their 
mistake. The court held that the settlement was binding.  In the German cases 
there was a duty on the non-mistaken party to inform the mistaken party of their 
mistake and the conclusion was that the displacement of the autonomy of the 
individual was justified in order to equalise the informational imbalance. The 
English approach was that the parties should have made full enquiries before 
entering into the contract. The difficulty that seems to arise for the English courts is 
where to draw the line in terms of informational symmetry.  Assuming that the 
English courts rely on the protection of the markets (and therefore on the certainty 
                                                          
549 See for example Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.14. 
550 See Ch. 4.6 - KG NJW RR 89, 972 . 
551 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
552 Statoil ASA v Louis Drefus Energy Services LP (The Harriette N) [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 685. 
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of the transaction)553 it seems to justify a higher degree of self-reliance on the 
parties to discover their own mistakes, 554  whereas in the German cases this onus is 
put on the other party unless they were not at fault and then the non-mistaken 
party will be awarded reliance damages under § 122 BGB.  
However, there is a category of cases in English law that is based on the relationship 
of the parties which increases the duty towards the other party on the basis of that 
relationship. The main category are the contracts made ‘Uberrimae Fidei’ where 
one party has access to material facts which he must disclose to the other party. 
Contracts of insurance,555 to subscribe to shares in a company,556 family 
settlements,557 contracts for the sale of land,558 contracts for suretyship,559 
partnerships560, maritime salvage agreements561 or where the parties are in a 
                                                          
553 Kronman, ‘Paternalism and the Law of Contracts’ (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal 763, 774 – 786. 
554 The line, as was shown in Chapter 3, seems to be drawn in English cases where there has been a 
positive misrepresentation (e.g. Redgrave v Hurd [1881] 20 Ch D1).  
555 Chitty on Contracts (H. G. Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 6-161. 
556 See Grogan v Grogan [1816-19] 3 Swans 400 in Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2013) at 6-163. 
557 Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 6-164. 
558 Ibid. at 6-166. 
559 Where there is only a limited duty to disclose. Ibid. at 6-170. 
560 Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161, 227; Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), 
at 6-172. 
561Waddams, ‘Precontractual Duties of Disclosure’ in P Cane and J Stapleton (ed), Essays for Patrick 
Atiyah (Claredon Press Oxford 1991), p. 243. 
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relationship of trust and confidence,562 all involve an increased duty to disclose 
information. Chitty argues that the result of such a breach would provide the party 
with the right to rescind the contract rather than damages.563 Acknowledging the 
fact that insurance contracts are in themselves ‘special’ contracts with extensive, 
specific legislation and that family settlements, suretyship and contracts to 
subscribe to shares in a company, all deal with very specific contracts, this leaves 
partnership agreements, to which joint venture agreements can also be added.564  
In Banwaitt v Deji565 Mr Banwaitt had been induced into a venture to invest in a 
project to buy property in Cambodia which was supposed to be sold on to a hotel 
group shortly after purchase on the understanding that planning permission would 
be granted. In fact, the person who had been elected to buy the property in 
Cambodia (because non-nationals would not be able to buy property) turned out to 
be a fraud and was arrested. In addition, other investors had pulled out of the deal. 
The defendant then continued to represent that all was well and that 20% of the 
future purchase price had already been paid by the hotel chain when this was far 
from the truth. The judge held that the claimant had an undoubted right in 
damages in the tort of deceit. However, the judge went on to claim:  
                                                          
562 Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), at 6-173. 
563 Even if the other party kept quiet fraudulently – see ibid. 6-151. 
564 Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2007] EWHC 2115 (CD), at [197], where Briggs J 
held that the duty of disclosure was not limited to partnerships but may be extended to contracts 
with elements of a joint venture.  
565 Banwaitt v Dewji [2013] EWHC 876 (QB). 
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 ‘Mr Cullen submitted that the relationship between Dr Dewji and Mr Banwaitt was 
such that Dr Dewji owed Mr Banwaitt a duty of disclosure like that owed in a 
contract uberimae fidei. […] I accept that a duty of disclosure arose because Dr 
Dewji [the defendant] was the orchestrator of the venture, was inviting Mr 
Banwaitt [the claimant] to join and persuading him to do so, and he knew that Mr 
Banwaitt was totally reliant on him as Mr Banwaitt said at the time on the golf 
course and in his email of 1 July 2008. This way of putting it is perhaps the belt to 
the braces of the case in overt misrepresentation. As the history and my 
consideration of the case in misrepresentation show, the duty of disclosure was 
broken at every turn.’566 
Particularly interesting in the case is the recollection of the facts. The judgment 
begins ‘The parties to this action lived next to each other in Milton Keynes and were 
friends.’567 The description is reminiscent of the judgment in the Daktari case where 
the court held that ‘where such a trust situation, which in this case lead to the duty 
to inform the claimant, resulted […] from the long-standing and close, professional 
relationship and beyond that from the personal and friend-like relationship, which 
arose from the utilisation of film series in which […] they pursued the same goal.568 
                                                          
566 Ibid at 72. 
567 Ibid at 1. 
568 ‘Ein solcher besonderer Vertrauenstatbestand, der hier zur Aufklärungspflicht der Klägerinnen 
führt, ergibt sich aus den bereits angeführten Feststellungen des Berufungsgerichts, dass die Parteien 
in langjährigen intensiven Geschäftsbeziehungen und darüber hinaus in persönlich freundschaftlichen 
Beziehungen gestanden hatten, die Verwertung der Filmserien […] aufgrund der beiderseitigen 
Beteiligung am Erlös im gemeinsame Interesse verfolgt hatten[…]. Ob […] insoweit von einem 
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The question must therefore be raised whether the German approach may in fact 
be closer to the English approach than has generally been assumed.569 In fact in the 
German case it would seem that the factor of whether this may or may not have 
been a joint venture was addressed. ‘Whether in so far it can be assumed that it 
was a joint venture or joint venture-like relationship can remain open.’570 It may well 
be then that if the Daktari Film case had been brought in the English courts a similar 
result may have been achieved on the basis of a joint venture.  
Still there is a difference between the cases. In the English case the duty seems to 
arise from the contractual nature which then creates the duty. In Reading v King571 
Lord Asquith held that ‘Whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to be 
performed, for instance, the negotiation of a contract on his behalf or for his 
benefit,[…] there is such a fiduciary duty.572 It is therefore the contract that gives 
rise to the fiduciary relationship which in turn gives rise to a duty of disclosure. In 
                                                          
Gesellschafts- oder Gesellschaft ähnlichen Verhältnis ausgegangen werden kann, kann offen bleiben. 
BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) at 25.  
569 E.g. Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 
(2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006) p. 310. Beale, Mistake and non-disclosure of Facts- Models for 
English Contract Law (Oxford University Press 2012), p. 21. 
570 ‘Ob […] insoweit von einem Gesellschaft oder gesellschaftsähnlichen Verhältnis ausgegangen 
werden kann, kann offen bleiben‘. BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) at 25. 
571 Reading v Attorney General [1949] 2 KB 232 (CA) at 236. 
572 Further confirmed in Ross River Ltd v Cambridge City Football Club Ltd [2007] EWHC 2115 (CD) at 
197, and by Finn, ‘Fiduciary Law in the Modern Commercial World’ in E McKendrick (ed), Commercial 
Aspects of Trusts and FIduciary Obligations (Claredon Press Oxford 1992).  
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Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation,573 Manson J held that 
‘The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the 
terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them’.  The 
extent of the duty, it is submitted here, is the proximity of the parties to each other 
(or in other words the degree of reliance by the other party). In Banwaitt v Deji574 
the friendship between the parties meant that the duty on Dr Deji was higher than 
it would probably have been had they been dealing at arm’s length. The next point 
is that Mr Banwaitt and Dr. Deji were both, although intelligent, not well versed in 
property related matters and Mr Banwaitt in particular had to rely on his 
relationship with Dr Deji.   
In the Daktari case575 it was not the joint venture576 but the mistake as to a 
characteristic considered essential in business which at first invoked a duty to 
disclose. The fact that there had been a mistake was clear but whether it invoked a 
duty to disclose was the central question.577 In other words the extent of the duty 
was then defined by the relationship of the parties. It would seem therefore that 
                                                          
573 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, at 97. 
574 Banwaitt v Dewji [2013] EWHC 876 (QB). 
575 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
576 Mainly because the court excluded this in their judgment.  
577 Based on the fact that the lower court rejected the notion that it created a duty: ‘Die langjährige, 
intensive Zusammenarbeit […] könnten nicht dazu führen, dass von zwei notwendigerweise […] 
gegensätzliche Interessenvertretenden Verhandlungspartnern jeweils verlangt werde, dem Gegner 
alle für dessen Kalkulationen und Risikoeinschätzung geeigneten, für ihn selbst aber nachteiligen 
Gesichtspunkte ungefragt mitzuteilen.‘ BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) at 12. 
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the German courts are requiring a general duty of honesty based on the 
expectation of the mistaken party.578 By focussing on the mistaken party, the 
question that the court seems to be posing is whether there was true consent. 
Assuming though that if the Daktari case appeared before the English courts and 
the court were to hold that there was a joint venture the question would still have 
to be answered whether the relationship was sufficiently proximate to give rise to a 
duty to inform that there were larger profits that could be made. On the basis that 
here there were two large commercial parties dealing in their area of expertise it is 
unlikely that an English court would hold that there was a duty to disclose that sort 
of information. It seems that it may be the economic analysis579 and with that the 
argument of certainty that serve to explain the English position. 580   
On the basis of the above discussion it can be concluded that in the English cases 
the law gives relief in cases of misrepresentation, in sale of goods cases and in other 
exceptional circumstances (e.g. joint venture). However, it does not give relief 
where the mistake falls outside these boundaries (to which we may have to assume 
Daktari581 still belongs). This indicates very different values on the basis that the 
                                                          
578 This is probably why Hein Koetz and Hans-Bernd Schaefer have decided that the Daktari case was 
decided incorrectly. (see Koetz and Schaefer, Judex oeconomicus (Mohr Siebeck 2003), p.178-180).  
579 Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Informational and the Law of Contracts’ in AT Kronman and RA 
Posner (ed), The Economics of Contract Law (Little, Brown & Co 1967); Koetz and Schaefer, Judex 
oeconomicus (Mohr Siebeck 2003)  p.161-180.  
580Waddams, ‘Precontractual Duties of Disclosure’ in Stapleton (ed), Essays for Patrick Atiyah 
(Claredon Press Oxford 1991), p. 252. 
581 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
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German system focusses on the mistaken party whereas the English system 
focusses on the behaviour of the non-mistaken party.582 In English cases where the 
mistake is purely self-induced the court will not provide any relief where the 
German court will.583 
4.08 Errors in Calculation – German Law 
Generally, it is clear that an internal (i.e. not on the face of the document) 
calculation that the other party did not and could not have known of will not be 
relevant.584 If the document does not provide any evidence that there has been a 
mistake (because the mistake was made off the face of the document, e.g. when 
calculating the wages of the workers), then the mistake must be an error in 
motive.585 Errors that then appear on the face of the document (e.g. 2+5+8= 10) are 
mistakes in declaration under § 119 (1) BGB.586 The LG Hannover held that where 
the seller in a shop makes a mistake by typing in a lower price from the price tag 
into the till this would also be considered a mistake in declaration.587  
The BGH has gone so far as to hold that where the recipient of the mistaken offer 
clearly knew what the mistaken party meant to offer, then they would be held to 
                                                          
582 Though it should be remembered that in cases of innocent misrepresentation the English system 
will also provide a remedy.  
583 Though may have to compensate under § 122 BGB. 
584 E.g. RGZ 55, 369 , 369 ff. and Pawlowski, ‘Die Kalkulationsirrtuemer: Fehler zwischen Motiv und 
Erklaerung’ (1997) JZ 741, at 741. 
585 BGHZ 139, 177 and BGH NJW 2002, 2312 . 
586 See obiter RGZ 64, 266 , 266 ff. 
587 LG Hannover NJW RR 1986, 156 , 156 ff. 
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what the party meant and not what they wrote (see the three cases below).588 The 
interesting case relates to where the other party could or possibly should have 
known of the mistake589 and this is where it seems that the courts have taken 
several approaches. The approach that has been advocated by Flume was that the 
mistake in calculation should be corrected on the basis of the agreement and the 
will of the parties. In other words Flume advocates that in cases where the actual 
will of the parties is clear (e.g. the Rubel case590), the will of the party should take 
precedent over the written document. However, it seems that not all the cases in 
which the courts wanted to provide relief could be covered by Flume’s approach 
and three further approaches appeared: the general duty of good faith, mistake 
and abuse of law, fraud and the trust relationship.   
The calculation as the basis of the agreement – party intention 
The idea here goes back to the basics of contract law – the will of the parties. In the 
Rubel case591 a loan had been provided in roubles but was to be repaid in marks. An 
error was made in calculating the exchange rate and the wrong amount was 
entered into the contract. The court held that this was a legally relevant error as 
both parties had negotiated on the basis of the exchange rate even though the 
calculation had not been included in the contract. This was merely a matter of falsa 
demonstration non nocet and the agreement could be rectified on the basis of the 
                                                          
588 BGH NJW RR 1996, 1458 . 
589 This was left open in BGH NJRW RR 1986. 569 . 
590 RGZ 105, 406 (Rubel Case) . 
591 Ibid. a similar case is LG Kleve WM 1991, 2060 (Dinare case) . 
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correct exchange rate. However, in many calculation cases the non-mistaken party 
may be agreeing to the total price but there has been a mistake that they should 
have noticed. For example in the Builder’s Bill case592 where a builder had 
calculated that the price for the materials was to be DM 54,60 and the cost of 
labour to be DM 19,23. He then charged a total of DM 54,70 instead of DM 73,93. 
The court held that this was a legally relevant error due to the fact that the 
calculation was clearly displayed on the face of the document.  
If the court were of the opinion that the other party knew of the mistake or shared 
the misunderstanding, in other words they said DM 54,70 but clearly both meant 
DM 73, 93, the court could use the principle of falsa demonstration non nocet.593 
Here though the courts is dealing with cases where there is an error in declaration 
and if the other party did not know of the mistake then they will still have to 
compensate under § 122 BGB.  The underlying value would still be that the courts 
are giving way to the parties’ original intention.  
A general duty of good faith 
One of the problems that the courts have not addressed is the case where A makes 
it clear on what basis the calculation will be made (i.e. he will be using the 
minimum wage for a total of 30 man hours but then inserts a much lower amount 
into the contract). There is a mistake off the face of the document which the other 
party could have known. A difficulty here is that the other party may well have 
known (or at least should have known) of the mistake but that essentially the 
                                                          
592 LG Aachen NJW 1982, 1106 (Builder's Bill Case) . 
593 See Ch. 4.04 above. 
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mistake is one in motive. Where for example the father informs the seller that he is 
buying the dress for his daughter’s wedding it is questionable whether this 
additional information (in the previous cases the father had not expressed why he 
was buying it but the other party nevertheless knew) should lead to any relief for 
the father – it is essentially an error in motive.594  
In a case from the 1970s595 the defendant had been invited to submit a tender to a 
local council. The council estimated the costs to amount to around DM 80.000. The 
defendant submitted a tender for DM 63.000. The second lowest tender was for 
DM 85.000. The defendant claimed that there had been an error in calculation and 
that according to § 242 BGB the council had a duty to take the other parties’ 
interests into account. For that reason the claimant should have warned the 
defendant of their mistake. The court agreed that there was a general duty to 
inform the other when the non-mistake party identified that there was a mistake 
but that in this case the claimant had neither recognised the difference in price 
(30% was not a significant enough mismatch) nor had they noticed that there had 
been an error in calculation.596 It would seem then that a duty to warn the other 
party of their mistake arises from § 242 BGB. However, in another case from 
1985597 the council had asked for tenders for the building of a bridge. The 
contractor had forgotten to factor in the costs of the structural analysis (despite the 
                                                          
594 Pawlowski, ‘Die Kalkulationsirrtuemer: Fehler zwischen Motiv und Erklaerung’ (1997) JZ 741, 742. 
595 BGH NJW 1980, 180 . 
596 Ibid. 
597 BGH NJRW RR 1986. 569 . 
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council providing a disclaimer in the call for tenders to the effect that the cost must 
be included). The court held here that there was no indication that the council 
knew of the mistake before the contract had been made and that therefore the 
contractor was bound to the original contract. Both cases indicate that the 
threshold for a duty to arise under § 242 BGB is very high. It seems it must be 
obvious to the other party that there was a mistake.  
In 1998598 a case reached the German Supreme Court which concerned the building 
of a house by the local authorities. The authorities asked for tenders from 
carpenters for the interiors of the new building. The offers were to be handed to 
the local authority (the claimant) no later than 15 April 1993, and the acceptance of 
the tenders were to be made by 15 May 1993. The claimant had estimated the 
costs at around DM 350,758.00. The defendant handed in an offer for DM 
305,812.60. On 28 April 1993 the defendant wrote to the claimant explaining that 
they had forgotten to include the price of transportation and construction. They 
asked for their offer not to be considered.  
On 13 May 1993 the local authority explained that they were accepting the offer. 
The second closest offer had also been withdrawn due to an error in calculation. 
Even though there was a significant difference in price (the next lowest tender was 
for 349,014.10 DM and the highest tender was for the sum of DM 476,209.83) the 
court held that (contrary to the Court of Appeal) an internal error in calculation will 
always be not legally relevant even in cases in which the other party knew or should 
                                                          
598 BGHZ 139, 177 . 
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have known of the error. The German Supreme court indicated there may be 
liability under § 242, even though not in this case, in cases where the other party 
accepted the offer and insists on the contract even though he knows (or should 
have known) of the error in calculation. 
Mistake and the duty of good faith 
In the 2002 the First Class Holiday Case599 reached the OLG Munich. The claimant 
was an avid online shopper who had found a first-class ticket online for the price of 
728.30 Euros return from Germany to Bangkok. He booked the ticket and received 
a confirmation at 18.00 hours on 14 July 2002. On the same day at 20.07 hours the 
company sent an email explaining that there had been a mistake and that the price 
was in fact meant for the Economy Class. They offered the claimant a first-class 
ticket for 3676.30 Euros. The claimant insisted on his order and in fact booked the 
same ticket again in the morning of 15 July 2002. The claimant then offered to 
compromise the claim if they wished. The court addressed the case on two 
grounds. The first was that because with regard to the second booking the airline 
had not disputed the booking (as against the claimant at the time), there was no 
possibility of addressing the second booking via § 119 BGB. The court held that the 
claim for the second booking could not succeed on the basis that it was a misuse of 
the law and was contrary to the principle of good faith (§ 242 BGB). The reasoning 
was that the claimant knew the market and in comparison to the other airlines 
must have known that there was a mistake. Especially the fact that he booked a 
second ticket and then wanted to compromise the claim was evidence of his 
                                                          
599 OLG Muenchen NJW 03, 367 (First-Class Holiday Case) . 
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knowledge.  With regard to the first booking the court held that this was a 
declaration mistake (§ 119 (1) BGB and that due to the knowledge he would not be 
able to recover (§ 122 (2) BGB). It would seem therefore that in a case where the 
other party knows there has been a mistake simply because of the discrepancy 
between the price and the market value they cannot take advantage of that offer.  
Fraud and the trust relationship 
This category has already been discussed above (Ch. 4.6) and includes cases such as 
the Daktari Film Case600 and the Thor Steinar Case.601 It is conceivable that one of 
the parties may have made a mistake on the basis that the other party did not 
disclose vital information (i.e. the mistake was really one of motive) but that 
therefore there was a duty of disclose (due to the relationship). This would mean 
that non-disclosure is a breach of the pre-contractual duty and therefore amounts 
to fraud under § 123 BGB. 
4.09 Errors in Calculation – English Law 
It was shown above how German law will provide a remedy not only in cases where 
the other party knew of the mistake but also in cases where the non-mistaken party 
should have known that the other party had made a mistake.602 The position in 
English law is not quite as clear.603 The English courts will grant relief in cases in 
which the offeror has made a mistake on the face of the document and the offeree 
                                                          
600 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
601 BGH NZM 2010, 788 (Thor Steinar Case) . 
602 This related to the compensation available to the non-mistaken party under § 122 BGB.  
603 Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 5-076. 
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knew of the mistake604 or possibly should have known of the mistake.605 However, 
in cases where the mistake is not in the document the courts have been unwilling 
to provide relief. In comparison to German law, the English courts have recourse to 
misrepresentation even if the non-mistaken party did not know that he was 
misrepresenting.606  
The court’s approach in cases where there has been no misrepresentation becomes 
clear when turning to the case of Tamplin v James607 where a brew house and the 
surrounding property were for sale at auction. The auction plans showed the 
property608 consisting of two plots of land. One of these plots which had previously 
belonged to the property had been sold to the railway. The buyer approached the 
seller after the auction and went on to purchase the property. The buyer never 
checked the plans because he knew of the property from when he was a child, not 
knowing that parts of the property had already been sold and he was buying a 
much smaller portion. The contract referred to the title map, stating the plots that 
were to be sold and their size.609 The court held that ‘if a man will not take 
reasonable care to ascertain what he is buying, he must take the consequences’.610 
                                                          
604 Hartog v Colin & Shields [1933] 3 All ER 566 (KB). 
605 See above Ch. 4.05.  
606 Via innocent misrepresentation.  
607 Tamplin v James [1880] 15 Ch D 215 (CA). 
608 Even though it seems that the map was quite small (see ibid. at 221). 
609 It should be noted that the court conceded that a buyer may be unaware of the difference. 
between twenty and forty perches (ibid. at 219). 
610 Ibid. per James, L.J. at 220. 
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The court expressed concern about the floodgates opening once allowing claims 
where one party is mistaken611 and in doing so focused much of the attention on 
the hardship to the non-mistaken party who had reasonably relied on the 
statement.  
In Webster v Cecil612 the seller had made a mistake in his calculations (it would 
seem though that these calculations had not been shown to the buyer) and added 
up the sum as being £ 1100 rather than £ 2100.613 However, the seller had 
previously rejected to sell the property at a price of £ 2000 and upon discovering 
the mistake had contacted the buyer immediately. It is safe to say that the buyer 
knew of the mistake. The court, in a short judgment, refused to order specific 
performance but that does not inhibit a claim at common law.614 Lord James (in 
Tamplin v James) in reference to Webster v Cecil states that it is ‘a case where a 
person snapped at an offer which he must have perfectly well-known to be made by 
mistake […]’615. This could therefore lead to the conclusion that in cases in which 
one of the parties had made a mistake as to the price (i.e. an error in calculation) 
                                                          
611 Ibid. at 221. 
612 Webster v Cecil [1861] 30 Beav 62 (CC).  
613 Ibid at 63. 
614 The continued existence of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside contracts for unilateral mistakes 
doubtful (see Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) 5.0.79) (see though Huyton SA v 
Distribuidora Internacional de Productos Agricolas SA [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 780 (CA)) the decision in 
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407 (CA). (See Yeo, 
‘Great Peace: a distance disturbance (Case Comment)’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review, 393). 
615Tamplin v James [1880] 15 Ch D 215 (CA), at 221. 
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the other party will not be able to rely on the offer for specific performance616 if 
they knew that a mistake had been made. The consequence is therefore that 
specific performance will be refused if it causes hardship amounting to injustice to 
the defendant although the defendant may still be liable for damages at common 
law.617 This does not really change the approach to errors in calculations. In Smith v 
Hughes618 where the buyer believed to be buying old oats when in fact he was 
buying new oats, the court held that there was no relief for the buyer because he 
was only mistaken as to the quality of the object which was not a term of the 
contract. It was therefore irrelevant whether the seller knew of the buyer’s 
mistake. 
The approach taken in Smith v Hughes619 has been confirmed, in the calculation 
error context, in a more recent case of The Harriete N.620 The case concerned a 
contract of demurrage in which the seller had miscalculated the amount to be 
charged to the seller due to the fact that they had entered the wrong dates into the 
computer system. The buyers admitted that they were aware of the mistake621 and 
did not inform the seller of the mistake. Whilst the court accepted that if there was 
a mistake as to the terms of the contract and the other party knew of the mistake, 
                                                          
616 Or the courts may be unwilling to specifically enforce the contract. 
617 Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 5.077 – 5.078. 
618 Smith v Hughes [1871] 6 LR 597 (QB). 
619 Ibid. 
620 Statoil ASA v Louis Drefus Energy Services LP (The Harriette N) [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 685. 
621 Ibid. at 85. 
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the contract would be considered void, they also held that the seller’s date for 
completion (which was in fact wrong) did not form part of the agreement.622 
In other words, had the calculation been part of the contract (in which case the 
mistake would have appeared on the face of the document and the other party 
would or should have known of it), then the contract can probably be avoided 
under English law. However, if the seller makes a mistake which is not on the face 
of the document the contract will remain valid, even if the other party knew of the 
mistake.  
This is in stark contrast to the German cases in which relief will be provided for 
errors in calculation. Relief will be provided in all circumstances if the error was on 
the face of the document and there is no requirement under § 119 BGB that the 
other party knew or should have known of the error.  In cases where the mistake 
was made off the document the court will look to whether the other party knew or 
should have known. If the party knew or should have known then the court will 
impose a duty of disclosure on the party to bring the error to the attention of the 
mistaken party.623 It was shown above that the German courts are protecting the 
mistaken party in cases when the non-mistaken party should have noticed that 
there has been an error. The German courts are then willing to impose a duty on 
the non-mistaken party to confirm that no mistake has occurred.624  
                                                          
622 Ibid. at 87 – 96. 
623 See for example the above at Ch. 4.6. 
624 Ibid. 
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The question remaining is why the English courts have not followed the continental 
approach in cases in which the other party knew or should have known and the 
mistake was not on the face of the document. The court seems to provide some 
indications in the Harriette N, where it was held that ’the mistake was entirely the 
result of carelessness by Mr Rostrup[…]’.625 It would therefore seem that rather 
than just protecting the reliance of the other party, which is unlikely in cases in 
which the non-mistaken party knew of the mistake, there also seems to be an 
element of punishment of the party making the mistake. At first glance the English 
approach may seem questionable when just taking into account the contracts 
between two parties but in cases in which there is a chain of contracts and where 
contracts have to be made with little time to spare (and therefore often opting for 
the cheapest option), it may be in the interest of commercial certainty not to 
require the non-mistaken party to have to enquire as to whether there may have 
been a mistake.     
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the theoretical development of mistake has influenced 
the German approach to mistake which in turn has influenced the perspective from 
which the courts analyse the cases. In other words the focus in the German cases is 
on the mistaken party but in the English cases, where there has been a mistake as 
to terms, the focus is on the non-mistaken party. The will theory in the narrow 
sense is then limited by reasonable reliance and this approach is reflected in both 
systems (in Germany through § 122 BGB and in England via the objective theory). 
                                                          
625 Statoil ASA v Louis Drefus Energy Services LP (The Harriette N) [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 685, at 106. 
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The autonomy of the individual not to have to enter into an agreement where he 
was mistaken as to the terms of the contract and the other party knew of the 
mistake is therefore a shared value. However, the fact that the courts in cases 
where § 119 BGB did not apply decided to fall back on the principle of culpa in 
contrahendo reveals, similar to the conclusion in chapter 3, that the understanding 
of the will theory has been expanded to a duty to look after the interests of the 
other and not doing so will lead to fraud. Not disclosing the mistake to the other 
party in the English cases is not seen as ‘fault’ in the German sense, except in cases 
where there is a special relationship (see Ch. 4.9).    
A similar value was revealed in Ch. 4.6 and Ch. 4.7 where the courts seem to be 
protecting the parties against informational imbalance. However, it is quite clear 
that many of the calculation mistake cases cannot be explained on the principle 
alone (e.g. see the evaluation of Hein Koetz626 in relation to the Daktari Film 
Case627) and it is the German courts that were willing to use general norms (such as 
good faith) to achieve their perceived just result. Partly this was explained on the 
basis of gaps in the legislative provisions (see a.6 on§ 434 BGB).  
It is not part of this thesis to answer the question whether this second form of 
background relationship contract exists but the fact that cases along those lines 
exist provides a basis for expanding the thesis of Chapter 3 where it was disclosed 
that there seems to be a different understanding of ‘fraud’ in the German and 
English system. The above was clear that the protection of the parties’ will is 
                                                          
626 Koetz and Schaefer, Judex oeconomicus (Mohr Siebeck 2003).  
627 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case)  
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paramount to a valid contract but that the reliance of the other, as part of the 
‘Interessenjurisprudenz’,628 will be protected through § 122 BGB. In addition 
though, there seems to be a social element namely that where the result would be 
unbearable or where there is a relationship of trust exists the courts will step in to 
ensure protection. The term social is of course rather broad and could firstly be 
seen in light of the individual parties, i.e. the need to help another clearly in need 
(see the argument alluded to in Chapter 2 of the unterlassene Hilfeleistung which 
creates a positive duty)629 but secondly it could also be seen in light of the wider 
social aspect. In the first sense the meaning of social is directed at the individual 
and that assisting the individual is desirable as a society.  
The second sense of social is the fact that society as a whole should be protected 
from contracts that create unbearable results or through the misuse of trust 
relationships. The last point is probably best explained in light of the 
‘Rechtsmissbrauch’ cases, where the court holds that enforcing the legal right 
would be contrary to good faith and therefore a misuse of the law. It would seem 
that overall it is the protection of society against the misuse of rights in cases that 
lead to unbearable results630 which is the primary concern. The last point of 
protection of society as a whole may not seem to fit comfortably at this point but 
                                                          
628 See Heck, ‘Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz’ (1914) 112 Archiv fuer die civilistische 
Praxis, p. 1 ff; ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’ means that the judge is required to fill gaps in the law with 
reference to the way in which previous cases gave way to the conflicting interests. 
629 The influence of which was discussed in Ch. 2.02 as originating in the German constitution.  
630 What exactly ‚unbearable’ means will be discussed in chapter 6.03 in light of society as a whole.  
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Chapter 6 will reemphasise the validity of the argument in light of unfair standard 
terms. This social aspect is not entirely lost on the English courts and the chapter 
has shown that in certain defined circumstances, e.g. joint ventures, the court will 
apply a similar principle of fault/fraud to the German courts.  
Chapter 5- Unfair Contract Terms 
5.01 Introduction 
The need to create a more efficient and quicker way to contract, as well as being 
able to apportion risk in advance, has meant that standard form contracts have 
been increasing in usage since the industrial revolution and have now become the 
norm. However, with the use of standard form contracts it has also become easier 
for the economically more powerful party to impose one-sided and unfair terms on 
the other party. Both the German and the English legal systems have developed 
mechanisms to protect the disadvantaged party against the use of unfair terms.  
The first part of this chapter will provide a historic overview of the development of 
the principles used by the courts in order to determine whether a term should be 
considered unfair. The first part of the historic overview will identify two main 
concerns that influenced the German judges but which are almost non-existent in 
England. The first is the supposed threat to the principles set out in the BGB 
through the creation of industry-led, one-sided norms, while the second is the fear 
of a monopoly or monopolistic (unfair) behaviour. The second part of the historic 
overview will show how the protection of society as a whole from generally unfair 
terms becomes the underlying value influencing most of the German courts’ 
judgments.  
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Ch. 5.3 will begin with a short introduction to the main developments relating to 
unfair terms in the English courts. The historic overview will show firstly that there 
is no evidence to suggest that the two underlying values mentioned in the first part 
of the German overview influenced the English judges. It will show how instead 
asymmetry of information, and in some cases the protection of the individual’s will, 
have strongly influenced the judges’ decisions. The later developments will then 
show how the individual’s knowledge and the application of the term to the 
individual case are the main underlying values in English Law. 
5.02 German Law prior to 1933 
The Romans seemed to adhere to a set of standard terms which were available to 
most merchants.631 This is probably the earliest use of a type of standard form 
contract but differed from what we know today as standard form contracts in that 
it was a summary of the rules relating to the relevant trade. In other words it was a 
summary of the existing laws, including case studies, to establish parties’ liability 
more quickly than by using the courts.632 Similarly, in the 15th century, in the upper 
Italian provinces, notaries would develop generic forms for a particular industry 
that would often become an industry norm as they were nothing more than a 
summary of what was common practice (rather than a rule of law) within the 
                                                          
631 Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die 
Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p. 1-5. 
632 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935), p. 
24-26. 
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industry.633 This practice was developed in Germany in the 18th century in a way 
that is more similar to the general terms and conditions used today.634 The rise of 
the stock exchange from a rather static to a frequent ‘exchange’ of shares meant 
that there was a need for a standardisation of the terms on which these large 
numbers of exchanges are to occur.635 This was closely followed by the insurance, 
train and transport industries which require a large number of small scale contracts.  
Parallel to this development associations, such as the German booksellers’ and 
publishers’ association, which was founded in 1825, created standard form 
contracts for their own industry.636  
There are at this point two types of influences on standard terms. The first is where 
there is an industry network that, funded by the industry, requires standardised 
transactions for a more efficient operation of the market. The second influence is 
the government. The government as the main provider of train,637 postal, and later 
telecommunication services, created general terms that would govern all contracts 
                                                          
633 Pappenheim, Handbuch des Seerechts, vol 3 (Duncker & Humboldt 1918), p. 115. 
634 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935) ,p. 
26. 
635 There is more information on the rise (and regulation) of the stock exchange in Germany in 
Ehrenberg, ‘Boersenwesen’ in Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, vol 2 (2nd edn, Gustav 
Fischer 1899), p. 1023 – 1053; Bernhard, Die Boerse, ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Bedeutung 
(S. Simon Verlag 1900). 
636 Between publishers, retailers and individual stores but not between the customers and sellers.  
637 With some private companies providing train services in the early 1800s; the train services were 
all nationalised by 1920. 
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within the individual sector. This would later give rise to a discussion on whether 
standard form contracts (AGB), being issued by the state, were in fact legal norms 
without any question as to the fairness (or for that matter incorporation) of the 
terms.638 In turn this adds weight to this thesis that the courts were in fact only 
interested in protecting society against monopolistic behaviour and protecting the 
legal system. The argument here would be that as the standard forms were issued 
by the state these values must already be protected.   
Even with regard to standard terms created by the industry, the courts’ approach to 
dealing with clearly one-sided AGBs was rather tentative. In 1883 the courts 
refused to provide any sort of relief regardless of how far ‘the balance of liability 
had been shifted in contrast to the natural status’.639 Such non-intervention by the 
courts is not surprising as general terms and conditions were seen as a product of 
economic liberalism,640 enhancing free competition between traders. Economic 
self-interest was the driving force in building the economy. The rise of economic 
self-interest was based on the motivation for profits and was seen as a necessary 
driver to uphold the harmony of the economy within Germany.641 Particularly with 
a rise of the new middle class and an increase in trade activities from around 1890, 
                                                          
638 Noting here that often it was easier to draft legislation that was automatically incorporated into 
the contract rather than create AGBs. See Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig 
gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p. 204 – 208. 
639 RGZ 11, 100 .  
640 Ibid. 
641 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935), p. 
15. 
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Germany experienced a new community-driven leadership. This new force was 
expressed by trying to create transactions with foreseeable rules – rather than the 
rulings of judges based often on their personal beliefs. The use of general terms and 
conditions was therefore a welcome form of harmonisation. Particular areas of 
business would create standard forms, harmonising the rules within their trade.642  
In addition, the courts were also reluctant to intervene because the AGBs were 
considered similar (or in some cases equal) to legal norms.643 This was mainly due 
to the mix of standard forms issued by the government and the standard forms 
used in industry as a summary of the industry norms. Just five years after refusing 
to provide relief, in 1888 the courts held that the owner of a transport company 
could not exclude liability for damage to the goods caused by his employees 
because the general public had no other choice but to use this particular service. In 
1888 the court based its decision on AGBs being contrary to good morals and the 
fact that there was harm to the general public because there was no other party 
they could contract with.644 The fear here was that a monopoly could impose terms 
on the general public as they wanted. The First World War and the subsequent 
inflation exaggerated the use of standard terms (and particularly terms that could 
                                                          
642 Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die 
Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p. 2-5. 
643 See above.  
644 It should be noted though that the courts refrained from using this reasoning in later shipping 
cases (e.g. RGZ 25, 104 ) which also had an effect on other industries (e.g. an insurance case RGZ 48, 
114 ). 
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relieve the business man from the risks) and in the process also created much 
negative publicity for the government and courts alike.645 
A factor that will have influenced the court’s decision whether or not to intervene 
was that strict limitations on trade by local associations had only just been lifted. 
The question was therefore whether these were waves of the new free market 
which would smooth as competition grew or whether this was a permanent 
difficulty which needed to be addressed.646 This uncertainty would explain the non-
interventionist approach by the legislator and the courts. The government changed 
its position from the neutral stance of allowing the industry to develop, to 
becoming a leader of industry.647 A new spirit of community-driven governance was 
injected into the German leadership which resulted in economic self-interest being 
viewed as subject to the greater good of Germany as a state. This in turn allowed 
for easier intervention in cases of a monopoly exploiting its position as against 
society. This change in governmental thinking had an impact on the courts’ 
approach to cases of unfair terms. The post-1933 cases still reflect the idea of 
protection of the public against monopolistic behaviour and also the protection of 
society as a whole.648  
                                                          
645 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935), p. 
28. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid, p. 16. 
648 See below Ch. 5.05. 
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As early as 1928 the courts were willing to intervene (on the basis of §§ 242 and 
315 BGB) in cases where an unusual term649 was hidden in the AGBs.650 The 
approach that was taken by the courts was that the term was so unusual that the 
party could not have been taken to have agreed to it. In turn this meant however 
that if the term had been conspicuous or it could be shown that the party knew or 
should have known about it then the term would be incorporated into the contract. 
The case is more important though for two reasons. The first is that the courts were 
willing to intervene for the first time on the basis that a term was considered 
unusual (and it would be safe to infer that the term was unfair) and that there was 
a need to protect parties against unusual terms hidden in the AGBs. The second is 
that the courts decided that the term was so unusual that it was not incorporated.  
The reason for intervention may also be found in the theory of first Grossmann-
Doerth651 and later Wagner,652 that with the growing acceptance of one-sided AGBs 
by the public, the weaker party (meaning the consumer) would be educated in two 
ways. The first was that there would be little point in trying to fight the stronger 
party. The second was that there would be no reason to believe in the protection 
supposedly afforded by the BGB as the standard terms would probably override 
                                                          
649 Translation from the German: ‚unüblich‘. 
650 RG (25.09.1928) BankA 28/185  In Salzer, Allgemeine Geschaeftsbedingungen- Schriftenreihe der 
Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift (C. H. Beck Verlag 1971), p. 86 FN 20. 
651 Grossmann-Doerth, Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und Staatliches Recht: 
Antrittsvorlesung (Band 10 Universitaet Freiburg, Breisgau 1933). 
652 Wagner, Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen- Bestandsaufnahme und Rechtspolitisches Programm 
(Dissertationsdruck G. Bauknecht 1973). 
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them anyway. The consumers (or weaker parties) would therefore come to expect 
the one-sided AGBs as the norm and to follow the power of the economically 
wealthier. 653 In that same process the consumers (or weaker parties) would lose 
faith in the legal system which in effect would be allowing a separate, self-sufficient 
economic legal system that would represent norms that were contrary to the ethos 
of the BGB (so-called anti-BGB norms). This was the first time that there is 
acceptance (at least by academics) that unfair terms are harmful to society as a 
whole.  
The courts then gradually began to base their decisions on §138 BGB654 which 
meant that the term had to be contrary to good morals. §138 BGB reads: 
(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to good morals is void. (2) In particular, a 
legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, 
inexperience, lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of will of another, 
causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be 
                                                          
653 See ibid; p. 12-14; Grossmann-Doerth, Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und Staatliches 
Recht: Antrittsvorlesung (Band 10 Universitaet Freiburg, Breisgau 1933); p. 16. 
654 §138 BGB is tentatively used in RGZ 20, 115 , 117. In RGZ 62, 264 , 266 the court openly base their 
decision on §138 BGB: ‚[…] der einzelne ein ihm tatsaechlich zustehendes Monopol oder den 
Ausschluss einer Konkurrenzmoeglichkeit dazu missbraucht, um dem allgemeinen Verkehr unbillige, 
unverhaeltnissmassige Opfer aufzuerlegen, unbillige und verhaeltnismaessige Bedingungen 
vorzuschreiben.‘ Translation: if the individual misuses an actual authority or an exclusion of 
competition to impose or prescribe unfair or disproportionate obligations on the general public.  
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promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the 
performance.  
The difficulty with §138 BGB was that it was aimed at contracts which had as an 
object something that was contrary to good morals. In contrast if the aim of the 
contract is not against good morals, being for example for the supply of gas or 
electricity, it was not sufficient that the freedom of the individual655 had been 
limited until the court decided to broaden the scope of what was to be considered 
‘contrary to good morals’.656 The parameters within which the court was therefore 
willing to apply the principle was that the use of the AGB was only considered 
contrary to good morals if the other party had no alternative. In other words, only if 
there was a monopoly would the court allow a claim under § 138 BGB.657 Even if 
there was a monopoly and the term was considered unfair there was the added 
difficulty of the term having become customary law or alternatively an industry 
norm in which case there was no relief for the weaker party.658 The implication 
could be that if a term has become customary law then there is no harm to society 
as a whole.  
                                                          
655  RG (14.02.31) JW 31/1958 where it was held that it was impossible that the party could have 
voluntarily agreed to that term; also RG (25.03.36) JW 36/2093 . 
656 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935), p. 
280. 
657 Note though that the definition of ‚monopoly‘ broadens over time (i.e. if it was a monopoly 
within a certain area or to a certain group of people) – see cases such RGZ 79, 224 . 
658 Weber, Die Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen- Eine rechtliche Gesamtdarstellung (Schweitzer 
Verlag 1967); p. 197 – 208. 
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The courts’ approach to allowing claims on the basis of § 138 BGB in cases where 
they had misused their position based on their monopoly (taken from the pre-BGB 
times) was then not based on the limitation of the individual’s contractual freedom 
but must then be shown to be a misuse of power that was contrary to the public as 
a whole. Only if the AGB were contrary to the public as a whole (and not only to 
that individual) due to their monopoly would § 138 BGB be applied by the courts.659 
There are two aspects which are of particular striking in relation to the courts’ 
decision to use § 138 BGB, the first is that it represents the fear of monopolistic 
behaviour of that time which is declared to be against good morals660  (a less 
demanding standard than being contrary to good faith) and the second is that in 
order for it to be against good morals it must affect society as a whole.661  
                                                          
659 Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die 
Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p. 284. 
660 At the time there seems to have been a tension between wanting monopolies to avoid cheaper 
foreign imports (see for example the Zuendwarenmonopolgesetz of 1930 ) where the main aim was 
to monopolise the sale of matches to avoid the cheaper Soviet imports. In the process though the 
main producers had attempted to increase their market share by dumping the prices. A further 
example is monopoly in the marine towing industry (For a complete historic overview see Bieling, 
Das Monopol in der Schleppschiffahrt (Maritime Press 2013)) and wanting to maintain diversity 
among sellers to offer alternative sources for buyers. In works such as Thalheimer, Ueber die 
sogenannte Wirtschaftsdemokratie (Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik 1928), the author claims that the 
workers have no influence on the monopolies such as iron works (see p. 13-19). 
661 This is also a product of the time. Falling commodity prices and exorbitant interest payments 
created a public fear that society may be falling apart. This fear is translated into a value which was 
carried into the national socialist ideology (where for examples farmers would be supported due to 
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The wide use of standard terms was not reduced by the national socialist 
government of 1933 but there was a significant change.662 The new structure of the 
state and economy meant that industry associations were impacted by national 
socialist ideals. Prices and terms were to be brought in line with the national 
socialist ideology through economic regulation.663 This was achieved by either 
creating or taking over trade associations which would create industry-specific 
terms which they would then impose on the private sector.664 These terms set by 
the associations were seen as universally applicable without the necessity for any 
reference within the contract.665 The consequence was that AGBs issued in this way 
                                                          
their contribution to society as a whole, debts would be written off for the birth of children because 
children were seen as a contribution to society as a whole) - Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution 
(Norton 1980) p.100 -110.  
662 The change was almost immediate with the use of so-called cartels. See Leonhardt, Kartelltheorie 
und Internationale Beziehungen: Theoriegeschichtliche Studien (Georg Olms Verlag 2013), p. 210 – 
250. 
663 See for example Larenz, Vertrag und Unrecht: Teil 1- Vertrag und Vertragsbruch (Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt 1936); p. 33. 
664 Examples include AGBs for the sale of potatoes, sweets, honey, sugar, vegetables, fruits etc. (for a 
more detailed list see Haupt, Die Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen der deutschen Banken (Leipzig 
1937), p.209).  
665 […] wichtig ist in allen Fällen, dass die auf Grund dieser Bestimmungen entstandenen AGB für 
allgemein Verbindlich erklärt werden können, so dass sie also im Verhältnis zwischen Unternehmen 
und Kunden gelten, ohne dass einer rechtsgeschäftlichen Einigung darüber bedarf. […]‘ibid, p.201. 
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were not considered contractual agreements but legal norms and as such were 
considered fair.666  
5.03 German Law after 1935 
In 1935 Raiser published his work on the use of unfair terms. He criticised the fact 
that the courts for failing to distinguish between cases of procedural unfairness (i.e. 
whether the term was incorporated) and unfairness as to the substance of the 
term. This statement seemed to go unheard for many years. However, Raiser’s 
summary (and commentary) of the law on unfair terms did provide a foundation for 
renewing the system. There were several difficulties facing the courts. The first was 
that it was apparent that §138 BGB would only catch cases where there was a 
monopoly but not cases where all competitors were using the same kind of terms. 
The second was that the national socialist era had left a legacy of norm-like terms 
and conditions including the ease with which these could be included in the 
contract. In brief, as long as the other party knew or should have known that AGBs 
existed, they were automatically incorporated into the contract.667 However, this 
rule only applied in cases where the AGBs could reasonably be expected to be 
included. In cases where the reasonable party would not expect the term to be 
included, it could only be included by express reference to that term.668 The 
                                                          
666 Not entirely without criticism. In 1863 v. Geber and shortly after Mittermaier had mentioned that 
AGBs were misinterpreted as legal norms – see Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, 
einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p. 213; 
also see the development of the argument of legal norms in this section, below.  
667 See for example RGZ 103, 405 ; RGZ 114, 282 . 
668 RGZ 103, 84 ; RGZ 112, 253 and later BGHZ 17, 03 . 
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difficulty with this approach was that if the whole industry was using similar terms 
(whether fair or not) they would automatically be included in the contract.  
The third was that even though Raiser had proclaimed that the tool in every judge’s 
toolbox was to interpret the AGB against the person relying on them,669 the general 
rule had been to establish the proclaimer’s will or at the very least the will of both 
parties.670 For example in the Betting Shop Case,671 the back of a betting ticket that 
the claimant had bought from an agent of the betting shop excluded all tickets that 
had not been received by head-office. In this case two of the three tickets handed 
in by the claimant were sent to the head office (the third and vital ticket was later 
found at the agent’s office). The court held that due to the principle of restriction 
the term only applied to cases where the claimant should have had reason to 
believe that the agent would not send his bet to head-office.672 Schmidt-Salzer later 
added that in cases where the AGB were restricting provisions of the BGB, they 
should always be interpreted very narrowly.673 This approach was accepted as the 
principle of ‘restriction’.674 For example, if the purchaser of property has made it 
                                                          
669 Raiser, Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1935), p. 
265. 
670 See Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und 
die Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p.126. 
671 BGHZ 5, 111 , 115. 
672 See also BGH NJW 1968, 591. 
673 Salzer, Allgemeine Geschaeftsbedingungen- Schriftenreihe der Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift 
(C. H. Beck Verlag 1971), p. 83. 
674 E.g. BGHZ 22, 90; BGH NJW 1959, 38. 
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clear that the reason he is buying the property is to build on it and the contract 
contains a term that any claim for visible or invisible defects of the property is 
excluded, the exclusion would not apply if the buyer later found out that he could 
not build on the property – this would not be considered a defect.675   
§242 BGB and Standard Terms 
Even at the beginning of the 1950s the idea of some AGBs being considered legal 
norms still lingered. The BGH finally rejected the idea in 1951 and allowed for a 
fresh approach to evaluating the fairness of standard terms.676 The court reiterated 
this approach in a 1953 case where it was claimed that the general terms for freight 
forwarders677 had been included in a forwarding order without the consent of the 
other party. The argument was that because they had a norm-like character they 
were automatically included. The courts rejected the suggestion that the other 
party must know (or at least should have known) that the terms were included. 
The use of § 242 BGB became essential in the new approach to evaluating standard 
terms mainly because of the limits of § 138 BGB. The approach to unfair terms 
under § 138 BGB was focussed on the procedure through which the contract was 
entered into (i.e. did the other party use his monopoly to force the other party to 
accept the terms). There was little scope for evaluating whether the substance of a 
                                                          
675 BGH NJW 1964, 356, at 358. This statement was made orbiter dictum as the contract was signed 
in the presence of a notary public in which case the standard terms and conditions would not be 
classed as a one-sided but are then classed as an individually negotiated contract. 
676 BGHZ 03, 200; BGH MDR 1953, 353 . 
677 Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteurbedingungen. 
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term was unfair. In 1953 the court considered how deviations from the existing law 
should be considered. It should be remembered here that the protection of the 
underlying values of the BGB was an important element in the rise of § 138 BGB.678  
The first tentative approach was made in 1953. § 340 (2) BGB states that ‘if the 
obligee is entitled to a claim in damages for non-performance, he may demand the 
penalty as the minimum amount of the damage. Assertion of additional damage is 
not excluded.’ The court confirmed that this provision could be deviated from by 
the parties will.679 However, the court also held that the parties could not do so in 
the general terms and conditions. This followed from the fact that the party using 
standard form contracts was claiming the freedom of contract for themselves. In 
doing so, the court held, that they had a heightened obligation to take their future 
contractual parties’ interests into account. In other words, if the party is intending 
to use standard form contracts they must take the other party’s interests into 
account when drafting the clause.  
This was the first time that the court had moved away from the approach that the 
term must be known to the other party to make an informed decision to an 
obligation to take into account the other party’s interests. Just three years later the 
court decided to base their entire decision on §242 BGB rather than on §138 
                                                          
678 This was first mentioned in Ch. 5.01 above but will be developed further in the course of this 
chapter. 
679 See BGH GRUR 1953, 262 . 
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BGB.680 In the bedroom purchase case681 the court made it clear,682  with particular 
reference to Raiser’s work, that it was not sufficient that the term was unfair in this 
particular case for this individual but it must be generally unfair to the average 
buyer. Only this would justify the courts in analysing the substantive fairness of the 
particular agreement:683 
It can be concluded that in cases of new furniture that the exclusion of buyer’s 
statutory warranties can be included in standard form contracts if the buyer is 
provided with a right to repair or replacement. […] A differing design of the 
standard terms cannot be brought in harmony with the principle of good faith 
[…]684. 
                                                          
680 or in some cases a combination of both. 
681 BGHZ 22, 90 (Bedroom Purchase Case) . 
682 Ibid. at 98: ‚[…] sowie auf die Interessen der an einem solchen Kauf üblicherweise beteiligten 
Verkäuferschicht und Käuferschicht, nicht aber auf die individuellen Belange der in dem Einzelfall an 
dem konkreten Vertrag gerade beteiligten Vertragspartner ankommt.‘ – Translation: […] as well as 
the interests of the particular group of sellers and particular group of buyers that should be taken 
into account but not the individual interests of the particular case which only relates to the 
particular contract to which the parties are bound.  
683 Note here though the criticism by Hellwege that if protection of the general ‘good’ were the 
objective then the court should be allowed to evaluate the adequacy of the price, which the courts 
refuse. (See Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen 
und die Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010); p. 540 – 546). 
684 Translation of BGHZ 22, 90 (Bedroom Purchase Case) at 98: ‚Zusammenfassend ergibt sich daraus, 
daß bei einem Kauf fabrikneuer Möbel der Ausschluß der Gewährleistungsansprüche durch die 
allgemeinen Lieferungsbedingungen des Käufers zwar generell vorgesehen werden kann, wenn dem 
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It seems that the influence of Raiser’s work and his criticism of the use of § 138 BGB 
and the national socialist ideologies of protecting society against unfair terms was 
carried into the court’s values of the 1960s.  
In the Bedroom Purchase Case685 the defendant (buyer) had bought bedroom 
furniture. A credit agreement was drawn up by the claimant (an intermediary) and 
entered into by Gefa (the fourth party). The credit agreement excluded the 
purchaser’s right to withhold performance (i.e. payment) in case of a defect. The 
goods arrived and were damaged. The defendant (the buyer) refused to pay the 
instalments until the defect was cured. Upon defaulting on the payments Gefa sold 
the credit agreement to the intermediary who then brought this claim. The court 
balanced the interests of the claimant (to be able to uphold the contract) against 
the buyer’s interest in receiving undamaged goods (and therefore being able to 
enforce that right by withholding payment). The court held that the buyer’s 
interests outweighed those of the seller on the basis of good faith. It would seem 
that the court’s main concern was then the balance of the interests of the parties as 
a foundational principle of the contractual arrangement on the proviso that this 
                                                          
Käufer statt dessen ein Nachbesserungsrecht eingeräumt ist, daß aber die 
Gewährleistungsansprüche des Käufers aufleben, wenn sich das Nachbesserungsrecht aus 
irgendeinem Grunde nicht realisieren läßt. Eine andere Gestaltung der Lieferungsbedingungen läßt 
sich mit den Grundsätzen von Treu und Glauben nicht vereinbaren, weil dies zu einer rechtlich 
unhaltbaren, weil rechtlich unbilligen Belastung des Käufers führen würde, die nicht hingenommen 
werden kann. In dieser Hinsicht bestehen deshalb für den Inhalt der Lieferungsbedingungen gemäß § 
242 BGB zwingende Schranken. ‘ 
685 Ibid.  
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affects society as a whole.686 In other words the restriction on withholding buyers’ 
payments in general was contrary to good faith. The court also accepted that § 242 
BGB (rather than § 138 BGB) was the dominant provision to deal with unfair 
terms.687 
The Sunken Ship Case 688 showed that this approach by the courts did not apply 
universally but that it might be limited to consumer contracts. Here, the contract 
was for the security of two ships. The defendant had contracted to provide security 
patrols at the docks in Hamburg. Company X, who was insured with the claimant, 
had left two ships at the docks to be watched by the defendant.  The first ship sank 
in the bay where the company had left it, the second ship was moved by the 
defendant and later sank there. The defendant claimed that their responsibility for 
the damage (or loss) of the ships was limited to 300 Reichsmark.689 The claimant 
argued that the reason the ships sank was due to the negligence of the staff and 
that therefore the exclusion clause did not conform to the principle of good faith, 
particularly in light that there was no other company offering this service in 
Hamburg. 
The court acknowledged, in the Bedroom purchase case, that generally a reduction 
in cost could not justify the exclusion690 but that in this case the factor could be 
                                                          
686 Similarly see BGH NJW 1975, 163 (Burgled Pub Case) at 164. 
687 This problem would now be dealt with under §§ 358 and 359. 
688 BGHZ 33, 216 (Sunken Ship Case).. 
689 Note that the standard terms were from 1937, hence the loss was limited to Reichsmark.  
690 BGHZ 22, 90, 98 
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taken into account.691 The reason was that in the industry it was common for ship 
owners to have insurance to cover the loss of the ship and the reduced price 
therefore made business sense. More importantly the court went on to discuss how 
the AGBs should be interpreted. The first test is whether generally, to a reasonable 
person, the terms and conditions were fair and could be expected692 to be included 
in these types of contract.693 The second test was whether in this particular 
contract a term which was usually reasonable could still be contrary to good faith. 
The court concluded that due to the fact that it was normal in the industry for the 
other party to have insurance, this clause was not contrary to good faith.694 The 
focus for the court was therefore first and foremost on whether the term in itself 
was fair in substance and then to evaluate whether the term was expected in this 
                                                          
691 BGHZ 33, 216 (Sunken Ship Case), 220 
692 The line of thought here is that the other party only consented (in line with § 242 BGB) for the 
AGBs to be included which he could reasonably expect to be included under the circumstances.  
693 BGHZ 33, 216 (Sunken Ship Case) , 218 expanding on the analysis in BGHZ 7, 365 , 368. 
694 Summary of the courts decision at the end of para 2: ‚Notwendig, aber auch genügend ist bei 
Vertragsschluß die Einigung dahin, daß die von einem Vertragspartner aufgestellten 
Geschäftsbedingungen gelten sollen (ohne daß der andere Vertragsteil sie im einzelnen zu kennen 
braucht); der Unterwerfungswille des anderen Teils bezieht sich aber gem. §242 BGB nur auf solche 
Bedingungen, mit deren Aufstellung er billiger- und gerecht erweise rechnen kann (BGHZ 17, 1, 3;  
NJW 55, 1145). Dies erfordert eine Abwägung der Interessen der normalerweise für solche Geschäfte 
beteiligten Kreise (BGHZ 22, 90, 98;  NJW 57, 17). Ist eine unter diesen Gesichtspunkten geprüfte 
Klausel nicht zu beanstanden, so kann dennoch die Berufung auf sie im Einzelfall eine unzulässige 
Rechtsausübung darstellen und durch die Zulassung dieses Einwandes den Umständen des 
Einzelfalles Rechnung getragen werden […]‘. 
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type of contract. A term which in itself seems unfair can still be held to be fair if it 
was expected to be included in such a contract – e.g. because the parties are 
expected to be insured. 
The sunken ship case confirms the values of ‘protection of society’ and ‘protection 
against monopolistic behaviour’ because if in these type of cases it is the norm that 
the party has insurance then society is automatically protected. Similarly, there is 
no reason to protect the parties from the monopolistic behaviour because the party 
is protected by insurance.  
In 1964 the courts decided to find an alternative explanation on the basis of the 
individual’s private autonomy (combined again with the deviation from statutory 
rules). In the Storage Destruction Case695 the AGBs had reversed the burden of 
proof by making the customer prove that the owner of the storage facility was at 
fault for the damage. It was impossible for the person storing their goods to show 
that it was the storage owner’s fault because the goods were out of his control.  
The presumption would usually be that if the goods are with the storage owner, he 
would have to prove that it was not his fault if the goods were damaged whilst they 
were stored there. The courts argued here that the individual’s private autonomy 
had been destroyed due to the submission to the contract which justified the courts 
interference. The court held that there was an imbalance in the contract and that 
therefore the clause was invalid. Here the court relied more on the private 
individual’s autonomy than on the argument of protecting society as a whole in 
                                                          
695 BGHZ 41, 151 (Storage Destruction Case) . 
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order to allow the court to review the standard terms.696 The fairness of the terms 
was then to be measured against the degree to which the dispositive law was 
aimed at protecting societal values as opposed to considerations of expediency.697 
In this case the protection of the dispositive law (or the BGB) trumped the 
contractual terms because the remedies had been entirely removed by the 
contractual provisions. The reasoning in the case is reminiscent of the above 
arguments that were originally put forward – namely the loss of faith in the legal 
order if the protections in the BGB can be circumvented by contractual provisions 
to any degree.698  
                                                          
696 This was a summary of the courts argument under para III: ‚Da Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen 
ihre Rechtswirksamkeit nicht von einer (nicht bestehenden) Privatautonomie, sondern nur von der 
Unterwerfung des anderen Vertragsteils ableiten können, muß ihnen die Anerkennung versagt 
werden, soweit die von ihnen für eine unbestimmte Anzahl von Einzelfällen aufgestellte Regel mit 
den Grundsätzen von Treu und Glauben nicht zu vereinbaren ist.‘ 
697 This was a summary of the courts argument under para III: ‚Soweit Vorschriften des dispositiven 
Rechtes ihre Entstehung nicht nur Zweckmäßigkeitserwägungen, sondern einem aus der Natur der 
Sache sich ergebenden Gerechtigkeitsgebot verdanken, müssen bei einer abweichenden Regelung 
durch Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen Gründe vorliegen, die für die von ihnen zu regelnden Fälle 
das dem dispositiven Recht zugrunde liegende Gerechtigkeitsgebot in Frage stellen und eine 
abweichende Regelung als mit Recht und Billigkeit vereinbar erscheinen lassen. Der 
Gerechtigkeitsgehalt der vom Gesetzgeber aufgestellten Dispositivnormen kann verschieden groß 
sein. Je stärker er ist, ein desto strengerer Maßstab muß an die Vereinbarkeit von Abweichungen in 
Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen mit dem Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben angelegt werden.‘  
698 See Ch. 5.02. 
202 
 
There are therefore two values that the courts have considered in this case: 
protection of society and the individual’s autonomy. A fundamental value of the 
BGB is the protection of the individual’s autonomy/will.699 The approach taken by 
the courts may therefore be considered a widening of the doctrine on unfair terms 
in order to review terms which are unfair because they create a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ obligations (substantive unfairness). The conclusion would 
be that where there is a significant imbalance in the parties’ obligations due to the 
standard terms of the contract the court would consider the content of the term 
contrary to good faith on the basis that the individual’s will has been limited (noting 
here though that the court will still measure the fairness on the basis of the 
protection of society as a whole).    
The notion in the Storage Destruction Case700 of protecting private autonomy also 
had an influence on later cases. In the Confusing Slot Machine Case701 the AGBs 
contained a clause that if the slot machines were not set up correctly on the 
premises of the other party, 20 DM would have to be paid each day until the end of 
the contract. The owner of the pub refused to set up the slot machines (for 
unknown reasons). The contract had been structured in a particularly confusing way 
by jumbling all the terms and omitting any headings and sub-headings. It was 
argued that the contract had been ‘structured’ in this way to ensure that the other 
party would have to pay special attention to the AGBs. The court rejected this idea 
                                                          
699 See particularly Ch. 3.13. 
700 BGHZ 41, 151 (Storage Destruction Case) . 
701 BGHZ 51, 55 (Confusing Slot Machine Case) . 
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and found that the contract was contrary to § 138 BGB – against good morals.702 
The basis of the decision703 was that because one of the parties had imposed the 
terms on the other party – this was particularly apparent because the AGBs had 
been designed not to be understood by the other party - and had therefore claimed 
the freedom of contract for themselves, there was a duty on that party to have 
reasonable regard for the other party’s interests. The difficulty in this case was that 
the term itself was not in fact contrary to good faith – it was a simple penalty 
clause.704 Previously § 138 BGB had required there to be a monopoly but due to the 
Storage Destruction Case705 the courts could now argue that the contract was 
contrary to good morals because it did not consider the interests of the other party. 
An added benefit of using § 138 BGB in this case was that the court could hold that 
the whole contract was void.  
In the Greedy Accountant Case706 the German Supreme Court held that a term that 
was contrary to good faith because it was surprising and unfair would not have 
been incorporated into the contract. In the case the defendant had transferred his 
tax matters to a tax consultant under a mandate that referred to the consultant’s 
standard terms of business. These standard terms set out that if the mandate was 
revoked prematurely the full sum would be payable regardless of the work that had 
                                                          
702 See Ch. 5.02 above. 
703 BGHZ 51, 55 (Confusing Slot Machine Case) , 59. 
704 Which are legitimate in German law (§§ 339 BGB ff).  
705 BGHZ 41, 151 (Storage Destruction Case) . 
706 BGHZ 54, 105 (Greedy Accountant Case) . 
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been done. The court held that the term was so surprising and one-sided that the 
defendant could not be held to have agreed to that term.707  The court took a two-
step approach. First, it considered whether the term was surprising (procedural 
fairness) and later whether the substance of the term was unfair (substantive 
unfairness): ‘It is settled case law that the person who relies on standard terms 
assumes for himself control over the general freedom of contract as far as the 
content of the contract is concerned. He is therefore obliged at the stage of drafting 
those standard terms to look to the reasonable protection of the interested of his 
future contractual partners.’ The court then went on to consider the fairness of the 
remuneration and held that ‘it is true that it is not unacceptable as such that, 
according to the substance of § 17 ALLGO [their standard terms], the agent can and 
should retain the complete remuneration in the event of early revocation […]’. The 
court went on to hold that ‘the clause does not, however, accord with the principle 
of good faith, because in setting the level of the remuneration claim[…] it pays no 
attention at all to the extent to which services have actually been provided […]’. 
The philosophy the court seems to be upholding is that the individual should be 
able to enter into a standard form contract without having to expect any unusual 
terms to be contained therein. Even if the term is held to be unusual the court then 
has to review the substance of the term whether this term would generally be 
considered unfair. The idea that terms which are considered unusual in the 
                                                          
707 For a translation of the relevant part of the case Beale and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune 
Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010), p.764. 
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particular contract are held not to have been incorporated into the contract is now 
included in § 305c (1) BGB: 
Provisions in standard business terms which in the circumstances, in particular with 
regard to the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the other 
party to the contract with the user need not expect to encounter them, do not form 
part of the contract.’   
In 1975, in the Burgled Pub Case,708 the defendant, the owner of a pub, was 
contractually obliged to keep gaming machines in operation for several years. The 
contract stated that if in breach of this provision, the defendant had to pay 
2,000.00 DM in damages and whatever profits would have accrued. These terms 
were contained in the general terms and conditions. The pub was broken into and 
shortly after was also burgled. During the burglary the machines were damaged and 
the defendant then decided not to re-open the pub. The question was whether the 
claimant was entitled to 2,000.00 DM and the loss of profit. The court held that 
generally agreeing on a fixed sum of damages in a contract promoted certainty and 
efficiency but that the provision declaring that the 2,000.00 DM did not influence 
the additional payment of all damages was contrary to good faith in light of § 340 
(2) BGB.709 The fact that the 2,000.00 DM were in addition to the damages arising 
                                                          
708 BGH NJW 1975, 163 (Burgled Pub Case) . 
709 § 340 BGB reads: (1) If the obligor has promised the penalty in the event that he fails to perform 
his obligation, the obligee may demand the penalty that is payable in lieu of fulfilment. If the obligee 
declares to the obligor that he is demanding the penalty, the claim to performance is excluded. (2) If 
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from the breach, in this case 1,852.62 DM, meant that this was an exploitation of 
the other party.  
The court did not address whether the term was surprising but considered whether 
the term was unfair. The court balanced the benefit of expedience and the 
potential losses and came to the conclusion that the clause created a windfall for 
the creator of the standard terms without any benefit to the other party. In other 
words the claimant will have to show that there are more than just considerations 
of expedience that override the justice set up by the existing statutory law. The 
nature of § 340 (2) BGB, the court continued, is to balance the interests of the 
parties and could therefore not be excluded in this case.710 The test for whether the 
term can or cannot be excluded in standard form contracts is whether the interests 
of the other party are sufficiently protected.711  
In the case of the ‘greedy accountant’712 the court held that if the creator of the 
AGBs decided to limit the dispositive law only in his favour, thereby neglecting the 
interests of the other party, he was misusing the freedom of contract which in turn 
legitimises the courts intervention. It would seem that the development of the 
cases show how the courts have reviewed cases in two different ways. The first are 
cases where there is a monopoly (or quasi-monopoly) and the term is considered 
                                                          
the obligee is entitles to a claim to damages for non-performance, he may demand the penalty 
payable as the minimum amount of the damage. Assertion of additional damage is not excluded.  
710 See also BGHZ 22, 90 (Bedroom Purchase Case) discussed above. 
711 BGH NJW 1975, 163 (Burgled Pub Case) , 164. 
712 BGHZ 54, 105 (Greedy Accountant Case) , 109. 
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unfair in substance. The second approach is where the term is surprising and unfair 
in substance.713  
5.04 German Law and the AGBG 1975 
The Bundestag (the German parliament) published its suggestion of the AGBG (the act on 
standard form contracts) in August 1975.714 The suggestions by the Government 
acknowledge that there had been a shift from the small business on an individual basis with 
a ‘model of self-regulation of the economy’715 to imposed standardised contracts. The basis 
for the hands-off approach by the government in years prior to the reform had been, 
similarly to that in England, that of freedom of contract of the individual716 and most likely 
the expectation of self-regulation.717  
The final AGB Gesetz in essence followed the recommendations of the Deutschen 
Juristentag (the German jurists’ conference) in that it did not limit its application to 
consumer contracts but also included business-to-business contracts. It thereby rejected 
the proposal of socialist legal theorists for an independent consumer code.718  It also 
rejected the proposal of an inspection of AGBs prior to their use by government 
                                                          
713 Note that where a clause is found to be surprising it is sufficient under § 305 c BGB for the clause 
not to be included without the requirement of the clause being unfair.  
714 BT Drucksache 7/3919 (Bericht des Rechstausschusses - 6. Ausschuss) (1975). 
715 Ibid; p. 9: ‘[…]hatte in einer weithin von Handwerk und Kleingewerbe geprägten 
Wirtschaftsordnung das ‚Modell einer sich selbst regulierenden Harmonie des ökonomischen 
Geschehens noch eine reale Grundlage […]‘. 
716 Ibid . 
717 See above Ch. 5.02. 
718 See Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und 
die Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010),p. 313-320. 
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agencies.719 However, the Federal Cartel office would hold copies of AGBs which were 
claimed by consumer associations (and related agencies) to be unfair. The main reason for 
intervention is the disparity in the party’s protected interests in the standard terms which 
justify the intervention by the courts. The implementation of the AGB-Gesetz followed the 
case law that had arisen first from § 138 BGB and then later from § 242 BGB720, where the 
courts had previously held that in some cases standard contracts contained clauses that 
were contrary to good faith. 
5.05 German Law: Ex post facto justifications or value based judgments? 
The justification of the intervention 
Much of Raiser’s argument was based on the protection of society and as we have 
seen above this is what the courts (as far back as the 1800s) based their decisions 
on. The idea was that if a term of the AGB was merely unfair to a particular 
individual in that case then the claim would fail. However, if the term was 
considered generally unfair then the claim would succeed. Interestingly the courts 
would not consider the price to be unfair under any circumstances.721 The idea that 
society as a whole needed protection against unfair terms seems to have arisen 
though from the early judgments and became a lot stronger in later cases.  
The idea of the protection of society fits in particularly well with the national 
socialist ideologies of the 1930s and 40s. The protection of society as an ideology is 
                                                          
719 Ibid. 
720 See above Ch. 5.03. 
721 Note though that the price may be considered unfair under particular circumstances that fall 
within §138 (2) BGB.  
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represented by an increase in the number of AGBs that were approved or often 
imposed by trade associations controlled by the government during this time.722 
This approach also resonates in the suggestions put forward for the AGB Gesetz 
that there should be a government agency responsible for approving AGBs, which 
was ultimately rejected. What did remain was a general opportunity for 
competitors to bring claims against each other in case one of them was using unfair 
standard terms.  
Schmidt-Salzer attempts an approach based on the individual’s freedom of 
contract.723 If the contract is negotiated individually, the foundation of the contract 
is that the parties did so in full knowledge of the consequences. The parties are 
therefore fully responsible for their side of the bargain.724 He argues that the 
difference with the AGBs is that these go beyond the individual party’s 
responsibility in that only one side has taken the responsibility of drafting the 
clauses on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. The contract is therefore unilateral, rather 
than bilateral, in terms of its construction and its terms can therefore not be 
classed as contractual terms that have been checked by the other party. The fact 
that the contract has not been negotiated individually may not be relevant from a 
                                                          
722 Salzer, Allgemeine Geschaeftsbedingungen- Schriftenreihe der Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift 
(C. H. Beck Verlag 1971), p. 14-16. 
723 Ibid, p. 16. 
724 There may be exceptions to this if the contract is particularly one sided see Markesinis, Unberath 
and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2006), 
p. 254 -260. 
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legal point of view per se but is an important social factor which in turn justifies the 
creation of a special set of norms.725   
According to Schmidt-Salzer’s analysis above, the courts must consider the AGB as 
being one-sided, independent of the individual’s circumstances and intentions. In 
other words the courts are justified in interpreting AGBs differently from normal 
terms of a contract726 as there was no negotiation (and therefore they are not the 
result of negotiations).727 The courts will not have to apply the usual rules of 
construction because the other party cannot be seen as having influenced the 
contract. However, the approach by the courts seems to be motivated by the need 
to protect society balancing this against freedom of contract. Originally there was a 
presumption that the AGBs were so universally applicable within fields that they 
had reached (or in some cases were meant to reach) the status of a norm.728 The 
courts then decided to intervene in cases where the AGBs were contrary to 
statutory provisions. The idea was based on the fact that the statutory provisions 
                                                          
725 Salzer, Allgemeine Geschaeftsbedingungen- Schriftenreihe der Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift 
(C. H. Beck Verlag 1971) p.16. 
726 For an analysis of the usual interpretation see Larenz and Canaris, Methodelehre der 
Rechtswissenschaft (3rd edn, Springer Verlag 2008); Chapter 4 (3) (g). 
727 Not though that this does not mean that the courts will neglect to take into consideration the 
relationship between the individually negotiated part of the AGBs. The courts will have to consider 
the AGBs in light of the individually negotiated part. (see also Salzer, Allgemeine 
Geschaeftsbedingungen- Schriftenreihe der Neuen Juristischen Wochenschrift (C. H. Beck Verlag 
1971) para. 111). 
728 Ibid 
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were considered the balanced approach. Grossmann-Doerth729 argues that if one of 
the parties has the privilege of setting up terms that are then considered norms he 
is acting as a legislator.730 On that basis he has the same duties as a legislator to 
create norms that are considered fair to society as a whole.731 In fact this argument 
was put forward slightly differently in Storage Destruction Case732 where the court 
argued that due to one of the parties having the privilege of creating the AGBs they 
have a duty to take the other party’s interests into account. In fact combined with 
Raiser’s argument that the court has a right to intervene in order to protect society 
as a whole it can now be argued that the court’s developed a duty on the user of 
standard form contracts to protect society by taking into account the wide range of 
potential parties upon whom the standard for may be imposed.  
It was shown above that the courts also had an interest in protecting the legal 
system itself.733 If anyone can contract out of the dispositive law through their 
terms then the individual will lose faith in the protection that is meant to be 
provided by the dispositive law. The parties that would therefore be exploited the 
                                                          
729Grossmann-Doerth, Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und Staatliches Recht: 
Antrittsvorlesung (Band 10 Universitaet Freiburg, Breisgau 1933), p. 544. 
730 See Ch. 5.02.  
731 See BGHZ 51, 55 (Confusing Slot Machine Case) or BGHZ  54, 106 p. 109. 
732 BGHZ 41, 151 (Storage Destruction Case) . 
733 See Ch. 5.03. 
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most are the least fortunate and least informed. Such provisions are therefore 
contrary to the social state principle.734  
Early writers identified that most commonly liability for faulty goods or services 
would be limited or excluded.735 The impact on society would therefore be to 
encourage negligent work by shifting the risk to the other party.736 This in turn 
influenced the courts to look particularly to those parties at a disadvantage to 
restore the balance that the dispositive law had created with the social state 
principle in mind. Three categories of imbalance have led the courts to intervene. 
The first category are cases where there is an informational imbalance.737 This can 
occur either in cases where one party is not aware of the standard exclusions of a 
particular industry738 or where one party is unable to understand the consequences 
of the terms because for example they have been hidden within the contractual 
                                                          
734 Hellwege, Allgemeine Gerschaeftsbedingungen, einseitig gestellte Vertragsbedingungen und die 
Allgemeine Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck 2010), p.554 . 
735 See the examples in Wagner, Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen- Bestandsaufnahme und 
Rechtspolitisches Programm (Dissertationsdruck G. Bauknecht 1973), p. 13. 
736 Ibid. 
737Larenz and Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Buergerlichen Rechts (9th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2004), §42 RN 
8. 
738 Note though the simple fact that the other party was not aware is insufficient. There is also the 
possibility of § 138 (2) BGB applying in cases where the party was exploited due to their ignorance 
(this will not be discussed further here because it would need an excursion into the law of 
unconscionability). 
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document.739 The second category of cases are those where there is an economic 
imbalance. This category is in essence the broader monopoly argument mentioned 
above. The economically disadvantaged party is unable to negotiate different terms 
or to choose a competitor since either there is a limited market that is covered by 
similar terms or there is only one party.740 The final category is the situational 
imbalance.741 The situational imbalance arises in cases where one party has time 
(and often legal guidance) to create the terms (even in in one-off contracts) 
whereas the other party is then presented with the terms and given little time (or 
they do not have the capacity) to understand the terms in a way that they could 
present changes to those terms. This final point could apply to business-to-
consumer contracts as well as to business-to-business contracts.  
5.06 English Law – Overview 
The early nineteenth century saw an increase in the use of standard term contracts 
in England and with it also an increase in the use of exclusion/limitation clauses. 
Standard form contracts were seen742 as a welcome form of increasing efficiency to 
                                                          
739 There were some early attempts to remedy these cases via § 119 BGB but this approach was 
rejected shortly after the publication of Raiser’s book.  
740 For § 138 (2) BGB to apply the legislator now provides that there must be a significant imbalance.  
741 Larenz and Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Buergerlichen Rechts (9th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2004), §42 RN 
9. 
742 And are still considered today (See Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion- Some thoughts about 
Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Reviewat p. 631; Beale, ‘Unfair Contracts in Britain 
and Europe’ (1989) 42 Current Legal Problems 197, p. 203-204. 
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support industrialisation.743 The use of exclusion clauses was merely seen as part 
and parcel of freedom of contract and a way for businesses better to apportion the 
risk.744 In fact this idea carried through in later cases where the courts at least paid 
lip service to this ideology.745 This period of non-intervention soon shifted to a 
phase (from around 1885746 to the 1920/30’s) where judges were generally hostile 
towards exclusion clauses. This manifested itself in variety of ways in which judges 
                                                          
743 Yates, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1982), p. 1; Mulcahy, Contract 
Law in Perspective (Routledge Cavendish 2008), p. 161 – 163. 
744 Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion- Some thoughts about Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia 
Law Reviewat p. 631; Also see the definition of risk in this context Yates, Exclusion Clauses in 
Contracts (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1982), p. 1; Mulcahy, Contract Law in Perspective (Routledge 
Cavendish 2008), p.2-5. 
745 E.g. in Carr v Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway [1852] 7 Ex 707 (CE), at 715/716: […] if a special 
contract be entered into by him and the party sending the articles to be conveyed, both sides are 
bound by the terms of the contract. The Carriers Acts says that a special contract may be made. If 
that be so, all that we have to do is to see what that contract is. […] the parties who have the care of 
such goods may contract that they will not be answerable for their own gross negligence.’; or in 
Gallin v London & North Western Railway Co 1874-75 LR 10 QB 212 (QB), where the court held that 
when the train company excluded all liability for loss or personal injury ‘in transit’ this must also 
include the platform.  
746 However, there are some examples of quite the opposite. In the case of McCarten v North 
Eastern Railway Co [1885] 54 Law J Rep QB 441 the judges held that the companies are so well 
advised that they must have intended to avail themselves from any liability and therefore had done 
so in this case. 
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would find either the exclusion clause was not included in the contract,747 should be 
interpreted as not to cover this particular breach,748 was not clear enough,749 or 
could not be effective because they were excluding fraud.750 The difficulty with this 
approach was that if (what we would now consider to be) an unfair term fulfilled 
the above requirements it could still be considered fair. Lord Denning therefore 
resurrected the concept of ‘fundamental breach’.751  
In 1977 the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) came into force which incorporated 
the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms Act) 1973752 and consolidated many of the 
piecemeal solutions to unfair terms.753 It is argued by the author that UCTA was a 
                                                          
747 See Ch. 5.03 Incorporation below; starting which cases such as Parker v South Eastern Railway Co 
[1877] 2 CPD 416 (CA) see particularly Mellish L.J. at 422; Chapelton v Barry Urban DC [1940] 1 KB 
532 (CA); Henderson v Stevenson [1870-75] LR 2 Sc 470 (HL).  
748 See Ch. 5.02 Interpretation, contra preferentem; Ernest Beck & Co v K Szymanowski & Co [1924] 
AC 43 (HL); Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394 (HL); Baldry v Marshall [1925] 1 KB 
260 (CA), where the court held the exclusion of a breach of ‘guarantee or warranty’ did not exclude 
the breach of a ‘condition’ (at 158) . 
749 See Scrutton L.J. in Gordon Alison & Co v Wallsend Slipway & Engineering Co Ltd (1927) 27 Ll L 
Rep 285, at 324. 
750 This applied in cases where one party would try to exclude liability for their own fraudulent 
statements (see S. Pearson & Son Limited v Lord Mayor of Dublin [1907] AC 351). 
751 Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armenent SA v NV Rotterdamsche Koeln Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 (HL). 
752 The 1973 Act provided control over exclusion or restriction clauses for breach of terms implied 
under the Sale of Goods Act. 
753 E.g. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854. 
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product of the post-war consumer protectionist movement.754 The application of 
the reasonableness test unearths a few of the values that influenced the judges 
over time.  
In 1980, in the case of Photo Production Ltd v Securior Transport Ltd755 the court 
rejected the principle of fundamental breach on the grounds that commercial 
parties needed the freedom to apportion the risk between themselves.756 In 1993 
the EC Council of Ministers adopted the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts757 and it was transposed into English Law as the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 which was then superseded by the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. The Regulations will not be dealt 
with in this Chapter as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provide a clearer view of 
the underlying values because the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999 were modelled on values outside the UK and this thesis is only concerned with 
the English values (or German values respectively).  
                                                          
754 This does not preclude there being many B2B related provisions included in the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977.  
755 Photo Production Ltd Securior Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL), per Lord Wilberforce. 
756 It could be argued that it was only rejected on the ground that the Lords were aware of the 
introduction of UCTA and therefore decided not to uphold a competing concept. This discussion will 
have to be left for another time.  
757 Council Directive 93/13EEC of 5 April 1993, OJ L95/29. 
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5.07 English Law - Interpretation, contra preferentem  
The courts in England, as in Germany, have used interpretation to limit the effect of 
exclusion/unfair clauses in contracts.758 The starting point in both jurisdictions was 
that the clauses were to be given their ordinary meaning and in the ‘early days’ 
exclusion clauses in standard form contracts were not interpreted any 
differently.759  
By 1924760 this approach had changed and exclusion clauses were then interpreted 
against the party relying on them. If the exclusion clause was not expressed clearly 
then it would not be effective.761  The fear seemed to be that interpreting the 
exclusion clause widely would mean that the party who was already at a 
disadvantage in terms of bargaining power would be at a further disadvantage.762 
This works well with the overall theory that the standard term contracts are also 
                                                          
758 E.g. in Ernest Beck & Co v K Szymanowski & Co [1924] AC 43 (HL): cotton reels of 200 yards each 
were sold. The contract stated that any defect was deemed to have been accepted if notice was not 
given after 14 days. The House of Lords held that the clause covered only the right to reject but not 
the right to claim damages.  
759 It would seem that this approach can be traced back to the middle of the fifteenth century. In 
principle, if there was a signed document and there was some form of quid pro quo the contract 
(and thereby the exclusion clause) would be upheld – see Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England Volume VI 1483-1558 (Oxford University Press 2003)p. 814-815. 
760 Ernest Beck & Co v K Szymanowski & Co [1924] AC 43 (HL). 
761 Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd (The Strathallan) [1983] 1 WLR 964 (HL); but 
also see Bem Dis A Turk Ticaret S/A TR v International Agri Trade Co Ltd (The Selda) [1999] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 729 (CA) or Air Transworld Ltd v Bombardier Inc [2012] 1 Lloyd's Rep 349 (CC). 
762Coote, Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell 1964); p. 15. 
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meant to inject more certainty into the transaction. In other words it is meant to 
encourage the drafter of the document to include as much detail as possible 
particularly in the case where he is excluding his own liability for negligence. 763  
The development of the contra preferentem rule on exclusion/limitation clauses 
follows a similar pattern to that in Germany. The focus for the courts in the German 
cases was to what degree the terms deviated from the dispositive law which in turn 
increased (or decreased respectively) the need for the term to cover the particular 
event specifically. There is therefore no need for further analysis of the 
interpretation cases.  
5.08 English Law - Incorporation  
The incorporation of standard terms into contracts has in some cases provided the 
courts with the opportunity to exclude unfair terms from contracts. One of the first 
cases was the 1875 case of Henderson v Stevenson.764 Lieutenant Stevenson of the 
18th Royal Irish Regiment had purchased a ticket to travel from Dublin to 
Whitehaven. On the back of the ticket the owners of the steamship had excluded all 
liability and they attempted to rely on this clause when Stevenson’s luggage was 
lost. The court distinguished the case from Carr v Lancashire and Yorkshire 
                                                          
763 Note though that the German courts are much less lenient in terms of interpretation in that there 
has to be genuine ambiguity as to the meaning of the words in order for the term to be excluded 
(see BGH NJW 2002, 3232 ). It will be shown later that this is mainly due to the use of §§ 138 and 
242 BGB. 
764 Henderson v Stevenson [1870-75] LR 2 Sc 470 (HL). 
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Railway765 - where the railway company had excluded liability for their own 
negligence and the court held that the exclusion clause was valid - and held that 
Stevenson did not have notice of the term on the back of the ticket and therefore 
the term had not been incorporated into the contract. The court held this to be the 
case despite this term being displayed at the office.766 The basis of the decision was 
that there was no assent to the terms.767 This decision was made despite the earlier 
judgment of Zunz v South Eastern Railway Company768 where the court held that 
where a ticket is taken which contains terms, there is a presumption that the terms 
have been read.769  
In Parker v South Eastern Railway Co.,770 Parker had left his luggage in the 
cloakroom and received a ticket. The back of the ticket included terms which 
limited the railway company’s liability to £10. Bramwell LJ held that it should be a 
question of law whether there had been reasonable notice and that therefore he 
would have found for the defendant. Mellish LJ (with whom the others agreed) 
argued that it was a matter of whether the person receiving the ticket did or did not 
see (or at least should have seen) that there was writing on the ticket and whether 
                                                          
765 Carr v Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway [1852] 7 Ex 707 (CE). 
766 Here it should be noted that the court did so on the ground that ‘no evidence whatever was given 
that the Pursuer saw, read or indeed had an opportunity of reading that general notice.’ 
767 See the judgment of Henderson v Stevenson [1870-75] LR 2 Sc 470 (HL) per Lord Chelmsford at 
476. 
768 Zunz v South Eastern Railway Co [1868-69] LR 4 QB 539 (QB). 
769 Confirmed later in Thompson v London Midland & Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1 KB 41 (CA). 
770 Parker v South Eastern Railway Co [1877] 2 CPD 416 (CA). 
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he knew (or should have known) that the writing contained conditions. In other 
words Mellish LJ was looking for whether there had been reasonable notice of the 
terms.  
In Chapelton v Barry UDC771 the plaintiff had borrowed a deck chair (which required 
him to purchase a ticket). The ticket contained an exclusion clause. The court held 
that the ticket was only a receipt and that it was not reasonable to expect the ticket 
to include terms because the reasonable person would expect the ticket to be 
nothing more than a receipt. It was the element that the customer would not know 
to look there for the term.  
Ch 5.02 discussed the 1928 case772 in Germany (and the later analysis), where the 
court found that the term had not been included because there had been no notice. 
The German justification for intervention was the protection of the legal system 
(and the public’s faith in the system). The English cases773 were based on the 
asymmetry of information as between the parties. At this stage the German and 
English analysis leads to the same end result. The conclusion at this point must 
therefore be that the English courts focus on whether the procedural fairness has 
been met (i.e. whether the term was incorporated)774 and will not take into account 
the content of the term on its own.  
                                                          
771Henderson v Stevenson [1870-75] LR 2 Sc 470 (HL). 
772 RG (25.09.1928) BankA 28/185 . 
773 See particularly Melish LJ above.  
774 Confirmed by for example L'Estrange v F. Graucob Limited [1934] 2 KB 394. 
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5.09 Fundamental Breach 
One of the areas which must be distinguished from the fundamental breach cases 
are the so-called deviation cases, where there is a deviation from the contractually 
agreed route. The deviation will be considered breach of a condition of the 
contract.775 An example is London & North Western Railway v Neilson,776 in which a 
train unloaded the luggage at the wrong station (where it then went missing). The 
contract had excluded liability but the court held that because the luggage had 
been unloaded at the wrong station the exclusion clause could not apply. 777 The 
deviation was a breach of a condition in itself, which meant that when the luggage 
was lost after a breach of that condition the railway company was not entitled to 
the protection of the exclusion clause.778  
                                                          
775 Tate & Lyle Ltd v Hain Steamship Co Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 597 (HL); but note that there have been 
alternative explanations: Coote, Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell 1964)p. 89-93. 
776 London & North Western Railway Co v Neilson [1922] 2 AC 263 (HL). 
777 See further examples such as Bontex Knitting Works Ltd v St. John's Garage [1944] 1 All ER 381; 
Tate & Lyle Ltd v Hain Steamship Co Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 597 (HL). 
778 Per Scrutton L.J. in Gibaud v Great Eastern Railway Co [1921] 2 KB 426 (CA), at 435: ‘[…] if you 
undertake to do a thing in a certain way, or to keep a thing in a certain place, with certain conditions 
protecting it, and have broken the contract by not doing the thing contracted for in the way 
contracted for, or not keeping the article in the place in which you have contracted to keep it, you 
cannot rely on the conditions which were only intended to protect you if you carried out the contract 
in the way in which you had contracted to do it.’  
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In the deviation cases breach of the condition would give the aggrieved party a right 
to terminate the contract.779 Interestingly though it would seem that the deviation 
would also displace any exemption clause,780 whether or not the other party 
accepts the deviation or not.781 The deviation cases are important though to the 
fundamental breach cases because the House of Lords, in Hain v Tate & Lyle used 
the term fundamental to delineate between ‘normal’ conditions and such which are 
‘fundamental’. 782 In Tate & Lyle v Hain783 it was held that in a contract for the 
carriage of goods by sea there was an implied condition that they would follow the 
agreed route. The breach of such a condition will give the other party the right to 
rescind the contract (or alternatively waive that right).  
                                                          
779 This right may be lost by waiver – see Tate & Lyle Ltd v Hain Steamship Co Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 597 
(HL). 
780 Unless the ship-owner can prove that the damage would have occur despite the deviation (see 
Coote, Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell 1964) p. 88 for an explanation) – and in some cases the 
contract would continue without the exclusion clauses applying. 
781 See ibid p. 81; Davis v Garrett [1830] 6 Bing 716 (CP); Scaramanga & Co v Stamp [1880] 5 CPD 295 
(CA).  
782 This is because if Lord Atkin and Lord Wright’s use of the word ‘fundamental’ see B.Coote, 
Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell 1964); p. 104-105. 
783 Tate & Lyle Ltd v Hain Steamship Co Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 597 (HL). 
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From this same line of thought Devlin J.784 in Smeaton Hanscombe & Co. Ltd v 
Sassoon 1. Setty & Co. (No. 1)785 laid down the definition of ‘fundamental term’: 
I do not think that what is a fundamental term has ever been closely defined. It must 
be something, I think, narrower than a condition of the contract, for it would be 
limiting the exception too much to say that they applied only to breaches of 
warranty. It is, I think, something which underlies the whole contract so that, if it is 
not complied with, the performance becomes something totally different from that 
which the contract contemplates.786 
The judgment provided more than just an explanation of what a fundamental term 
was. It also provided an explanation of what Devlin J. was attempting to protect, 
namely the reasonable expectations of the business parties. In effect he seems to 
be saying that if the term ultimately destroys the reason for contracting then it is 
absurd to think that anyone would have agreed to it under the circumstances.787  
                                                          
784 See also previous cases such as Atlantic Shipping Co v Dreyfus [1922] 1 AC 250 (HL); Chandris v 
Isbrandtsen Moller Co Inc [1951] 1 KB 240 (CA); Alexander v Railway Executive [1951] 2 KB 882 (KB). 
785 Smeaton Hanscomb & Co v Sassoon I Setty Son & Co (No. 1) [1953] 1 WLR 1468 (QB). 
786 Ibid. at 1470.  
787 See Pearson L. J. UGS Finance v National Mortgage Bank of Greece and National Bank of Greek SA 
[1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep 446 (CA), 450: ‘…[I]t is a rule of construction based on the presumed intention of 
the contracting parties…’(Affirmed in Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armenent SA v NV Rotterdamsche 
Koeln Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 (HL). 
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The concept of ‘breach of a fundamental term’ came at a time788 when there was 
general discomfort with the previous ‘laissez-faire’ approach789 to exclusion clauses, 
and was welcomed790 with open arms.791 Three years later Denning L.J. attempted a 
further definition of a fundamental breach: ‘If he has been guilty of a breach of 
those obligations in a respect which goes to the very root of the contract, he cannot 
rely on the exempting clauses.’792 This is the first attempt to review the content of 
an exclusion clause as opposed to the review of the procedural aspect of the 
exclusion clause.793 
                                                          
788 Even though it was by no means a new concept – see Melville, ‘The Core of a Contract’ (1956) 19 
The Modern Law Review; at p. 26 
789 The term ‘laissez-faire’ is used only in the context unfair contract term and does not relate to the 
contested overarching term that was used to describe contract law during the industrialist society. 
(see MacMillan, ‘Contract Terms between unequal parties in victorian England’ in Louise Gullifer and 
Stefan Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives on Contract an Commercial Law - Essasy 
in Honour of Hugh Beale (Hart Publishing 2015), p. 15 – 17. 
790 Note thought that Pearson L.J. rejected that fundamental breach constituted a rule of UGS 
Finance v National Mortgage Bank of Greece and National Bank of Greek SA [1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep 446 
(CA), 450.  
791 See Coote, Exception Clauses (Sweet & Maxwell 1964); p. 108. 
792 Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936 (CA). 
793 i.e. does the clause cover the breach, is it incorporated etc.  
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The first doubts were raised by Lord Reid794 in Suisse Atlantique795 where he 
mentions that it is difficult to assess whether an exclusion clause can always be 
considered ‘harsh and unfair’ in different circumstances. The problem that Lord 
Reid identified was that of a consumer who has no choice but to accept the 
contract and who may therefore be disadvantaged by the breach of a fundamental 
term and two commercial parties who may want to deliberately distribute the risk 
(for example due to insurance) in that particular way. Lord Reid also called for 
legislative intervention on the matter on the basis that stretching the existing 
principles could not provide a satisfactory answer.796 The court concluded797 – 
similar to the German court’s approach - that an adaptation of the contra 
preferentem rule should be applied, in that the more serious the breach in the 
particular instance the less likely it would be that there was intention to exclude or 
limit liability.   
                                                          
794 Even though the case did intimate that the court would have held that there had been a 
fundamental breach.  
795 Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armenent SA v NV Rotterdamsche Koeln Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 (HL) 
796 ’Courts have often introduced new rules when, in their view, they were required by public policy. 
In former times when Parliament seldom amended the common law, that could hardly have been 
avoided. […] But my main reason is that this rule would not be a satisfactory solution of the problem 
[…]’, ibid. at p. 406. 
797 Thereby rejecting Denning L.J.’s attempt of the substantive doctrine of fundamental breach in 
Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936 (CA).  
226 
 
The difficulty of examining the content of the exclusion clause rather than the 
procedural aspects re-appeared in Photo Production Ltd v Securior Transport Ltd,798 
where the employee of the security company, employed to guard the premises, lit a 
fire which burnt them down. The term in the contract provided that Securior would 
only be liable for the actions of their employees where they had been negligent in 
their selection. The court held that due to the nature of the companies this term 
was in fact fair. This ruling brought the concept of fundamental breach to an end.799  
The German courts never attempted any such approach to exclusion/limitation 
clauses. Lord Reid’s fear of the individual consumer without a choice was most 
likely what motivated the German courts to use §138 BGB by identifying that this 
would only be the case where there was a monopoly – although this would not be 
the case where all the competitors are using the same standard terms. The 
protection of society against the monopoly does not seem to feature at all in the 
English cases on fundamental breach neither does the need to protect society 
against these terms.800 In fact the main concern in the English cases seems to be the 
protection of the reasonable expectations.  
                                                          
798 Railway and Canal Act 1854. 
799 Ignoring Denning MR’s attempt in the Court of Appeal to follow his judgment in Harbutt's 
Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447 (CA).  
800 With the exception of A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay (Formaly Instone) [1974] 1 
WLR 1308 (HL) where the emphasis was on protecting the individual from the monopoly. However, 
there seems to be no evidence of any later judgments referring to the monopoly status of the other 
party as a ground for review the standard terms. 
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5.10 UCTA 1977 and the Reasonableness Test 
For the first time in 1975 the public interest as a whole was acknowledged as a 
motivator by the Law Commission.801 The Law Commission identified in their work 
that certain terms are to be considered ‘unfair’ simply for their impact on society.802 
The report also mentions the difficulty of a monopoly (or virtual monopoly).803 
However, and again unlike Germany, the monopoly does not feature in the 
legislation either. This is an indication that the legislator in England is aware of the 
fact that a monopoly could lead to unfair terms being imposed but that there is a 
belief that it is not the cause or origin of unfair terms – for example a whole 
industry may be using the same unfair terms.  
A further concern for the Commission was the reasonableness test which was to be 
applied mainly in non-consumer cases.804 The Law Commission was clear on the 
need to protect the individual consumer and that this will, in contrast to the non-
                                                          
801 See the Second Law Commission Report No. 69 (and Scottish Law Commission Report No. 
39)(1975); p.4 – We are in no doubt that in many cases they operate against public interest and that 
the prevailing judicial attitude of suspicion, or indeed of hostility, to such clauses is well founded.  
802 See for example the need for control on clauses exempting from liability for negligence: […] are in 
many cases a serious social evil[…] (Law Commission Report No. 69 (1975) p. 19. 
803 the Second Law Commission Report No. 69 (and Scottish Law Commission Report No. 39)(1975); 
p.36. 
804 Applied by the courts in cases such as London & North Western Railway Co v Neilson [1922] 1 KB 
192 (CA)and Chapelton v Barry Urban DC [1940] 1 KB 532 (CA). 
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consumer cases, mean an outright ban in order to provide certainty to the 
consumer. 805  
Despite the name suggesting that the act deals with unfair clauses generally, it in 
fact only deals with exclusion (and limitation) clauses.806 The scope of the act is 
wide enough to cover the cases where there is an attempt to indirectly exclude or 
limit the remedies that the other party would usually have at his disposal.807 There 
are two main distinctions within the Act. The first is whether the other party deals 
as a consumer or whether they are dealing in the course of a business (this will be 
addressed below).808 The second (and this is often linked to the first) is whether the 
clause is outright void or whether it is subject to the reasonableness test. It is 
impossible to exclude liability for negligence which leads to death or personal 
injury.809 If the other party is acting the course of a business then a clause excluding 
negligence giving rise to loss or damage (other than death or personal injury) is 
subject to the reasonableness test.  
                                                          
805 See First Report on Exemption Clauses in Contracts (No. 24) Law Commission (1969), at 73. 
806 With the exception of S. 3 (2) (b) (i) and (ii), s. 4 UCTA 1977. 
807 See the definition in s. 13 UCTA 1977.  
808 Note that a business may also be seen as a consumer (R&R Customs Broker Co Ltd v United 
Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 847 (CA)) or dealing on the others standard terms (see the 
definition of ‘standard terms’ in St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 
481 (CA). 
809 S. 2(1) UCTA 1977. 
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There are three tests of reasonableness in UCTA. The first is a general test (which 
can only apply in conjunction with the relevant provisions),810 the second only 
applies to clauses which limit the amount of compensation that can be 
recovered,811 the third only applies to clauses which are caught by ss 6(3) (excluding 
terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act812 in sale and hire purchase agreements 
when not acting as a consumer) and 7(3) (excluding terms implied by the Sale of 
Goods Act813 in agreements where possession or ownership passes but is not 
governed by the law of sales of goods or hire purchase when not acting as a 
consumer). 
The reasonableness test in UCTA is an example of a legal concept with variations on 
the normative meaning depending on the scenario to which it is applied. The 
normative meaning relies on the values that the judges (or decision-makers 
generally) believe should be814 driving the legal concept. It is acknowledged that the 
idea to implement UCTA was driven by post-war consumer protection policies.815 
That same drive was countered by the desire for a non-interventionist approach to 
commercial contracts – though this will be qualified below.  The reasonableness in 
                                                          
810 S. 11 (1), (3) and (5) UCTA. 
811 S. 11 (4) UCTA. 
812 S. 13, 14 or 15 SGA. 
813 S. 13, 14 or 15 SGA. 
814 Whether consciously or unconsciously. 
815Brownsword and Adams, ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion’ (1988) 94 Law 
Quarterly Review, at FN 2; See also the introduction to of the ‘Final Report of the Committee on 
Consumer Protection’ (July 1962).  
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UCTA is supported by a list in Schedule 2 of the Act of what should be taken into 
account in the assessment of terms:816 
(a) The bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other, taking into 
account (among other things) alternative means by which the customer’s 
requirements could have been met; 
(b) Whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in 
accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other 
persons, but without having a similar term; 
(c) Whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and the extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to 
any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the 
parties);  
(d) Where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition 
was not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the 
contract to expect that compliance with that condition would be practicable; 
(e) Whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special 
order of the customer.  
The assessment of this list will show that the underlying values in the English 
system are the protection of the information symmetry and bargaining power 
between the parties as opposed to the German values of protection of the legal 
system and protection of society as whole.  
                                                          
816 Even though the guidelines are expressly for s. 6 and 7 of UCTA they are regarded as generally 
applicable (Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer and Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 (CA), at 608; Singer Co (UK) Ltd 
v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 (CC) at 169). 
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5.11 UCTA and Unequal bargaining power 
Both in the German courts and the English courts it is apparent that the bargaining 
position of the parties is relevant. The approach to evaluating the difference in 
bargaining positions in Germany is the test of whether there is a monopoly. The 
initial approach therefore relies in the fact that if there is no monopoly then the 
parties have the option of alternative sources which in turn alleviates the need for 
the courts’ intervention. The English approach to monopoly is, as shown above, 
almost non-existent but the inequality of bargaining power appears as an important 
factor in Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning in Photo Production:817 
‘After this Act, in commercial matters generally, when the parties are not of unequal 
bargaining power and when risks are normally borne by insurance, not only is the 
case of judicial intervention undemonstrated, but there is everything to be said, and 
this seems to have been Parliament’s intention, for leaving the parties free to 
apportion risks as they think fit and for respecting their decisions.‘ 
Lord Wilberforce’s reasoning paints a clear picture of what he believes the court’s 
approach to commercial contracts and clauses therein should be, namely non-
interventionist. There is the argument that this was later reduced in George 
Mitchell818 where the courts took a further aspect into consideration. The decision 
that the limitation clause was unreasonable was based on the conduct of the seeds 
men in often settling claims that exceeded the limit of the clause. The court held 
                                                          
817 Photo Production Ltd Securior Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL), at 843. 
818 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 (HL). 
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that this was an acknowledgement that the clause was unreasonable. Custom 
within the particular area of business would seem to influence the judges’ decision.  
The non-interventionist approach when the parties are of equal bargaining power 
was seen again in Watford Electronics Ltd. v Sanderson CFL Ltd:819 
‘Where experienced businessmen representing substantial companies of equal 
bargaining power negotiated an agreement, they may be taken to have had regard 
to the matters known to them. They should, in my view, be taken to be the best 
judges of the commercial fairness of the agreement which they have made; 
including the fairness of each of the terms of that agreement.’ 
The equality of bargaining power is mainly added in cases where the courts are 
upholding the exclusion/limitation clause820 as an added confirmation. In West v 
Ivan Finlay & Associates821 the main argument seemed to be whether or not Wests 
had understood (or at least were able to understand) the clause when they entered 
into the contract. The fact that the clause (which the court did acknowledge caused 
                                                          
819Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 (CA), [55]. 
820George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 (HL); Singer Co (UK) Ltd v 
Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 (CC); Watford Electronics Ltd v 
Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 (CA); AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 
EWCA Civ 133 (CA); West v Ian Finaly and Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316 (CA); Marex Financial ltd v 
Creative Finance Ltd [2013] EWHC 2155 (Comm) (CC). 
821 West v Ian Finaly and Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316 (CA), at [58] and [60]. 
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an imbalance in the parties’ rights) was prominently displayed was the deciding 
factor.822   
However, there is no evidence to suggest that a term has been held invalid due to 
the unequal bargaining positions of the parties alone.823 This suggest that the 
court’s main interest is not the bargaining power of the parties but, as in West v 
Ivan Finlay & Associates,824  whether the other party knew or ought to have known 
of the term in the individual circumstances.  
5.12 UCTA and Consent 
In Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship repair Group Ltd (The Zinnia)825 Staughton J examined 
an exclusion clause for any economic loss and a clause that limited all the remedies 
unless the vessel was returned to the yard. His main argument was that the print 
was so small and the language so complicated that they should be held unfair and 
                                                          
822 Ibid. at [67]. 
823 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 (HL); Singer Co (UK) 
Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 (CC); Watford Electronics Ltd v 
Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 (CA) AXA Sun Life Services Plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 
EWCA Civ 133 (CA); West v Ian Finaly and Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316 (CA); Marex Financial ltd v 
Creative Finance Ltd [2013] EWHC 2155 (Comm) (CC) which all deal with equal bargaining power.  
824 West v Ian Finaly and Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316 (CA) at [58] and [60]. 
825 Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd (The Zinnia) [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 211 (CC).  
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unreasonable;826 the case was decided on other grounds.827 It would seem that 
Staughton J was guided by the consent factor – i.e. it was unreasonable to assume 
that the parties had understood the contract. This approach is later confirmed in 
Rees-Hough828 where the standard terms excluded liability for pipes that broke due 
to pressure. It was held that the term was reasonable on the basis that the parties 
were of equal bargaining power, the term was intelligible and no objection had 
been raised. 
In Ch. 5.11 it was argued that the main consideration for the English courts is 
whether in fact the term was known (or ought to have been known) and 
understood by the other party. The importance of consent was also stressed by the 
Scottish Law Commission when they stated that ‘it must be clear or at least 
determinable from the outset what each contracting party has agreed to do or to 
give or abstain from doing […] A contracting party must be in a position to assess his 
risks before he enters into the contract[…].’829 The idea of custom resurfaces in AEG 
(UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd.830 The contract was for goods that were to be shipped 
to Iran. The goods were faulty and the defendant returned the goods to AEG and 
                                                          
826 ‘First, they are in such small print that one can barely read them; secondly, the draughtsmanship 
is so convoluted and prolix that one almost needs an LL.B. to understand them. However, neither of 
those arguments was advanced before me, so I say no more about them.’ (ibid. at 222). 
827 Ibid. at p. 222. 
828 Rees Hough Ltd v Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd (1984) 27 BLR 136. 
829 For a more detail see Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law: A Study in Comparative 
and EC Law (Hart Publishing 2007), p.67. 
830 AEG (UK) LTD v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265. 
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deducted the cost of transport from the bill. AEG then brought a claim for the 
difference due to a clause in the contract that the purchaser shall return the 
defective parts at his own expense. The terms had been incorporated into the 
contract by reference which could be requested from AEG. The court had to then 
decide whether Sched. 2 (c) in UCTA applied (whether the customer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of the term (having regard to, 
among other things, any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing 
between the parties)). It would seem that in this case the courts went as far as to 
invoke a reasonableness at common law rather than statutory reasonableness 
test.831 The important factor was though that the courts considered that the term 
was unreasonable. It is not unusual for standard form contracts to replace the 
statutory warranties with express shorter warranties (in commercial contracts). 
Therefore it could not really be argued that the term was particularly unusual in 
comparison to the industry norm. However, the fact that the term was in such small 
print, almost intelligible and only available upon request persuaded the court that 
the term was unreasonable and (with Lord Hobhouse dissenting) that it had not 
been incorporated. Lords Hirst and Hobhouse  seemed to qualify the objective 
approach to incorporation and introduced the consideration of whether the 
consent was ‘real’.832 The case is particularly striking because the courts decided to 
invoke the common law approach of incorporation in order to hold that the term 
                                                          
831 For further discussion on this topic see Bradgate, ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 MLR 
586, p. 582 – 593.   
832 See Hirst LJ at 274 and Hobhouse LJ at 278 in AEG (UK) LTD v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265. 
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did not apply and this was done solely on the basis that the term should have been 
brought to the attention of the other party.833 In Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland834the 
court held that a term in the contract was unreasonable due (partly) to the fact that 
the other party had little time to review the contract.835  In Singer co (UK) Ltd v Tees 
and Hartlepool Port Authority836 the court held that a term excluding liability for 
damage other than from proven negligence (in which case liability was limited) was 
reasonable on the basis that they could have opted to pay a higher fee for more 
control over the loading process. The court’s approach would seem to boil down to 
whether there was in fact consent and in this case it was clear that through the 
option of paying a higher price the other party must have been aware of the 
limitation on liability and in fact opted for that limitation.837   
5.13 Risk Allocation 
Risk allocation in commercial contracts is a factor that influences the parties’ 
decisions and calculations. The courts, in both Germany and England, take the 
allocation of risk in commercial contracts as part and parcel of everyday dealing. It 
is not therefore surprising that the reasonableness of the relative allocation of risk 
                                                          
833Bradgate, ‘Unreasonable Standard Terms’ (1997) 60 MLR 586. 
834 Phillips Products v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659 (CA). 
835 See Ch. 5.13 below for a case where there was sufficient time and the term was held to be 
reasonable.  
836 Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep 164 (CC). 
837 See also Sonicare International Ltd v East Anglia Freight Terminal Ltd [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 48 (CC); 
Monarch Airlines Ltd v London Luton Airport Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 403 (CC), where the court held 
that the parties knew of the term and could make the appropriate insurance arrangements.  
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features in judges’ decisions. However, it would also seem that when the judgment 
is based on the allocation of risk between the parties it is in fact a question of 
consent.  In Arthur White v Tarmac838 the court held that the exclusion clauses were 
in fact only a distribution of risk (i.e. a setting out of obligations), i.e. it only defined 
the parties’ obligations and divided the risk of the JCB driver’s actions between 
themselves. Particularly important was the fact that the division allowed for the 
parties to take out the relevant insurance cover. However, Phillips Products Ltd v 
Hyland839 it was held that a similar clause in a similar contract was unreasonable 
due to the short notice that was given and the resulting lack of time to review the 
contract.840 This point can be taken further in that in short notice contracts, where 
it is unlikely that the parties will read all the terms (and of course unlikely that they 
will take out the relevant insurance cover), it can be presumed that the party did 
not consent to the terms.  
In Britvic v Messer841 the contract was for the supply of carbon dioxide according to 
BS 4105. In short, the drink contained uncontrolled amounts of benzene and 
therefore did not comply with BS 4105. This could only occur through a fault in the 
manufacturing process. Messer had excluded liability and the court held that this 
was unreasonable.842 The reasoning was particularly interesting namely that 
                                                          
838 Arthur White (Contractors) Ltd v Tarmac Civil Engineering Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 1508 (HL). 
839 Phillips Products v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659 (CA). 
840 Note also that the court held that this case was decided on the particular facts of the case.  
841 Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd v Messer UK Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 548. 
842 Although the case failed on other grounds.  
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because the fault could only arise in the manufacturing process Britvic could not be 
expected to test the supplied substance and Messer would have been able to pass 
the claim on to the actual manufacturer of the product. The court thereby took the 
allocation of risk in these circumstances and to a certain extent the insurance,843 
presuming here that the manufacturer was insured, into account in assessing the 
reasonableness of the term. Britvic v Messer844 is one of the few cases where the 
courts have taken into account the substance of the term rather than the 
procedure845, which may indicate a shift in values.  
5.14 Conclusion 
There has been some shift in recent years with the advance of economic thinking in 
European Civil Law.846 The economic analysis of unfair contract terms in standard 
form contracts leads to the conclusion that it is not necessarily the bargaining 
power of the other party that results in accepting the pre-formulated contract but 
the higher costs in having the contract reviewed by a legally qualified person and 
                                                          
843 Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd v Messer UK Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 548, at [26].  
844 Note though that the limitation clause in that case was upheld. 
845 See also Bacardi Martini Beverages Ltd v Thomas Hardy Packaging Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 549 (CA); 
however the fact that it was decided under UCTA makes the case slightly less surprising because it 
allows the court to evaluate the substance of the term.  
846 Becher, ‘Asymentric Informatin in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge that is yet to be met’ 
(2008) 45 ABLJ.  
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the fact that the events for which the clause is designed847 are in fact unlikely848 to 
occur.849 Ch. 5.11 and Ch. 5.12 both proved that the main concern for the English 
courts is whether the other party knew or ought to have known of the clause. These 
are mainly cases where the court is considering whether the procedure of how the 
agreement was entered into were reasonable. It is interesting though that the 
English courts have focused on whether or not there is individual consent in the 
particular cases. The underlying values seem to lead back to ‘reasonable 
expectations’. 
The German approach has used the argument of limiting the individual’s autonomy 
in order to justify intervention in the case but it would seem that the individual 
assessment of the terms is based on broader principles. The protection of society as 
a whole which gathered momentum during the nationalist socialist era and seems 
to have carried through until this day. This value is later combined with the 
protection of the legal system, i.e. there is a need to protect society against an 
                                                          
847 i.e. default or liability for defects. 
848 Note that in addition to this it has been argued that the other person may not be aware of the full 
extent of the risks involved which in turn means that they underestimate the risks involved. Leyens 
and Schaefer, ‘Juducial Contral of Standard Ters and European Private Law’ in P Larouche and 
Filomena Chirico (eds), Economic Analysis of the DCFR (Sellier European Law Publishers 2010), 97, at 
p. 99. 
849 Drygala, ‘Unfair Contract Terms in Business to Business Transactions’ in B Heiderhoff T Drygala, M 
Staake, G Zmij (ed), Private Autonomy in Germany and Poland and in the Common European Sales 
Law (De Gruyter 2012), p. 42.   
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alternative legal order that is contrary to the principles of the BGB and there is the 
need to protect society against monopolistic behaviour.  
The English approach is focussed in the first instance on consumer protection on 
the one hand and protection of the reasonable expectations of business people 
(represented by the need for consent or implied consent) on the other. There is no 
indication of any value in terms of the protection of society or societal norms as in 
the German cases.  
The final point in this chapter that stands out is what the courts (and legislators) 
have focused on in order to assess what is ‘unfair’. It is a fair summary that the 
English courts have focussed on the how serious the breach is that the term is 
aiming to protect. There is no such assessment in German law but instead the 
analysis is based on how far the term deviates from the norms of the BGB. The 
value that seems to be protected in the English cases is therefore the freedom of 
contract of the individual parties (which is then limited in line with the policies 
mentioned above) but in the German cases reveal that protection of the BGB is the 
main value that is being protected.   
Chapter 6 – Change of Circumstances 
6.01 Introduction 
This chapter will take a closer look at the values underlying the law of frustration. In 
both the German and English legal system the approach to ‘simple’ frustration 
cases - where it has become impossible or illegal to perform the contract - is largely 
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the same850 and, apart from outlining the basic approach, this chapter will ignore 
these pure cases. It is the cases that are on the periphery that are of interest here 
because these are the cases where the courts have been willing to stretch the 
existing legal principles in order to do (what they perceive as) justice. From that, the 
underlying values can then be deduced. The starting point in both jurisdictions will 
always be freedom of contract: if the parties had clearly foreseen the event then 
the courts will uphold that agreement.851 Much more interesting here is when, 
how, and why the courts are willing to impinge on the parties’ freedom. In the 
German section it will be shown that the courts will attempt to uphold the 
contractual agreement but to adjust the contract to the changed circumstances. In 
the English cases if they are stretching the meaning of ‘impossible’ to include cases 
that are technically impracticable but not impossible then the court will hold that 
the contract is discharged.  However, there are some cases where the English 
courts have left the doctrine of frustration aside and have used construction in 
order to adjust the contract. 
In terms of the values at play it should be said that firstly there seems to be a 
different understanding, further proof of the thesis in chapter 5,852  in Germany of 
the ‘autonomy of the parties’ than there is in England and similarly that what is 
seen as ‘protecting the economy’ in Germany is seen in England in quite the 
                                                          
850 In the UK this has been the case since the introduction of the Law Reform (frustrated Contract Act 
1943, s. 1(2). 
851 With the exception of ‘illegality’ which will not be discussed here.  
852 See Ch. 5.14. 
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opposite light. The difference in understanding will mean that the chapter will first 
draw out that difference853 and only then begin to explain the underlying values of 
those principles.854   
6.02 German Law - Impossibility and change of circumstances 
The first principle to recall is that generally each party has a right to specific 
performance,855 unless the other party is released from this duty through a 
provision in the BGB.856 The second principle to bear in mind is the division 
between the creditor’s and the debtor’s duties, which exist independently from 
each other.  
Keeping the above principles in mind, § 275 BGB gives the party that cannot 
perform their side of the bargain due to impossibility (or, as will be shown shortly, 
impracticability) the right to refuse performance. This right is now (it was different 
before the reform of 2002)857 regardless of fault and regardless of whether it is only 
impossible for that party or impossible for anyone. It is also irrelevant at this stage 
                                                          
853 See Ch. 6.02 -6.05. 
854 See Ch. 6.06. 
855 See § 241 BGB that states: ‘(1) By virtue of the obligation relationship, the creditor is entitled to 
demand performance from the debtor. Performance can also consist in an omission. (2) The 
obligation relationship can, according to its content, oblige each party to have regard to the rights, 
legal entitlements and interests of the other party.’ See also § 883 ZPO. 
856 See Ch. 6.05 for examples. 
857 The old § 275 (1) BGB read: ‚Der Schuldner wird von der Verpflichtung zur Leistung frei, soweit die 
Leistung infolge eines nach der Entstehung des Schuldverhältnisses eintretenden Umstandes, den er 
nicht zu vertreten hat [emphasis added], unmöglich wird.‘  
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whether or not it was impossible from the outset or became impossible after the 
contract had been made. § 275 BGB states that: 
(1) A claim for performance is excluded to the extent that performance is impossible 
for the obligor or for any other person.  
It is important to recall that it is not that the party does not have to perform at all 
and is therefore released from all his obligations under the contract, it only releases 
the obligor from his duty to specifically perform the contract. In cases where the 
obligor deliberately caused the impossibility he will have to pay compensation 
according to § 283 BGB (and then § 280 BGB and § 281 BGB). If he caused the 
impossibility negligently, the BGB equates it with cases where it was caused 
deliberately.858 There is an exception to this, namely if the parties have stipulated 
that the risk may fall to the obligee. In the case where the ring is to be transported 
to the other side of the lake and is for that reason thrown across the lake, the 
parties may have stipulated in the contract that the risk (of the ring not getting to 
the other side of the lake) for this action shall lie with the obligee.  However, it is 
not possible to exclude liability for deliberate actions.859 
In cases where the impossibility was not the obligor’s fault § 280 (1) BGB will not 
apply and the obligee will not be able to claim damages. This does not preclude the 
obligee from terminating the contract through § 323 BGB and therefore not 
                                                          
858 See §276 (1) and (2) BGB. 
859 §276 (3) BGB. 
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providing his side of the bargain.860 There is an exception to this if the obligee 
(rather than the obligor) is responsible or is mostly responsible for the 
impossibility.861 In such a case the obligee will not be able to withhold his 
performance but the obligor will be excused from performing.862 It is then the 
obligor’s responsibility to prove that he was not at fault in order to avoid having to 
pay damages in lieu of performance.863  However, impossibility does not cover 
cases where it has become more burdensome to fulfil the obligations under the 
contract. These cases are covered by § 313 BGB.864  
6.03 German Law – the History 
§ 313 BGB was introduced into the BGB with the reform of the law of obligations in 
2002,865 which meant that the first draft of the BGB did not include any provision 
dealing with cases where the circumstances had changed but did not make it 
impossible to perform the contract. The idea that something may have disturbed 
the foundation of the transaction has its roots in the Roman law. The principle of 
                                                          
860 Although he may want to continue the contractual arrangement in cases where there is partial 
impossibility which will be discussed later.   
861 § 326 (2) BGB. 
862 § 275 (1) – (3) BGB. 
863 It is the negative wording in §280 BGB that shows  -  ‘this does not apply if the debtor is not 
responsible for the breach of his duties’ (emphasis added) - that there is a general presumption that 
the debtor is responsible for any breach of his duties and that therefore the burden is on the obligor 
to prove he was not at fault. 
864 Though there may still be instances where this kind of case could be covered by § 275 (2) BGB. 
865 See Ch. 2.01. 
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clausula rebus sic stantibus (literally translated: ‘things thus standing’) is based on 
the premise that the circumstances surrounding the contract will stay the same. In 
other words there is an implied condition that the foundational assumptions upon 
which the contract rest will remain the same. There is some evidence to suggest 
that Cicero866 used this idea in 44 A.D., his examples include a sword that would not 
have to be returned to the owner after he has become insane.867 Thomas von 
Aquin, in Summa Theological, applied the principle of clausula (though he did not 
use that word) in the context of changed circumstances in light of wars,868 although 
he did not confine its use to contracts.869 It is not until the 16th century that the 
‘clausula’ becomes a general principle that underlies all legal acts as a ‘tacita 
conditio’.870 The 17th Century saw a rise in use of the clausula doctrine both in 
private and public international law.871 A general clausula principle was added to 
the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis872 but it was again limited to the law of 
                                                          
866 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996), p. 579. 
867 Koebler, Die Clausula rebus sic stantibus als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz (Mohr Paul Siebeck 
Tuebingen 1991), p. 23. 
868 Ibid. p. 29. 
869 Huang, Zur Lehre von der Geschaftsgrundlage nack altem und neuem Recht (Peter Lang Verlag 
2008); p. 19. 
870 Koebler, Die Clausula rebus sic stantibus als allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatz (Mohr Paul Siebeck 
Tuebingen 1991), p. 30. 
871 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996), p. 581. 
872 See §12 IV, 15 Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis. 
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obligations and then limited by the principle of fault – i.e. if the change in 
circumstances had been caused by the obligor’s fault, he could not rely on the 
principle. It also allowed the judge a great deal of discretion in the choice of remedy 
(i.e. whether all obligations under the contract are to be reversed or only some is at 
the judge’s discretion).873 The clausula next appeared in the ALR874 (the Prussian 
civil code) in § 377, I, 5 ALR and § 378, I, 5 ALR 1794. However, the principle was 
severely restricted so that it only really applied to cases of impossibility.875 In the 
Code Civil of 1804,876 by contrast, the clausula were completely excluded, which is 
not surprising as in the 19th century, with the rise of Savigny’s will theory (and his 
predecessors),877 the discussion of codification878 and the search for legal reason 
                                                          
873 Ibid.: ‚ob die Obligation völlig aufgehoben, oder nur nach Proportion der Veränderung gemäß 
werden solle‘. 
874 See also § 267, 268, II 2 of the draft to the ALR where the principle had a slightly wider scope. 
875 Pfaff, ‘Die Clausel: Rebus sic stantibus in der Doctrin und der österreichischen Gesetzgebung’ in 
Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage Sr Excellenz Dr Joseph Unger überreicht von der Rechts- und 
Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der KK Universität Wien am 2 Juli 1898 (J. G. Cotta’schen 
Buchhandlung 1898), p. 223, 304. 
876 The Code Civil applied to the territory left of the Rhine occupied by France.  
877 See Ch. 4.02.  
878 Thibaut arguing for a general code and Savigny against (see. Zimmermann, ‘Savigny's Legacy: 
Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Science’ (1996) 112 Law 
Quarterly Review, at 576 – 577; Hattenhauer, Thibaut und Savigny (Verlga Franz Mahlen Muenchen 
1973)). 
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meant that the equitable doctrine lost its appeal.879 The motives underpinning the 
German civil code880 show that the principle of ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ was 
meant to apply only to loan contracts (what then became § 610 of the old BGB)881 
where the circumstances of the other party to repay the loan had changed and no 
money had yet been paid.882 For the purposes of this chapter it meant that the 
principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus had not been included in the codification of 
the BGB.   
6.04 German Law - The Resurrection of ‘Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus’ 
In 1888, in the Brandy Case,883 a tax was levied on all brandy. This made the sale 
price the parties had agreed lower than the actual tax on the brandy. The court held 
that ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ did not apply and that the contract would 
                                                          
879 Roesler, ‘Hardship in German Codified Private Law - In Comparative Perspective to English, French 
and International Contract Law’ (2007) 3 European Review of Private Law, 487-489; Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon Press 1996), p. 581; 
Though there were writers such as Windscheid that advocated the doctrine of tacit presupposition 
(See Windscheid, ‘Die Voraussetzungs’ (1892) 78 Archiv fuer die civilistische Praxis 197). 
880 Mugdan, Die Gesammten Materialien zum Büergerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, vol 3 
(R. v. Decker 1899),  p. 199. 
881 A person who promises to make a loan may, in case of doubt, revoke the promise if a serious 
worsening in the financial circumstances of the other party comes about whereby the claim to 
repayment is endangered.  
882 ‘[…] den Ruecktritt wegen veränderter Umstände – clausula rebus sic stantibus – laesst der 
Entwurf in einem Falle zu, nämlich bei dem Vertrage, durch welchen die Hingabe eines Darlehens 
versprochen wird‘. 
883 RGZ 21, 178 (Brandy Case) .  
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therefore not be adapted to the changed circumstances. In coming to this 
conclusion, the court first considered whether it had become impossible to deliver 
the wine and held that the tax had not made it impossible.884 The court further 
discussed whether there may have been a mistake and whether therefore the 
parties did not intend to enter into that contract or would not have entered into 
the contract had they known of the tax. The facts suggest that there had been 
deliberations about this new tax during the time the parties negotiated their 
contract. This seems to have influenced the judges in their decisions particularly as 
a remarkably similar case, decided on the basis of the ALR in 1883,885 held that 
‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ applied and the contract was adapted to the changed 
circumstances. 
In 1902, in the Petroleum Delivery Case,886 the German Supreme Court held that the 
motives to the BGB did not allow any space for the principle of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus to be included.887 They did however leave a back door open in that the 
court would be allowed to conclude that the parties had meant to include the 
provision, taking into account the custom of the particular business.888 The question 
                                                          
884 Ibid. at 179. 
885 RGZ 10, 233 . 
886 RGZ 50, 255 (Petroleum Delivery Case) . 
887 ‘[…] dass es sich hier nicht um Anwendung eines allgemeinen Prinzips […] handelte.’ (ibid. at 257). 
888 Ibid. 258: ‚[…] in jedem Einzelfalle weiter zu prüfen sein, ob nicht nach der Absicht der Parteien der 
Rücktritt wegen veränderter Umstände der einen oder anderen Partei zustehen soll, und es wird bei 
dieser Prüfung nach §346 BGB auf die im Handelsverkehr geltenden Gewohnheiten und Gebräuche, 
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in the petroleum delivery case was whether the change in one party’s economic 
circumstances would be enough to allow the other to cancel the contract.  
Though it is generally assumed that the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus was 
not used until the 1920s (after the inflation cases),889 the Swimming Pond Case890 of 
1917 indicates that the courts may have been using other ways of reaching the 
same conclusion. The defendant had taken on a long lease of a shop next to a 
popular swimming pond. After war broke out swimming on that pond was 
forbidden. The defendant argued that they should be released from their 
obligations to pay the rent. The court held that because the reason for which the 
shop had been leased was obstructed by the war-time restrictions, the defendant 
was to be released from his obligations even though the shop could have been used 
to serve the troops that were stationed there. The court argued that the troops had 
different needs891 and that therefore the contract would have been entirely 
different. What was important was that the court first had to hold that there was a 
rental agreement (and not a lease) because they could then hold that there was a 
subsequent defect in the object of the rental agreement (i.e. a lease would have 
only covered the ground without any particular purpose whereas a rental 
                                                          
sowie nach §157 BGB auf das, was Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte fordert, 
Rücksicht zu nehmen sein.‘. 
889 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon 
Press 1996), p. 582; Roesler, ‘Hardship in German Codified Private Law - In Comparative Perspective 
to English, French and International Contract Law’ (2007) 3 European Review of Private Law, 487. 
890 RGZ 91, 54 (Swimming Pond Case) . 
891 Thereby distinguishing the case from RGZ 4, 171 . 
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agreement would have had the purpose of the shop as a condition) which would 
allow the contract to be brought to an end. The reasoning, it would seem, was 
based on the fact that generally in cases where there was a rental agreement the 
risk allocation demanded that it should be carried by the owner and that this 
principle could be transferred.892 
In 1911, in the Petrol Station Case893 the court held that the landlord was not 
entitled to the rent, firstly because the petrol station was being used by local 
authorities and secondly because there was little (or in some cases no) petrol to be 
sold. They acknowledged that this did not mean that it was in fact a flaw in the 
product according to § 323 BGB but (according to what was then § 537 BGB) had 
the same effect because it could not be used for the purpose for which it had been 
rented.894   In the Lunapark Case895 the lessee of a dance club refused to pay rent 
due to a war-time ban on dancing. The court held that both parties were aware that 
the club had been leased for this purpose and therefore the lessee was relieved 
                                                          
892 ‘so hat es auch der Vermieter zu tragen[…] von einem ihre Tauglichkeit zu dem vertragsmäßigen 
Gebrauch aufhebenden Verbot betroffen wird. ‘  
893 RGZ 94, 267 (Petrol Station Case) . 
894 The court achieved this by using the combination of §323 (1) BGB (‘If, in the case of a reciprocal 
contract, the obligor does not render an act of performance which is due, or does not render it in 
conformity with the contract, then the obligee may revoke the contract, […].’) and specifying that § 
537 (1) BGB is the exception: ‘The lessee is not released from his obligation to pay rent due to the 
fact that, for a reason relating to his person, he is unable to exercise his right of use. […]’. This means 
that in cases where it is not ‘relating to his person’ the lessee is released from his obligations.  
895 RGZ 87, 277 (Lunapark Case) or in RGZ 88, 96 (Wine-Bar Case) . 
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from having to pay rent for the time of the ban. The basis of the decision seemed to 
be that a condition of the contract was that the premises could be used as a dance 
club and because this was not possible there was a flaw in the rented object.  
The German Supreme Court has used ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ in other ways, 
despite their statement that this was not a principle to be applied generally but was 
confined to the particular facts of the case. In 1905896 the court used the principle 
to reach an entirely different conclusion on a similar topic, the creditworthiness of 
the company. The case concerned the take-over of a German insurance company by 
an English company. The individuals that had taken out insurance contracts claimed 
to be released from the contract on the basis that the circumstances had 
significantly changed. The argument was that firstly the company was not the same 
one they had originally signed up to and secondly that the value guaranteed was 
now watered down due to the take-over. It was not clear how much of the money 
would still be accessible to fulfil claims in Germany, with restrictions placed on how 
much money could be ‘exported’. The court acknowledged that ‘clausula rebus sic 
stantibus’ did not apply as a general principle but also held that this did not 
preclude the court from assessing individual situations in light of the principle. In 
other words, the court could consider whether there was any way of finding that 
the parties had incorporated the principle into the contract through 
                                                          
896 RGZ 60, 56 (English Insurance Provider Case). 
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interpretation.897 The court held that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the value of the insurance company (in relation to the German element) formed a 
basis of the contract and that this had been incorporated into the contract. It seems 
that this is the first time the court acknowledged that a change in the 
creditworthiness of a party can form the basis of the transaction. Here, the court 
used an implied term to avoid a result they did not agree with. However, the case 
may just be a product of its time because the fact that the company was not 
German seemed to play a role, in the sense that the German court of appeal 
evaluated the English legal systems in terms of adequacy of protection for the 
insured after the take-over.898   
This principle was not applied universally. In the Heidelberger Bierkrug Case,899 for 
example, the fact that there was a limitation on the amount of beer that the pub 
was allowed to brew did not (according to the court) have enough impact on the 
nature of the pub to warrant a reduction in the rent.  The court distinguished the 
case from the Lunapark Case900 and Swimming Pond Case901 on the basis that the 
purpose for which the property had been let was still available and that it was up to 
                                                          
897 Ibid. at p. 59 ‚Damit ist jedoch die Prüfung nicht ausgeschlossen, ob nicht im einzelnen Falle oder 
auch bei einer ganzen Gattung von Verträgen nach der Absicht der Parteien und nach der Natur der 
Verträge ein Rücktrittsrecht wegen veränderter Umstände gegeben ist‘. 
898 Ibid. at p. 62 ‘[…] auch dann nicht, wenn die Gläubigerschutzvorschriften des englischen Rechts für 
minderwertig gegenüber denen des deutschen Rechts erachtet würden‘. 
899 RGZ 90, 374 (Heidelberger Bierkrug Case). 
900 RGZ 87, 277 (Lunapark Case). 
901 RGZ 91, 54 (Swimming Pond Case). 
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parliament to include a reduction in the rent in the legislation. The court also 
restricted the approach in the above cases to rental agreements.  
With the hyperinflation that followed World War One, the Reichsgericht was faced 
with a string of cases where the level of the price had increased by over 1400 times 
the original cost. The court therefore resorted to using the doctrine of impossibility 
under § 275 (1) BGB and created the concept of economic impossibility.902 It would 
seem that one of the first cases to re-consider the idea of impossibility, was the 
case Roland.903 The buyer had ordered a particular type of flour, ‘Roland’, to be 
delivered from June to October at 100 bags a month. This type of flour was only 
produced in the seller’s mill, which had burnt down. The mill was quickly rebuilt but 
the flour could not be delivered until the following year’s crop had been harvested. 
The court held that as the flour was severely dependent on the economy that the 
contract was limited to that particular crop of that year. It also added that the delay 
caused by the fire meant that the content of the contract would have changed 
entirely and that therefore the contract had become impossible to perform.904 A 
similar case, Eichenlaub,905 arose where before the fire some of the flour (with the 
name of ‘Eichenlaub’) had been shipped to a different buyer. The claimant argued 
                                                          
902  RGZ 94, 45 (Copper Sale Case);  RGZ 100, 129 (Steam Delivery Case) - although see below on the 
distribution of losses. 
903 RGZ 42, 114 (Roland Case). 
904 Note that the approach to cases where it was temporarily impossible to perform the contract 
changed from the pure interpretation of the contract to a more flexible approach in BGHZ 83, 197, 
200 - based on good faith.  
905 RGZ 57, 116 (Eichenlaub Case). 
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that this flour was still ‘on the market’ and in light of what was then § 279 BGB906 
the court would have had to find that the flour was still available on the market and 
could be re-purchased. However, the court disagreed and held that it would be 
contrary to good faith to expect the seller to recover the flour.907 The court, in both 
cases, took a narrow view of what had been promised908 and in the cases that 
followed extended that interpretation implying a condition that incorporated the 
reason for which the parties had entered into the contract.  
Not long after909 the court decided that §275 (1) BGB was not the correct device for 
dealing with these kinds of cases and based their decision on Oertmann’s theory 
which effectively was ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’. However, they did add the 
proviso that not allowing the other party to adjust the contract was contrary to 
good faith under § 242 BGB.910 At this point then it seems that the courts concluded 
that in exceptional circumstances, based on the will of the parties, the principle of 
sanctity of contract is displaced but only in so far as the other party has been given 
the possibility to accept an adjustment of the contract. From here the court 
                                                          
906 And what is now § 276 (1) BGB. 
907 RGZ 57, 116 (Eichenlaub Case), 118. 
908 Ruethers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung (Mohr Siebeck Verlag 2012), p.15.  
909 RGZ 103, 328 (Spinning Works Case). 
910 It would seem that some commentators (e.g. See Roesler, ‘Hardship in German Codified Private 
Law - In Comparative Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law’ (2007) 3 
European Review of Private Law, 488) have concluded that the decision was based entirely on § 242 
BGB but the court seems to have in fact followed the principle of implying a term (namely clausula 
rebus sic stantibus) and then later relying on § 242 BGB.  
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developed the idea that if the equivalence of the contract had been disturbed 
significantly it could be ‘unduly burdensome’ to hold the parties to the original 
agreement. In fact, the court held that if ‘as a result of entirely changed 
circumstances that are significant for the fulfilment of the contract, the completion 
of the contract on the basis of the old conditions could not reasonably be expected 
of the other party.’911 The case involved a contract made in 1915 by the sole 
distributor for Opel cars for the south of Germany and several customers, to deliver 
cars immediately after the war had finished. The court held it would be 
unreasonable to force the delivery of the cars in light of the damage the war had 
caused.912 It was, however, not only the changed circumstances that led the court 
to their conclusion but the fact that if the car dealer had to deliver the car (and 
therefore deliver other cars to around 20-30 other clients) it would cause him 
financial ruin. There were two questions for the courts to answer, the first was 
whether the defendant could rely on contracts entered into with other customers 
in order to show that fulfilment of the contract would be ruinous to him and the 
second was whether the fact that it was ruinous to him was sufficient for the court 
to intervene on the basis of good faith. The court held that the dealer could refer to 
the other contracts to prove his financial ruin and that this was sufficient. This 
conclusion seems to indicate that the court attached more value to the dealer’s but 
also the company’s (Opel) continued existence than to that of the contract. Again, 
the socio-economic circumstances of the time must be taken into consideration. 
                                                          
911RGZ 100, 134 (Opel Case) , 134. 
912 A similar case RGZ 101, 79 . 
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‘Opel’ was a major German producer. In 1907 they had won the price for fastest car 
in the Taunus races and were therefore named ‘kaiserlicher Hoflieferant fuer 
Automobile’ (‘imperial purveyor’), in 1911 their factory had been destroyed in a 
large fire, and in 1914 the company produced trucks for the army. The ruin of the 
main dealership would have had a knock-on effect on Opel and would have 
probably caused the company financial hardship. Any such action would probably 
have caused a public outcry in light of the war and would have probably also been 
contrary to the public interest. The reasoning that it was ‘unduly burdensome ‘for 
the individual was therefore linked to the needs of society.    
Originally the courts held on to the idea that the change in equivalence had to be 
sufficiently significant that forcing the parties to hold on to the original contract 
would cause financial ruin to one of the parties. In the Energy Delivery Case913 the 
court held that the burden on the delivery company was not ‘such as would be 
considered […] an unjust ruin’ for the claimant914 and that therefore the certainty of 
continuation of the contractual arrangement was more important. In this case 
though the courts explicitly use the phrase clausula rebus sic stantibus which 
indicates that they are falling back on the Roman traditions of the principle.  
Only a few years later the Steam Delivery915 case reached the German Supreme 
Court. In brief the claimant was the landlord of the property who wanted the rent 
to be adjusted to take account of the economic change that had caused the cost for 
                                                          
913 RGZ 99, 258 (Energy Delivery Case). 
914 Ibid. 258. 
915 RGZ 100, 129 (Steam Delivery Case). 
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the delivery of steam to increase significantly. It was not in this case a simple 
matter of just releasing the parties from their obligations as the steam had already 
been delivered and the court held, in stark contrast to the Energy Delivery Case,916 
that the contract should be adapted.  By now the effects of the war had become 
abundantly clear and the court decided to adapt the contract to the new 
circumstances. The adaptation of the contract was not supposed to place the 
burden of the increased cost on the other party but was meant to be spread across 
both parties.917 The courts used the Steam Delivery Case918 to allow for the contract 
to be adapted. This almost revolutionary new step was justified by the courts’ need 
to step in and adapt contracts to the changes of life particularly after the war. This 
rather emotional response, Markesinis argues, erupted from the dissatisfaction 
with the government’s failure to address the problems (particularly of inflation).919 
It was clear from then that the difficulties of a change in equivalence could not be 
solved by simply relying on the financial ruin of one of the parties920 and was 
subsequently replaced by a general principle of equivalence based on general 
                                                          
916 RGZ 99, 258 (Energy Delivery Case). 
917 Ibid. at 260: ‚Es darf ihm nicht der ganze Nachteil aufgebürdet werden, so dass nunmehr der 
Zustand für ihn ein nicht erträglicher sein und der Billigkeit und Gerechtigkeit widersprechen würde‘. 
918 RGZ 100, 129 (Steam Delivery Case)  
919 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2006), p. 329 – 332. 
920 Nauen, Leistungserschwerung und Zweckvereitelung im Schuldverhaltnis - Zur Funktion und 
Gestalt der Lehre von der Geshaftsgrundlage im BGB und im System des Reformentwurfs der 
Schuldrechtskommission (Duncker & Humboldt 2001), p. 73. 
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unreasonableness.921  The courts built in a two-step process, thereby avoiding what 
was then §§ 275, 323 BGB, by allowing the party to withdraw from the contract 
only if he had without avail asked the other party for an increase (of money or 
whatever had decreased).922  
In taking this approach the court turned their back on the principle of nominalism 
and pacta sunt servanda to uphold the equivalence set by the parties on the basis 
of the parties’ supposed intention when they entered into the contract. 
Oertmann923 attempted to summarise and developed the existing discussion on the 
foundation of the transaction.924 Oertmann’s theory was  ‘the foundation of the 
transaction is that which becomes clear and is accepted as important by the other 
party and not objected to, or it is the shared belief of both  parties of the existence 
or future existence of particular circumstances, on the basis of which the will to 
contract was based.’925 In 1921 Oertmann published his work on the ‘basis of the 
transaction’ and it was not long before the German Supreme court picked up the 
                                                          
921 See for example the RGZ 103, 177 (Steel Cable Case). 
922 RGZ 106, 7 , 11; RGZ 107, 124 , 128. 
923 Oertman, Die Geschaftsgrundlage: Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff (Scholl 1921), p.2. 
924 See Lenel, ‘Die Lehre von der Voraussetzung’ (1889) AcP, p. 23.  
925 Oertman, Die Geschaftsgrundlage: Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff (Scholl 1921), p.37: 
‘Geschäftsgrundlage ist die beim Geschäftsschluss zutage tretende und vom etwaigen Gegner in 
Ihrer Bedeutsamkeit erkannte und nicht beanstandete Vorstellung eines Beteiligten oder die 
gemeinsame Vorstellung der mehreren Beteiligten vom Sein oder vom Eintritt gewisser Umstände, 
auf deren  Grundlage der Geschäftswille aufbaut.‘ 
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idea. In 1922 the courts held in the Spinning Works Case926 that fundamental 
circumstances are ‘perceptions shared by both parties as evident at the closing of 
the contract, or perceptions of one party, discernible to and not objected to by the 
other party, of the existence , present or future, of certain circumstances that form 
the basis of their willingness to contract.’927 These post-inflation cases928 openly 
acknowledge the use of Oertman’s theory of the ‘disappearance of the transaction’ 
(Wegfall der Geschaeftsgrundlage) and it seems from here there was no question as 
to the existence of the doctrine. What was left to be decided was the basis of the 
consequence, i.e. the adjustment of the contract or release of the parties from their 
respective obligations. In the Spinning Works Case929 plant was sold due to the 
company going into liquidation. Payment was to be made in two instalments. Even 
before the first payment was made inflation meant that the value of the money had 
significantly dropped and the court released the parties from their contract on the 
basis of §242 BGB.930 However, this was not before adding a further condition that 
indicates the same value as in the Steam Delivery Case,931 namely that the party 
                                                          
926 RGZ 103, 328 (Spinning Works Case) , see particularly at p. 332. 
927 Ibid.; RGZ 104, 394 ; RGZ 168, 121 , 126. 
928 E.g. RGZ 103, 328 (Spinning Works Case) ; RGZ 104, 394. 
929 RGZ 103, 328 (Spinning Works Case), 332. 
930 Note that Nauen argues that the courts only adhered to Oertmann’s ideas superficially (Nauen, 
Leistungserschwerung und Zweckvereitelung im Schuldverhaltnis - Zur Funktion und Gestalt der Lehre 
von der Geshaftsgrundlage im BGB und im System des Reformentwurfs der Schuldrechtskommission 
(Duncker & Humboldt 2001); p. 82. 
931 RGZ 100, 129 (Steam Delivery Case). 
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relying on the changed circumstances must provide the other party with the 
opportunity to adapt to the new circumstances. In other words, should the other 
party be willing to change the purchase price to match the inflation, he must be 
given that opportunity.  
The court’s approach of adapting the contract and Oertmann’s concept of the 
foundation of the transaction were finally brought together in the Luederitzbucht 
Case932 – another inflation case. This idea was carried over into the LAG cases933, 
where property that had been taken during the war (or had been particularly badly 
destroyed) and was then handed back to the original owners but with the 
possibility of additionally receiving ‘compensation’ from the government. It was not 
always certain how much property owners would receive. In some cases where the 
property was sold, the buyer and seller estimated how much they would be 
receiving and added this to the purchase price. However, in a few cases it turned 
out that the buyer received significantly more than expected. The court held in 
these cases that the purchase price should be adapted to the changed 
circumstances. It is difficult in these cases to see what exactly the previous owner 
of the property had lost. It seems that the courts were more interested in ensuring 
that the new property owners were not enriched. The court justified that in some 
cases the new owners would receive the property for ‘free’ and that this was ‘so 
manifestly contrary to the parties’ consideration of equivalence that it had to be 
rectified. 
                                                          
932 RGZ 107, 78 (Luederitzbucht Case). 
933 BGH WM 1958, 297 (LAG Case). 
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This is an interesting shift in approach. It seemed that in other cases it was the 
protection of the party that suddenly would receive nothing in return for their 
delivery or where it would cost more to produce than what they would get for the 
object. In these cases it was about avoiding one party going bankrupt and avoiding 
the consequent harm to society. In the LAG cases934 the value of the money 
remained the same and it was then just a matter of the buyer being lucky when 
they received the property for ‘free’. There are two possible explanations for this 
shift. The first is that the court considered the equivalence to apply to these kind of 
cases and that this would in effect mean that the buyer is enriched. This could in 
consequence be similar to ‘taking advantage’ of the party that did not know the 
value of the property – behaviour which is contrary to good faith. The more likely 
explanation is that the LAG cases were aimed at compensating those who had lost 
their land (or use of their land) during the war. It would have been easier for the 
relevant government body to administer the compensation by attaching it to the 
land rather than trying to trace the owners of the land. It would mean that the 
people at whom the compensation was aimed would not be receiving their 
compensation and that others would be enriched. However, even working on the 
basis of the last assumption it seems that the court was aiming to uphold the 
equivalence of the transaction even where there had been no detriment and most 
importantly the court was willing to adjust the contract to give way to that 
equivalence.  
                                                          
934 E.g. Ibid. 
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The BGH followed the approach taken by the Reichsgericht. In the Drill-Hammer 
case,935 the buyer had ordered a number of these drills to be delivered to the west 
of Germany that were then to be sold in the east of Germany. As the delivery to the 
east of Germany was forbidden (or a large tax would have been levied on the 
products) the contract in itself remained possible but the buyer was unable to sell 
the amount of drills through other distribution channels. The German Supreme 
Court first held that generally the motive for entering into the contract was not the 
basis of the transaction except in cases where the will of both parties was based on 
that motive.936 In this case though it was only the motive of one party and therefore 
the contract must remain in force. However, the court adapted the contract by 
using § 242 BGB and reducing the number of drills the buyer was obliged to accept 
to the number of drills that had already been produced (1/4). The difficulty in this 
case is firstly, the buyer’s subjective foundation of the transaction should not really 
be of concern for the seller, secondly, the contract was not impossible (the parties 
just did not know how long the blockade would last) and thirdly the equivalence 
had not changed. It would seems therefore that in this case the court was willing to 
forgo their inhibitions for removing the limitations on the intervention on freedom 
of contract to ensure that the contract made commercial sense. The conclusion that 
must be drawn from this is that the court was insisting on an ongoing duty of the 
                                                          
935 BGH LM § 242 (Bb) BGB Nr. 12 (Drill Hammer Case) (for a translation of the main facts see Beale 
and others, Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2010), p. 1142) and later the BGH NJW 1972, 1703 (Polish Beans Case) ; BGH WM 1978, 
323 (Oil Crisis Case) ; BGH JZ 1994, 626 (Porsche 959 Case). 
936 BGH LM § 242 (Bb) BGB Nr. 12 (Drill Hammer Case). 
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seller to take into account the buyers need in cases where the circumstances have 
changed. 
6.05 Reform of the BGB and § 313 BGB 
The cases above formed the basis for the implementation of the principle of 
‘disruption of the foundation of the transaction’ (‘Stoerung der 
Geschaeftsgrundlage’) into the BGB. § 313 (1) BGB relates to cases where the 
objective basis of the contract has been disrupted:  
(1) If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed 
since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into 
the contract or would have entered into it with different contents if they had 
foreseen this change, adaption of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, 
taking account of all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the 
contractual or statutory distribution of risk, one of the parties cannot reasonably be 
expected to uphold the contract without alteration. 
§313 (2) BGB relates to cases where the parties’ basis of the contract has been 
disrupted, i.e. their common belief in a certain state of affairs that is foundational 
to their contract: 937 
(2) It is equivalent to a change of circumstances if material conceptions that have 
become the basis of the contract are found to be incorrect.  
§ 313 (1) BGB applies to cases where after the contract has been entered into the 
basis of the contract has changed significantly and had the parties known of this 
                                                          
937 § 313 (3) BGB will be dealt with at a later point.  
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change they would not have entered into the contract (or would have entered into 
the contract on different terms). It is then added that in accordance with good faith 
and particularly taking into account the allocation of risk the obligor should not be 
expected to carry the burden of the change in circumstances. It is clear from the 
explanatory notes that § 313 BGB is designed to codify the already existing case law 
without making any changes.938 This means that reference to cases prior to the 
reform of the BGB will apply in the same way today.   
According to § 313 (2) BGB, if important beliefs have become the foundation of the 
contract and those beliefs turn out to be mistaken the parties will be released from 
their obligations under the contract. According to the motives of the reform939 this 
is to include cases where both parties were mistaken as to the motives940 and cases 
where one person is mistaken as to the motives and the other party has accepted 
these ideas. The cases that were difficult to bring within § 119 (2) BGB941 are to be 
solved by § 313 (2) BGB. However, if both parties were mistaken as to the motives 
and these were considered essential in business it would seem odd not to solve the 
cases according to § 119 (2) BGB. Huber argues here that there may still be a 
development in the courts towards attributing these cases back to § 119 (2) BGB.942  
                                                          
938 Bundestages, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts 14.05.2001 – 14/6040 , 
p. 175. 
939 Ibid. p. 176. 
940 See for example BGH LM § 242 (Bb) BGB Nr. 12 (Drill Hammer Case). 
941 I.e. they were considered essential in business. See Ch. 4.06. 
942 Huber and Faust, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung- Einfuhrung in das neue Recht (2002), p. 233 RN 8. 
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6.06 The German Values 
It is clear from the above discussion that the idea that certain fundamentally 
changed circumstances could and should affect the contract was already a principle 
in Roman law. It is also clear that the German courts have been (and probably still 
are) unsure about the extent to which this principle should be applied and what the 
basis of the principle is. The inflation cases allowed the courts to move away from 
the principle of nominalism to the principle of equivalence in exchange. Of course 
the motivation, so it seems, was the dissatisfaction with the legislators’ inaction in 
providing a legislative solution to the devaluation of the currency. This does not 
preclude the conclusion that the equivalence of the exchange in a bargain is a 
fundamental value and this is underlined by the courts’ insistence on adjusting, 
rather than ending, the contractual relationship. The contract, and this must be a 
further fundamental value, as a promise of performance is to be upheld but this can 
then mean allowing only partial performance or adjusting the contract in cases of 
temporary impossibility.  
Though this may seem like a practical approach to changed circumstances it does 
impede on at least two other values, namely freedom of contract and the 
autonomy of the individual. Freedom of contract is limited by the courts’ 
intervention into the contractual deal whether they find that the contract is void or 
have decided to adjust the agreement. Though this also applies to the autonomy of 
the individual this value is limited further in cases where the contract is adjusted 
because the court is effectively imposing a new deal on the parties that neither had 
contemplated at the outset and (probably) neither had wanted when they were 
making the contract. The scale therefore slides in direction of upholding the 
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contract to the detriment of freedom of contract and the autonomy of the 
individual. The autonomy of the individual is intrinsically linked to the will-theory943 
and it seems here that although the court is imposing a hypothetical will on the 
parties it is not the parties’ will (and if it were then they would have anticipated the 
event which in turn means that they would have made a different agreement).  
Continuing on from the hypothetical will of the parties it would seem that the 
German courts are willing to underpin the existing contractual relationship with a 
‘safety-net’ to protect what (in their eyes) the parties may have agreed had they 
foreseen the event. In cases where there is simply a devaluation of the currency 
this seems largely to be a matter of adjusting the scale. However, where it has 
become more burdensome (e.g. the Drill-Hammer Case944, or the Swimming Pond 
Case945) it seems that this is an adjustment of the risk allocation that in this case 
chance has set. There are two elements that can be deduced from this approach. 
The first is that the court is imposing a standard of reasonable conduct in cases 
where there has been a fundamental change in circumstances, based on what a 
reasonable person would have agreed had they known of the facts. The second is 
that in doing so the court is assuming that whatever the circumstances may be the 
parties ‘will’ must be to continue the contractual relationship. The conclusion that 
must therefore be drawn from this is that the court is not protecting the contract 
between the parties but the (contractual) relationship between the parties.    
                                                          
943 See Ch. 4.02 and Ch. 4.03. 
944 BGH LM § 242 (Bb) BGB Nr. 12 (Drill Hammer Case). 
945 RGZ 91, 54 (Swimming Pond Case). 
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Chapter 5 revealed the court’s underlying value of protecting society as a whole. In 
cases such as the Opel Case946 the court seems to have focused on the importance 
of a particular industry at the time and thereby protecting not only society but also 
the economic viability of the judgment. Refusing to adjust the contract would have 
meant bankruptcy for a major industrial force which would have surely had knock-
on effects for the economy and national spirit of the time. Though this may be the 
exception to the rule it does fit into the underlying thought of section above, 
namely the continuation of the contractual relationship - an impossibility if the 
distributorship for south Germany were to go bankrupt.   
The LAG cases947 may just be a one-off reversal of the principle in that the seller of 
the property would not have technically ‘lost’ anything due to changed 
circumstances but that really it was an unforeseen gain to the buyer. In the eyes of 
the court this seems to be manifestly unjust but the basis of the principle, it is 
argued here, may be no other than the principle of equivalence mentioned above. 
The court is thereby trying to reinstate the original bargain and must therefore 
remove equalise the ‘unjust’ gain made by the seller.  
6.07 The English Approach: Introduction 
The explanation of the German law began with the law on impossibility before 
moving on to impracticability. The same will be true for the section on English law. 
However, in order to cover all the cases that in Germany are caught by the principle 
of § 313 BGB, the doctrine of common mistake must also be taken into account. 
                                                          
946 RGZ 100, 134 (Opel Case). 
947 E.g. BGH WM 1958, 297 (LAG Case). 
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This part of the chapter will first set out the approach to common mistake and then 
go on to discuss the general law on impossibility. It will then become clear that 
there is no general doctrine to deal with the adjustment of long-term contracts 
which has led the courts firstly to stretch the existing principle of frustration and 
secondly to use alternative techniques in order to achieve (at least in some cases) 
similar results. It will be suggested that the approach varies over time and that 
there may still be room (at least in construction contracts) for the principle of 
cardinal change.  
6.08 Common mistake in English Law 
The main difference between common mistake and frustration is that in the 
common mistake cases the event must have happened before the contract was 
signed.948 This would occur for example where upon signing the contract the goods 
had already perished. It would seem that the doctrine itself is a fairly recent import 
from the civil law,949 which may also explain the narrow parameters of the doctrine. 
In Bell v Lever Brothers two company directors had agreed, in exchange for 
compensation, to leave the company early. It later transpired that they had been 
involved in behaviour that breached their duties which meant that they could have 
been dismissed without the need to compensate. The court held that there was no 
common mistake. Since then the courts have attempted to find a coherent theory 
                                                          
948 See for example Radcliffe LJ in Davies Contractors v Fareham Urban DC [1956] AC 969.  
949 MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Hart Publishing 2010), p.190 ff.;  Beale and others, Contract 
Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for Common Law of Europe (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010)p. 486. 
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on common mistakes, by relying on the implication of terms950, which was later 
rejected951 in the Great Peace Shipping.952 In Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris 
Salvage (International) Ltd (The Great Peace)953 the court drew a parallel with the 
doctrine of frustration which meant that for common mistake to avoid the contract 
the non-existence of the state of affairs must have made contractual performance 
impossible. One of the main points though is that in common mistake cases the 
contract is either void or valid, and there is no room for the court to adjust the 
contract.  
6.09 Frustration in English Law 
The law of frustration allows the parties to be relieved from their duties under the 
contract once it has become impossible for one of them to perform their side of the 
bargain. There are several limitations to this approach, for example that self-
induced frustration or subjective impossibility will not lead to relief.  
English law is generally reluctant to allow for relief on the basis of frustration if it 
would have been possible to provide for the eventuality in the contract. In the 
                                                          
950 E.g. Lord Atkin in Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] AC 161; Slade, ‘The Myth of Mistake’ (1954) 70 Law 
Quarterly Review 385. 
951 Note that the implication of terms was still used in Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v 
Credit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255 (QB). 
952 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407 (CA), at 73: 
‘First that the theory of the implied term is as unrealistic when considering common mistake as when 
considering frustration.’  (see also National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675 
(HL)).  
953 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407 (CA). 
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landmark case of Paradine v Jane954 a tenant of a farm had been dispossessed of his 
land for three years. This prevented him from using the land. The court held that955 
‘when a party by its own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound 
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, 
because he might have provided against it by his contract.’956 However, the rule was 
relaxed in the mid-19th century. The revised approach held a contract to be 
frustrated in cases where the subject matter of the contract had been destroyed957 
without the fault of either party and it had therefore become impossible to perform 
the contract and the event had not been foreseen by the parties.958 In Taylor v 
Caldwell959 the music hall where the concert was to be performed burnt down.960 
                                                          
954 Paradine v Jane 82 Eng Rep 897. 
955 Ibid. 897. 
956 This is a case where the purpose of the contract was frustrated. It serves here just to illustrate the 
courts approach to frustration cases. Cases where the purpose of the contract has been frustrated 
are discussed in more detail below.  
957 In some cases partial destruction of the subject matter is sufficient. In Taylor v Caldwell [1863] 
122 ER 309 (KB) the gardens and four walls of the music hall remained. See also Asfar & Co v Blundell 
[1896] 1 QB 123 (CA) where the cargo of the sunken ship was recovered but had to be sold for to be 
used for an entirely different purpose due to the contamination.  
958 Walton Harvey Ltd v Walker & Homfrays Ltd [1931] 1 Ch 274 (CA). 
959 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] 122 ER 309 (KB). 
960 Note that it is unlikely that fire or the destruction of the subject matter of the contract in building 
contracts would frustrate the contract due to the fire insurance policies required in most building 
contracts. 
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The court held that the parties were released from their obligations under the 
contract as the contract was frustrated.961  
The same principle as in Taylor v Caldwell962 applies where the subject matter of 
the contract has become unavailable,963 the thing essential for performance has 
been destroyed,964 where the method of performance has become impossible,965 or 
where in a personal contract the party performing the obligation has died.966 The 
contract may also be frustrated in cases where it has become illegal for the contract 
to be performed.967  
                                                          
961 A statutory example of the same principle is s. 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 where the contract 
is avoided if specific goods perish without the fault of either party. 
962 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] 122 ER 309 (KB). 
963Re Shipton Anderson & Co [1915] 3 KB 676 (KB) – where a particular parcel of wheat that had been 
contracted for was requisitioned.  
964 See the example of the contract to paint frescoes and the church burns down; in Treitel, 
Frustration and Force Majeure (Sweet & Maxwell 2004); para 4-014. 
965 Nickoll & Knight v Ashton Edridge & Co [1901] 2 KB 126 (CA) where it was specified that the seeds 
where to be shipped by the steamship called Orlando and that steamship ran aground. The route or 
method has to have been specified in the contract (Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH 
[1962] AC 93 (HL)). 
966 E.g. Stubbs v Holywell Railway Co [1867] LR 2 Ex 311 – the death of a consulting engineer. 
967 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 (HL) where German 
forces had occupied the harbour to which the goods were supposed to be shipped. See also Denny 
Mott & Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265 (HL) where the outbreak of law made 
the agreement to deal with timber illegal.   
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The decision in Taylor v Caldwell968 was based on an implied term which was the 
juristic justification for frustration. However, in Davies Contractors Ltd v Fareham 
U.D.C.969 the court held that the test should be that of a fundamental or radical 
change. In other words the court would have to question whether the literal 
performance of the contract would be something fundamentally or radically 
different from the obligation originally undertaken.  
Overall, the courts have taken the ‘fundamental or radical change’ approach 
seriously which has resulted in a strict approach to cases where it has become more 
difficult to perform the contract.  
In the case of Larrinaga & Co., Ltd. V Societe Franco Americaine des Phosphates de 
Medulla, Paris970 the question arose whether contracts that had been made in 1913 
and were to be performed in 1919 and 1920 could be held to be frustrated due to 
the First World War. Lord Summers addressed the issue by holding that the 
insecurities of contracting could generally be expressed in monetary terms and that 
therefore the fact that it had become more expensive to perform the contract 
could not form the basis of a claim in frustration.971 This principle was followed in 
                                                          
968 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] 122 ER 309 (KB). 
969 Davies Contractors v Fareham Urban DC [1956] AC 969. 
970 Larrinaga & Co Ltd v Societe Franco- Americaine des Phosphates de Medulla [1923] 14 Ll L Rep 
457 (HL). 
971 Ibid. at 463. 
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subsequent cases.972 Particularly notable were the Suez Canal cases,973 where the 
Suez Canal was closed and the question arose whether due to the closure the 
contract was frustrated.974 The court held that the delivery had only become more 
expensive due to the fact that the ship could use an alternative (longer) route. 
It seems that one of the main factors behind holding that the contract was not 
frustrated was that risk allocation, expressly or impliedly, limits the application of 
the doctrine of frustration. It has been held975 that there is no single approach on 
which the court can base the allocation of risk and that there is now the so-called 
‘multi-factorial approach’:976  
‘[…] the terms of the contract itself, its matrix or context, the parties' knowledge, 
expectations, assumptions and contemplations, in particular as to risk, as at the 
time of contract, at any rate so far as these can be ascribed mutually and 
objectively, and then the nature of the supervening event, and the parties' 
reasonable and objectively ascertainable calculations as to the possibilities of future 
performance in the new circumstances.’ 
                                                          
972 Davies Contractors v Fareham Urban DC [1956] AC 969. 
973 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH [1962] AC 93 (HL). 
974 Later followed in Kodros Shipping Corp of Monrovia v Empresa Cubana de Fletes (The Evia) [1983] 
1 AC 736 (HL) 751 E. 
975 See for example Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 23-019. 
976 Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) 
[2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 517 (CA) at [111]. 
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Rix, L.J. then continued to place this multi-factorial approach to risk-allocation in 
the context of what was to be considered ‘radically different’:977 
‘Since the subject matter of the doctrine of frustration is contract, and contracts are 
about the allocation of risk, and since the allocation and assumption of risk is not 
simply a matter of express or implied provision […], the test of ‘radically different’ is 
important: it tells us that the doctrine is not to be lightly invoked; that mere 
incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; and that there has to 
be as it were a break in identity between the contract as provided for and 
contemplated and its performance in the new circumstances.’ 
The statement by Lord Rix shows a general hostility to the doctrine of frustration 
because it interferes with the contractual or natural risk allocation.978 However, 
there have been some cases where the courts have been willing to stretch the 
meaning of impossibility. In Krell v Henry979 a room had been let for the sole 
purpose of viewing the procession of Edward VII. The king was ill and the 
procession was cancelled. The court held that the procession was the foundation of 
the contract and therefore the contract was frustrated.980 In fact in cases where 
parties entered into a contract after the procession had been cancelled the court 
                                                          
977 Ibid at [111]. 
978 Though it can be argued that the multi-factorial approach may also work in favour of frustration 
in cases such as Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide (The Nema) (No. 2) [1981] 2 All ER 1030 (HL). 
979 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (CA). 
980 See also Chandler v Webster [1904] 1 KB 493 (CA); Blakeley v Muller [1903] 2 KB 760n; although 
see also the case of Herne Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton [1903] 2 KB 683 (CA). 
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held that there was a common mistake. 981 However, it has since been held that the 
principle should not be extended.982 Here, the court held that the contract was 
impossible even though it would have been perfectly simple to fulfil the contract, 
because the room could have been let without the view of the procession. There is 
also a special category of ‘delay cases’ where the courts have been willing to stretch 
the principle of ‘impossibility’.  
In Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.983 a ship was chartered to proceed 
with ‘with all convenient speed’ from Liverpool to Newport. In January the ship ran 
aground and by March it was clear that the repairs would take several months. The 
question would have been quite straightforward if the parties had agreed on a 
timescale for the voyage but in this case no time had been stipulated. The court 
held that despite the lack of stipulations as to time the delay meant that spring 
voyage would turn into an autumn voyage and therefore ‘when the ship was ready 
might be twice as dangerous, and possibly twice as long, from fogs, ice, and other 
perils, though war might have broken out meanwhile’.984 The court985 was therefore 
willing to imply a term into the contract, i.e. that it was meant to be a spring 
                                                          
981 Griffith v Brymer [1903] 19 TLR 434. 
982 Per Lord Wright in Maritime National Fish Ltd v Ocean Trawlers Ltd [1935] AC 524 (PC), at 529. 
See also Amalgamated Investment & Property Co v John Walker & Sons [1977] 1 WLR 164 (CA), 
where the purchaser of a property that later became listed was not permitted to escape the 
contract. 
983 Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1872-73] LR 8 CP 572 (CP). 
984 Ibid. at 321. 
985 Though not unanimously. 
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voyage, in order to allow the contract to be frustrated. It would seem that this was 
a particularly ‘soft’ approach to the definition of impossibility and it was a matter of 
essentially defining what could be considered ‘impossible’. In fact it is rather 
unlikely that the court would take the same approach in cases today with a much 
higher expectation that the parties should have included a clause in the contract.  
This approach though leads on to what can be called the ‘requisitioning cases’. 
These are cases986 where the parties have included a clause in the contract in the 
light of suspension by war but where the courts have still intervened on the basis 
that it would be an entirely different contract. During the First World War several 
vessels were held in the Baltic by the Russian authorities. In these cases the courts 
implied a term that if the contract became impossible for an uncertain duration of 
time the contract was to be considered frustrated.987 
A further case that involved a delay but which was not literally impossible is 
Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co,988 where the parties had contracted to 
build a reservoir within 6 years. The defendant was then required by the Minister of 
Munitions to stop work on the reservoir and sell their plant. The plaintiff claimed 
that a clause in the contract would have extended the 6-year period in the contract 
in case of unforeseen circumstances and that therefore the contract should be 
resumed at a later date. The court held that the obligation would be different if it 
were resumed after such delay and the contract was therefore frustrated. In this 
                                                          
986 E.g. Admiral Shipping Co Ltd v Weidner Hopkins & Co [1916] 1 KB 429 (KB). 
987 Ibid. at 237-238. 
988 Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr & Co Ltd [1918] AC 119 (HL). 
277 
 
kind of case the courts seem to be taking the economic situation into account when 
making their decision. It seems difficult to infer anything else when the court refers 
to the contract being an entirely different one after the war except that the 
economic situation will have changed significantly and this it is suggested is 
probably as close to the ‘equivalence cases’ in Germany as one can get.  
In all the above cases the courts were dealing with cases of frustration and in some 
cases they stretched the meaning of impossibility. It is not only the principle of 
frustration though that will provide relief in cases where there has been a 
fundamental change. In Staffordshire Area Health Authority v South Staffordshire 
Waterworks Co989 a hospital had entered into a contract with the local water works 
for the supply of water in return for not using a well for their own supply. The 
contract was to apply ‘at all times hereafter’. The cost had risen to over 18 times 
the original amount between 1919 and 1975. Lord Denning held that the contract 
was frustrated on the ground that the circumstances had significantly changed but 
this was not the view adopted by the other judges. The rest of the Court of Appeal 
held that the agreement was for an indefinite period and could therefore be 
terminated upon reasonable notice. Even though Lord Denning may have wanted 
to see the decision in this case to be founded on frustration it was in fact decided 
                                                          
989Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA), see also the Irish 
case of Irish Welding v Philips Electrical (Ireland) Ltd (unreported, High Court, 8 October 1976), 
where it was held that if the contract for a distributorship contract is silent on the issue of 
termination then a reasonable notice should be implied. 
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by interpreting the existing clauses.990 This meant that the court was willing to 
interpret ‘at all times hereafter’ against its natural meaning in order to give way to 
justice. In fact the wording in the judgment itself is surprising. Lord Cunning-Bruce 
first observed that it was ‘surprising that the parties should have deliberately 
decided to fix the cost of the supply of water forever’991 and then went on to say 
that ‘[t] words of the agreement are, of course a factor to take into account – and a 
factor of great importance – but are not to my mind sufficient to displace the 
inferences to be drawn from the other circumstances attending the formation of the 
agreement.’ In other words, the court was willing to take perfectly clear words and 
under the guise of construction give those words an entirely different meaning. It is 
difficult here not to be reminded of the German inflation cases and there seems 
here to be a link, the value of the water (though the same object it was when the 
contract was made) had changed. It is quite clear from that same judgment though 
why the rest of the court did not accept Lord Denning’s approach: ‘I can find no 
authority which leads me to the view that the changing value of money has the 
effect in relation to domestic as compared international contracts of giving rise to 
                                                          
990 Lord Denning has generally advocated for a more flexible approach to frustration cases. See for 
example British Movietonews v London and District Cinemas [1951] 1 KB 190 at 201 – 202:’ This does 
not mean that the courts no longer insist on the binding force of contracts deliberately made. It only 
means that they will not allow the words, in which they happen to be phrased, to become tyrannical 
masters. The court qualifies the literal meaning of the words so as to bring them into accord with the 
true scope of the contract. Even if the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless if it is not 
absolute in intent, it will not be held absolute in effect.’  
991 Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA), 1406. 
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the operation of an implied term that the contract should only persist while money 
maintained the value or more or less the value that it had at the date of the 
formation of the agreement.’992 The case seems therefore to be affirming the 
principle of nominalism993 in English law994 and this explains the rejection of Lord 
Denning’s approach, since he advocated that in some cases it may be worth 
departing from the principle of nominalism, a principle that he had originally 
confirmed in Treseder-Griffin v Co-operative insurance Society Ltd.995 Nominalism, 
according to Lord Denning, was founded on the trust of creditors and debtors that 
had put their faith in the sterling currency. Commercial interests and certainty were 
therefore the overarching principles. However, with Lord Denning’s departure from 
the rule it seems that he (and only he) saw a need to allow for cases of inflation to 
form an exception. It would seem from the above discussion that the court will 
have to go to great lengths where there has been a significant devaluation to do 
‘justice’.996 
                                                          
992 Ibid, 1406. 
993 British Movietonews v London and District Cinemas [1951] 1 KB 190. 
994 It is unlikely that the principle was ever in doubt. The only exceptions seem to have been 
mentioned in Gilbert v Brett [1604] Davies Rep 18, 27 & 28; Pilkington v Commissioners for Claims of 
France [1821] 2 Knapp PC7, 20.  
995 Treseder- Griffin v Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd [1956] 2 QB 127 (CA), 144.  
996 There may be some argument to be made that the application of the principle has led to other 
difficulties in terms of interests on debts but this discussion is left to others. See Proctor, Mann on 
the Legal Aspects of Money (Oxford University Press 2005), para. 9.29-9.52. 
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One of the arguments in the delay cases has been that the parties had not 
anticipated the delay but in the 1922 case of A.M. Peebles & Son v Becker & Co.997 
the parties had inserted a suspension clause into the contract. The contract was 
generally for the delivery of wood pulp and the suspension clause allowed for the 
suspension of the contract until the war was over. In this case the contract would 
have been delayed for four years. The court held that in light of the increase in 
price998 and the delay of four years the parties must have intended to qualify their 
suspension clause that should the delay be of four years or more both parties 
would be released from their obligations.999 Despite the fact that the rise in value 
was not the deciding factor in this case the judge used the rise in price (combined 
with the delay) to evidence the supposed intention of the parties on entering the 
contract.  
Similarly, in the Court of Appeal case of Express Newspapers Plc v Silverstone 
Circuits1000 it was held that a newspaper that had contracted the exclusive right to 
                                                          
997 AM Peebles & Son v Becker & Co [1922] 10 Ll L Rep 773 (KB). 
998 Ibid. at 774: ‘It will be seen that the difficulty of meeting the requirements of users of wood pulp in 
this country, due to the war, was measured by a rise in price which, though it had fallen greatly from 
its highest, was still in 1919 three times what it had been in 1914.’ 
999 Ibid.: ‘It is true that they had bound themselves for a long period of time, subject to the 
suspension clause: but I still think they would have said: ‘If the war is so prolonged as to cause a 
suspension of the contract until September, 1919, the results on our respective businesses may be so 
serious that it would be most unwise for either of us to bind ourselves to resume the obligations and 
liabilities of the contract.’ 
1000 Express Newspapers Plc v Silverstone Circuits The Times, June 20, 1989. 
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advertise on a bridge did not provide the newspaper with a right to prevent the 
removal of the bridge. The court therefore implied a term that the licence would 
terminate if the bridge had to be removed. 
6.10 Temporary and Partial Impossibility in English Law 
There is a further category of cases that deserves special mention. In cases of 
temporary and partial impossibility the courts have taken quite a unique approach. 
In Minnevitch v Café de Paris1001 the defendant had contracted for the claimant to 
play a humorous and light-hearted play over several nights. The contract was based 
on a payment for each show that took place.1002 Due to the news that the condition 
of his Majesty King George V was serious the defendant cancelled and the king’s 
death shortly after meant that the shows were cancelled for that week. 
Macnaghten J. held that the defendant was justified in cancelling the shows on 
Monday and Tuesday but that he was not justified in cancelling the shows for the 
rest of the week. Macnaghten J. concluded that the performance on Monday and 
Tuesday was impossible but ordered costs for the claimant for Wednesday to 
Saturday night.1003 Rather therefore than looking to the doctrine of frustration 
Macnaghten J. implied a term into the contract that the defendant was under an 
obligation to allow the claimant to play at his establishment and consequently pay 
for the performances but it would seem that he also implied a term that in the 
cases of a particular performance becoming impossible it would not frustrate the 
                                                          
1001 Minnevitch v Cafe de Paris (Londres) Limited [1936] 1 All ER 884. 
1002 To which the court implied a duty on the defendant to allow the claimant to play. 
1003 Minnevitch v Cafe de Paris (Londres) Limited [1936] 1 All ER 884, at 886. 
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obligation to allow the claimant to play on the other days. The courts have 
therefore used construction in order to find a solution in cases where the contract 
was only temporarily impossible. With frustration only allowing for the whole 
contract to be frustrated it seemed that the court was willing to use construction in 
order to allow the rest of the contract to continue in existence.  
In Cricklewood1004 the contract was for the lease of land on which the tenant was to 
erect shops. Due to the war there were restrictions on building which meant that 
the shops could not be built during this time. The tenant argued that the contract 
was frustrated. Lord Russell of Killowen held that the lease was not frustrated and 
that on the construction of the contract it was clear that rent continued to be due 
but that the landlord was excused from building the shops until such time as this 
was permitted again.1005  
In some cases the courts have been able to interpret existing clauses to cover event 
of ‘partial frustration’.1006 Where no such clause existed the court has fallen back on 
the general common law doctrine.1007 In Howell v Coupland1008 a contract had been 
                                                          
1004 Cricklewood Property & Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust [1945] AC 221 (HL), at 
233.  
1005 Ibid. at 233: ‘It seems to me clear that the intention of the parties was that rent would be 
payable even though the sites were vacant, and that the landlord was not to be driven to sue for 
damages for breach of covenant to erect ships. To such an action the war-time restrictions might well 
afford a defence, but that is a consequence very different and far removed from frustration.’ 
1006 Egham & Staines Electricity Co Ltd v Egham UDC [1944] 1 All ER 107. 
1007 Chitty on Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), at 23-068.  
1008 Howell v Coupland [1876] 1 QBD 258 (CA). 
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made for a set amount of potatoes from a certain piece of land. The crop largely 
failed and the seller delivered the crop that had grown on the land to the buyer.1009 
The court held that the seller only had a duty to deliver what had been actually 
produced on the land on the basis of Taylor v Caldwell.1010 In H R & S Sainsbury Ltd v 
Street1011 the parties had entered into a similar contract and most of the crop 
failed. The seller then sold the reduced amount of crops at a higher price to a 
different buyer. The court held that the seller was only liable for the amount that 
had actually been produced and not for the amount stated in the contract. 
However, here the decision was based on an implied term rather than on 
frustration1012 and so it could be argued that there is no doctrine of partial 
frustration in English law.  
However, in The Zuiho Maru1013 Kerr J. held that there was ‘an absolute obligation 
to supply cargo of the contractual description and quantity’ where the government 
in Saudi-Arabia had instructed the only oil supplier to cut 10% of the production for 
a set period. This cut was passed on to the individual tankers and in this particular 
case 7.52% less oil was loaded. Kerr, J. in his judgment went on to hold that 
‘[w]ithout resort to any definition of the nature of a frustrating event, it is self-
                                                          
1009 He also delivered crop from another piece of land but it seems that was beyond his duty (see 
Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (Sweet & Maxwell 2004); para 5-012). 
1010 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] 122 ER 309 (KB). 
1011 HR&S Sainsbury Ltd v Street [1972] 1 WLR 834.  
1012 See also Cricklewood Property & Investment Trust Ltd v Leighton's Investment Trust [1945] AC 
221 (HL). 
1013 Kawasaki Steel Corp v Sardoil SpA (The Zuiho Maru) [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 552 (CC), 555. 
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evident that any short-fall of this kind could never be capable of giving rise to 
frustration, because there is nothing like a sufficiently fundamental change of 
circumstances’.1014  It would seem therefore that not any failure of the source will 
suffice but that it has to be substantial. 
6.11 Cardinal Change in English Law 
It would seem that cases where for example there has been inflation will not be 
adjusted. This is suggested by Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UD,1015 where the 
reasoning was based on the fact that the parties could have inserted a clause 
safeguarding against the circumstances.  
Nevertheless, there have been some specialist areas where an alternative approach 
has been accepted. In building contracts the doctrine of ‘cardinal change’1016 will 
allow the contract to be ‘adjusted’1017 in order to take into account the changed 
circumstances and to therefore adjust the price. The principle, in English law, is that 
there may be an implied limit on the amount of additional work the contractor is 
expected to do within the contract rates. The idea is that generally building 
contracts will allow for certain changes to be made within the limits of the contract 
                                                          
1014 Ibid.  
1015 Davies Contractors v Fareham Urban DC [1956] AC 969. 
1016 It should be noted that the doctrine originated in the US. The English approach to the same 
principle is achieved by implying a term into the contract which has the same effect (see Chitty on 
Contracts (Beale ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), at 37-096). 
1017 It should be noted that the word adjusted is being used flexibly here. The court may not 
necessarily adjust the contract itself but may add a further agreement in order to achieve the same 
result as adjusting the contract would.  
285 
 
price. If however this limit is exceeded there is an implied term that any excess 
work will be paid for additionally.1018 In Lindsay Parkinson & Co. & Commissioners of 
Works1019 a building contract for a factory was made that included a clause by 
which the commissioner had the absolute discretion to modify the extent and 
character of the work. Delay was caused through the act of the commissioner which 
meant that the contractor would have been entitled to an extension. A deed of 
variation was created which meant that exceptional measures were used in order 
to speed up the work. This meant that the cost of the work increased significantly 
and the additions and variations far exceeded what the contractor had expected. 
The Court of Appeal held that the literal application of the clauses was insufficient. 
Lord Singleton accepted that it did not appear ‘that anyone thought at the time of 
the deed of variation that there was any likelihood of anything like the additions 
which were called for later.’ He therefore held that the clause would have meant 
that the contractors would have been liable for years and years to come and that 
this would have led to ‘manifest absurdity and injustice’.1020 It was therefore held 
that the additional work fell outside the contract and had to be paid for on top of 
the contract price.  According to Lord Asquith: ‘In other words delay though literally 
describing what has occurred, has been read as limited to normal, moderate delay, 
                                                          
1018 Lindsay Parkinson & Co. v Commissioners of Works [1949] 2 KB 632. 
1019 Ibid. at 665. 
1020 Ibid. at 673. 
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and as not extending to an interruption so differing in degree and magnitude from 
anything which could have been contemplated as to differ from it in kind.’ 1021 
There are some instances in English law where it may seem as if there has been an 
adaptation of the contract to the new circumstances. In the building cases, where 
the work has already been done and the contract is held to be frustrated, the 
contractor is paid on a quantum meruit basis. In Bush v Whitehaven Trustees1022 the 
Court of Appeal held even though the contract stated that the contractors were 
liable for any delays, those delays caused by not having access to the site (due to 
the other party not allowing them to enter it) were not included. More importantly 
though after this delay the contractors had completed the contract which the court 
then held had become a winter rather than a summer building contract (for water 
mains) and were therefore awarded damages on a quantum meruit basis.1023 In 
McAlpine Humberoak Ltd v McDermott International Inc.1024 a contract to build 
pallets for the construction of a deck on an offshore oil rig contained provisions that 
                                                          
1021 Or in other words: Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co [1919] AC 435 (HL) per Lord Summer: ‘A 
contingency may be provided for, but not in such terms as to show that the provision is meant to be 
all the provision for it. A contingency may be provided but in such a way as shows that it is provided 
for only for the purposes of dealing with one of its effects and not all.’ 
1022 Bush v Whitehaven Trustees [1888] 52 JP 392.Confirmed in H Fairweather & Co Ltd v 
Wandsworth LBC [1987] 39 BLR 106 (QB). 
1023 Note that Lord Lindley had his doubts as to the decision of the jury. See also Chambers, Hudson's 
Building and Engineering Contracts (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014), at 4.252 where it is 
presumed that the case would be decided differently today.  
1024 McAlpine Humberoak Ltd v McDermott International Inc (No 1) [1992] 58 BLR 1 (CA). 
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dealt with how compensation was to be dealt with in cases, including a formula. 
The contract was delayed significantly and McAlpine put forward a claim totalling 
£3.5 million (the contract price was £890,330).  The judge at first instance held that 
due to the fact that the delay had been caused by the defendants (with over 45 
revised AFC drawings, failure to respond to queries promptly and changing the 
scope of the work) and that therefore the contract was frustrated. The Court of 
Appeal held that the contract had not been frustrated and that as long as the 
contract included a mechanism for dealing with delay a contract will not be 
frustrated.1025 In any event it is difficult to see how the courts were able to refer to 
frustration since it would seem that there was always a breach by the employer 
(e.g. it was their fault for not letting the contractor on site) so the contractor may 
not have been released but the employer would have had to pay damages. This 
does leave the question unanswered where neither party is at fault and no 
provisions were made in the contract.  It is suggested here that in a case where for 
example the site is flooded for the summer period and the contract is then 
performed in the winter which causes an increase in costs, the original contract 
                                                          
1025 However, the court did hold that due to the delay caused by the defendant the contract could be 
extended for a reasonable period of time. Once that time had expired the defendant was entitled to 
damages for the delay.   
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may be held to be frustrated1026 and payment would have to be made on a 
quantum meruit basis, particularly where the contract was performed.1027  
6.12 The English Values  
The English section has revealed a slightly different approach to cases of 
impossibility but first and foremost it revealed a fundamentally different approach 
(and often outcome) in cases of impracticability. The all-or-nothing approach means 
that there is very limited scope to adjust the contract (i.e. the cardinal change cases 
or through construction).1028 This in itself can already be considered a value but it 
also provides (in contrast with the German values) that on the scale of things, the 
English courts seem to be protecting the autonomy of the parties in that they will 
not bind the parties to a contract that they had not originally agreed. So even in the 
cases such as South Staffordshire1029 the court preferred to allow the parties to exit 
the contract and renegotiate than to adjust the contract themselves. Apart from 
Denning’s judgment in South Staffordshire1030 it would seem that the English courts 
remain committed to the principle of nominalism and there may be good reason. In 
the German section it was concluded that the protection of the economy was 
                                                          
1026 Though there are also suggestions that if not regulated by the contract the risk simply lies with 
the contractor, although the presumption is based on US law (see Lane, ‘Disruption and Delay: Fair 
Entitlement and the Regulation of Risk’ (2006) 22 (2) Construction Law Journal 92, at 97) . 
1027Lindsay Parkinson & Co. v Commissioners of Works [1949] 2 KB 632, 665. 
1028 See Ch. 6.11. 
1029 Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA). 
1030 Ibid. 
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central in the Opel Case1031 which is in line with the domestic protection of the 
market. However, thinking globally, departure from nominalism could have 
significant repercussions taking into account international trade. There may well 
therefore be a similar value that the court is protecting, the economy, but that this 
(also taking into account the fact that the Opel Case1032 was decided around 1920) 
now means something different in each jurisdiction.   
The main stance is that if the parties wanted protection then they should have 
bargained for it. Though now this may not be absolute it is clear that this will only 
occur in extreme cases (i.e. frustration)1033 and here it seems that the court is only 
in fact assessing who should bear the risk.1034 
It is submitted here that South Staffordshire1035 is probably so exceptional that it 
can be side-lined (for now). It is clear that a main value is the principle of 
nominalism and that subscribing to that principle is seen as protecting the economy 
(i.e. an alternative understanding to the German value of protection of the 
economy). It would then mean that the court is first attempting to identify who has 
taken the risk and in most cases this will mean that frustration cannot apply. In the 
cases where the court has diverted from the allocation of risk it would seem this 
                                                          
1031 RGZ 100, 134 (Opel Case) . 
1032 Ibid. 
1033 See Ch. 6.09. 
1034 Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) 
[2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 517 (CA) at [111]. 
1035 Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA). 
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has been in order to avoid unjust gain by one of the parties. In cases like Sainsbury v 
Street1036 the court requires the seller to deliver proportionally in order to ensure 
that Street cannot gain from the possible increase in market price.1037 In 
Metropolitan Waterboard1038 the court identified that it would most likely be 
significantly more expensive to build after the war. Even in the Super Servant 21039 
the fact that the contract contained the possibility for the owners of the vessel to 
elect Super Servant 1 or 2 would have meant that they could have unjustly gained 
by picking the most lucrative contract. The conclusion must therefore be that 
maintaining the contractual relationships (in contrast to German law)1040 is not a 
value but that the balance in the English cases is between risk allocation and the 
prevention of unjust gain. The wider economy is then protected through the 
uncompromising subscription to the principle of nominalism.1041  
6.13 Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that there are a multitude of values that the courts seem to 
be protecting, from freedom of contract, party autonomy and nominalism to 
protection against unjust gain, protection of the economy or preserving the 
contractual relationship. It is rarely just one value and often it is therefore the 
degree to which the courts rely on a value or in some cases interpret that value that 
                                                          
1036 HR&S Sainsbury Ltd v Street [1972] 1 WLR 834. 
1037 This approach is in line with ss. 20A and 20B SGA 1979. 
1038 J Lauritzen AS v Wijmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1990] Lloyd's Rep 1 1 (CA). 
1039 Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr & Co Ltd [1918] AC 119 (HL). 
1040 See Ch. 6.06. 
1041 See Ch. 6.09. 
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is of comparative interest. In the German cases freedom of contract is always the 
starting point for the courts except that as a principle (or value) this is curtailed by 
the protection of the parties’ will. The parties’ will is, and this it seems is not only 
Savigny’s doing but mainly due to the political economic background, that the 
bargain should retain its equivalence. This means that in the inflation cases the 
courts could intervene to re-set the prices. Also derived from that same value of 
protecting the parties’ will is the assumption that the parties in most circumstances 
would have wanted the contractual relationship to continue. This assumption is 
further justified on the basis of the protection of the economy. By that the German 
court seems to mean two things: firstly, there is the economic approach which 
states that only bargains will further the economy and that therefore the contract 
should be upheld (and adjusted to the new circumstances) but secondly, in terms of 
the promise that even if the situation changes one party will not simply be released 
from their contractual obligations but the bargain will still continue. This has the 
positive side effect that the parties, in changed circumstances, are more likely to re-
negotiate the contract before going to court in order to save the expenses.1042  
In the English cases the starting point seems also to be freedom of contract.1043 In 
no way competing with the freedom of contract is the value of party autonomy 
which is interpreted as refraining from intervening in the way the parties have 
allocated the risk (or the natural risk allocation). In contrast to the German courts 
where the value of upholding the equivalence of the bargain (to the detriment of 
                                                          
1042 See for example BGH LM § 242 (Bb) BGB Nr. 12 (Drill Hammer Case) . 
1043 See Ch. 6.07. 
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freedom ‘from contract’) is grounded in the hypothetical will of the parties.1044 The 
non-willing of the parties (i.e. the parties had never thought about the 
circumstance) that in German cases leads to the assumption that the parties meant 
the contract to be adjusted leads to the opposite conclusion in the English cases. 
The justification it would seem in the English cases (with the exception of cases 
such as South Staffordshire Waterworks1045) is the principle of nominalism that has 
stood firmly as a principle underpinning English contract law.1046 Nominalism and 
the freedom of contract are then seen as the values that lead to the protection of 
the economy – quite the opposite to the German conclusion.  
One further value that emerges in both the English and the German approach is 
that of protection against unfair gain. Losses, particularly according to the English 
approach, seem to be a natural consequence but it is protection against unfair gain 
with which the courts seem to be concerned. In Dick Kerr1047 (temporary 
impossibility) and Sainsbury v Street1048 it seems that the court is protecting against 
unfair gain by either the party getting something that after the war would have 
become much more expensive or which due to (probably) general shortage would 
be more valuable. There may be the temptation to argue that the English approach 
is really protection against loss rather than gain but it is the look to cases such as 
                                                          
1044 See Ch. 6.06. 
1045 Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA). 
1046 See Ch. 6.09 and Ch. 6.10. 
1047 Metropolitan Water Board v Dick Kerr & Co Ltd [1918] AC 119 (HL). 
1048 HR&S Sainsbury Ltd v Street [1972] 1 WLR 834. 
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the Super Servant 21049 that identify that the election by one party (and therefore 
the taking of risk) is the deciding factor which again is nothing else than the 
protection against an unfair gain by one party.  
Overall, this chapter can conclude that the objective choice of values seems on the 
face of it to be the same, protection of the economy, freedom of contract but that 
on closer inspection the labels seem to have very different underlying meanings 
(and values) attached to them which then lead to different results.  
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
The first task of this research project was to provide a comparative analysis of 
German and English contract law by focussing on problems concerning pre-
contractual duties of disclosure, mistake (particularly mistake as to quality), unfair 
contract terms and impossibility (though it may be more appropriate to say 
impracticability here). In all four chapters, the emphasis was on identifying cases 
where the outcome would be different between the two systems and also to 
identify possible ways in which the problem may be addressed (e.g. in relation to 
promissory estoppel it was identified that in other common law jurisdictions it is 
possible to use this device as a sword).1050 This research also examined the 
underlying values of these concepts in each jurisdiction and identified that the 
values held by judges and legislators influenced the outcome of the cases (or the 
structure and content of the legislation). In most cases, the values were clearly 
                                                          
1049 J Lauritzen AS v Wijmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1990] Lloyd's Rep 1 1 (CA). 
1050 See Ch. 3.07 – Ch. 3.11. 
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articulated by the judges or legislators (e.g. freedom of contract was often used as a 
foundational argument in most chapters).1051 In cases where there was no 
articulation of the values, this thesis identifies the values that most likely underlie 
the decision.1052  
The judges and legislators have been willing to articulate and discuss the underlying 
values in both the German and the English system to a similar extent. However, a 
surprising conclusion of this research is the lack of academic discussion of these 
values in the German literature.1053 The introduction found that there has been 
some discussion of values in English literature on English law;1054 this conclusion will 
aim to contextualise and situate the findings of this thesis into the macro analysis of 
values conducted by Adams and Brownsword,1055 yet there appears to be little on 
the values of German law in German academic literature. This does not mean that 
the values have been absent in German law just that they have not been 
adequately discussed; this thesis seeks to fill the gap around German values.  
                                                          
1051 E.g. Ch. 3.02. 
1052 E.g. Ch. 5.05. 
1053 See Ch. 2.02 for the relevant literature.  
1054 See Ch. 1.03. 
1055 Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205. 
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7.01 The values 
The values that have been identified in this thesis are protection of the will of the 
parties,1056 protection of party autonomy1057, invested trust (either in the other 
party or in the venture),1058 pacta sunt servanda (i.e. the contract is binding),1059 
equivalence and also nominalism,1060 clausula rebus sic stantibus (i.e. the 
assumption that circumstances will remain the same),1061 protection of society,1062 
protection against unfair gain,1063 risk allocation (whether contractual or by the 
legislator),1064 protection against informational imbalance,1065 protection of the 
legislative body,1066 protection of the parties’ contractual relationship,1067 and the 
reasonable expectations of honest men.1068  
                                                          
1056 Particularly in Ch. 4. 03. 
1057 Here there are several meanings attached for example this could go to the parties consent but 
also could be framed in the German terms of self-determination.  
1058 E.g. Ch. 4.08.  
1059 This is often the starting point of the discussion. See for example Ch. 4.01. 
1060 E.g. 6.04 and Ch. 6.07.  
1061  Ch. 6.04. 
1062 Suffice it to say here that there are several meanings that could be attached to this value. See for 
example Ch. 5.05.   
1063 E.g. Ch. 6.13. 
1064 E.g. Ch. 5.13. 
1065 E.g. Ch. 4.07. 
1066 E.g. Ch. 3.02. 
1067 E.g. Ch. 6.06. 
1068 E.g. Ch. 5.09. 
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In addition to identifying these values the thesis also reveales that both jurisdictions 
rely on almost all these values, but not in equal measure. This means that even 
though it is important to identify the values involved in each of the individual 
problems it seems to be the difference in weight that the judges attach to each 
value that dictates the outcome of the case. The weight that is given to each value 
can often be explained through an analysis of the socio-historic background. This is 
done by retracing a value back to its origin, taking into account the influences and 
developments the values have undergone. A prime example of this is the value of 
‘equivalence’. The influence of inflation on post-war Germany meant that the 
courts were willing to depart from the competing value of nominalism in favour of 
equivalence in order to protect the German social order (or economy). ‘Clausula 
rebus sic stantibus’ was therefore seen as a measure of protecting the balance of 
the contract. The idea of equivalence appears briefly in the English case of South 
Staffordshire Waterworks,1069  but overall the value of nominalism overrides 
equivalence.  
Finding the original source of the value has helps to explain why a given value exists 
in the modern context, as well as helping to establish the limitations of values in the 
context of other competing values. The conclusion that must be drawn, therefore, 
is not that the underlying values in German and English law differ, but the weight 
that is given to each value differs, which in turn may lead to a different result.  
                                                          
1069 Staffordshire AHA v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387 (CA). 
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7.02 Values and their context 
Chapter three compared the approach of the two jurisdictions to pre-contractual 
duties of disclosure. The starting point in both systems is the freedom of 
contract1070 which translates into the general understanding that the parties are not 
liable to each other until they have entered into a contract. In other words, the 
parties have a choice as to whether or not to enter into a binding contract. 
However, the value of ‘freedom of contract’ is limited (in both systems) in two 
ways. The first is ‘unfair gain’,1071 where both systems hold that there cannot be 
gain to the party breaking off the negotiations. The second is where the innocent 
party has been deliberately (or carelessly) misled.1072 This second limitation finds its 
reasoning in two different values in each systems. In Germany, it is based on breach 
of trust that the innocent party has invested in the other party. In England, it relates 
to dishonesty or carelessness of the party that has misled. The third limitation on 
the parties’ freedom of contract is based on blameworthy behaviour (this is where 
culpa in contrahendo comes in). However, the understanding of what constitutes 
blameworthy behaviour (or where there is a duty of care) is wider in Germany than 
in England.1073  
One of the limitations on blameworthy behaviour in the German cases is the need 
to protect the BGB from being circumvented. This was the limitation in the cases 
                                                          
1070 See Ch. 3.02 and Ch. 3.07. 
1071 See Ch. 3.04. 
1072 See Ch. 3.06. 
1073 See Ch. 3.06. 
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where the BGB requires a need for formality.1074 This means that the protection of 
the BGB aids the freedom of contract but is itself limited by the fact that the 
innocent party must also be protected from the misuse of the BGB (as discussed in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters of this thesis). Chapter three demonstrated 
how the underlying values can lead to a different understanding of fault and of 
what ‘deliberately misleading’ means. In sum, means ‘freedom of (or from) 
contract’ competes with ‘protection against unfair gain’. Liability for blameworthy 
behaviour competes with freedom of contract and in Germany the balance falls in 
favour of the liability (based on the parties’ will).  
The balance of the values in chapter four led to a difference in outcome. Where A 
has given B to understand that there will be a contract, A will be liable in reliance 
loss. In the English cases there has to have been a positive statement by A (and this 
is also only supported by one case).1075 The conclusion of chapter three suggests 
that the difference in understanding of what ‘blameworthy’ is (resulting from the 
different balance of values) means that there is a narrower duty of care in the 
English cases as opposed to the German ones.  
Chapter four continues to discuss most of the values found in chapter three, but 
also identified new values which compete with each other and the values already 
identified. The law of mistake in Germany relied on the will-theory, while the 
English approach is based on reasonable reliance. The approach in Germany means 
that the ‘will of the party’ and ‘party autonomy’ align, although they compete with 
                                                          
1074 See Ch. 3.10. 
1075 William Reginald Box v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434 (CA). 
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‘pacta sunt servanda’. They are also limited by protecting the non-mistaken party 
against loss (through § 122 BGB – underpinned by the value of ‘reasonable 
reliance’) – though this may also be limited if there is fault. Most importantly, 
though, ‘pacta sunt servanda’ is limited by the protection against informational 
imbalance and the protection of society against unbearable results (e.g. 
disproportionate sanction. Furthermore, due to the proximity of the law of mistake 
and the pre-contractual duties of disclosure, pacta sunt servanda can also be 
limited by the duty of disclosure, underpinned by the protection of invested trust. 
In English law the starting point is the objective theory of assent and pacta sunt 
servanda. This only applies in England with contracts of a certain type (e.g. joint 
venture) or in very limited categories of special relationship (e.g. solicitor and 
client). Overall, the chapter reveals a strong reliance in the German law on social 
elements which only appear in the English cases where they have become part of 
the contract. Invested trust, protection of society and the will-theory feature a lot 
lower in English law than in German law in these cases.  
Chapter five compares the law on unfair contract terms. The starting point in both 
jurisdictions is pacta sunt servanda. However, in Germany the protection of society 
is a strong underlying value. As part of that value the court considers limitations of 
pacta sunt servanda necessary in order to protect the order of the BGB. It means 
that the value that previously aligned with pacta sunt servanda, namely the 
protection of the values of the BGB, opposes it in these circumstances. Protection 
of society in the German context seems to be divided between terms that are unfair 
to the other person (something we see in English law too) but then also the terms 
that are unfair to society (e.g. to competitors). This means that on the one hand the 
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court is protecting the other party and competitors but it is also protecting the rules 
(or norms) of society. 
Furthermore German law considers the will of the parties limited through unfair 
standard terms which then creates a duty to take into account the other party’s 
will. In Germany then there are three things that are protected. Firstly, The English 
limitations on pacta sunt servanda are here the will of the party, in the sense of 
consent and more importantly the question of risk allocation (or to what extent the 
usual allocation had been altered by the standard terms). However, the English 
context is much more limited in that it does not deal with standard term contracts 
generally but only with exclusion clauses and business to business contracts. 
Although the English courts look to societal norms for guidance, it is much less 
important than in the German cases mainly because the BGB states prima facie that 
any departure from the norms is unreasonable, whereas the English courts are 
much more willing to allow the parties to fashion their own terms. The argument 
here then is that the perspective from which the ‘agreement’ is viewed is different. 
In Germany the legislation relating to the contractual agreement is seen as coming 
from higher norms (or ‘proper behaviour’) and departure from that is seen as a 
negative. In the English cases the Sale of Goods Act is seen as based on agreement 
which in turn makes it easier to depart from those rules.1076   
Chapter six highlights a particularly interesting difference with regard to what 
protection of the economy means. The German approach indicates that pacta sunt 
                                                          
1076 See Ch. 5.13 and Ch. 5.14. 
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servanda can be limited by the need to protect society by relying on values such as 
‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ and ‘equivalence’. The English approach means that 
pacta sunt servanda is strengthened by reference to nominalism and risk allocation. 
It seems that although the values differ, in the context of impossibility both systems 
believe to be working towards the same aim, namely protection of the economy. 
However, ‘pacta sunt servanda’ has to compete with the prevention of unjust gain. 
The main difference, though, is that the German courts consider the continuation of 
the contractual relationship to be a value (i.e. the contract can be adapted). This 
value does not appear in the English context. It would seem in chapter six that 
protection of the economy in German law requires protection again undue loss. 
English law seems to rely on the approach of ‘survival of the fittest’.              
7.03 Consumer-welfarism or Market-Individualism 
The categorisation of consumer-welfarism or market-individualism was 
championed by Adams and Brownsword in 1987.1077 They describe the approaches 
as based on ‘ideologies’, leaving behind any pre-conceptions one might have about 
the word. In this thesis the terminology values was chosen as the micro analysis of 
the influences that underlie the judgments. It is in this section that the balance of 
the values as a whole (rather than categorised by area of law) is used to established 
whether the German or English system lean more toward a consumer-welfarist or a 
market-individualist ideology.  
                                                          
1077 Adams and Brownsword, ‘The ideologies of contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205 
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The basic approach in market-individualism begins with the market and the 
ideology is to facilitate competitive exchange.1078 This relies on values such as the 
objective approach to intention and rejection of a subjective approach to mistake. 
It therefore relies on the security of transaction and the transparency of the 
outcome. The individualist element of the ideology is based on doctrines of 
freedom of contract and sanctity of contract.1079 Part of the freedom of contract is, 
according to Adams and Brownsword, the need to strike down monopolies.1080 
Consumer-Welfarism is based on the principle of consistency (i.e. parties should not 
go back on their promises),1081 the principle of proportionality (remedies should be 
proportionate to the breach that has occurred),1082 the principle of bad faith, the 
principle that no person should profit from his own wrong, the principle of unjust 
enrichment, the better loss-bearer principle, the principle of exploitation, the 
principle of a fair deal, the informational advantage principle, the principle of 
responsibility for fault and the paternalistic principle.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to both methods and these are set by 
Adams and Brownsword1083 and in their article the main aim is to establish which 
category a judges’ motive falls into. However, the question here will be to establish 
whether, in the grand scheme of things, a trend can be established that will allow 
                                                          
1078 Ibid, 206. 
1079 Ibid, 208. 
1080 Ibid, 208. 
1081 Ibid, 210. 
1082 Ibid, 210. 
1083 Ibid, 213. 
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for a definite answer of whether German or English law is more consumer-welfarist 
or market-individualist. The summary of the chapters above confirms that the 
starting point in almost all areas is freedom of contract and sanctity of contract. 
From there the judges and legislators move to narrow or limit the scope. The 
question answered is therefore which jurisdiction ventures further into the 
consumer-welfarist approach than the other.  
To answer this question, as discussed in chapter 3, the element of difference is that 
in England only an express promise will suffice, whereas in the German system 
leading a party to believe that a contract will be formed is sufficient to make the 
party liable. This seems to go the extra step in terms of the principle of consistency 
in the consumer-welfarist approach. Chapter 4 on mistake provides a difference 
from the beginning. The German approach of looking at the subjective intention of 
the parties to ascertain whether there has been a mistake shows consumer-
welfarist tendencies. However, the most recent changes indicate that this approach 
is softened significantly by a stronger reliance on the objective interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the reliance on the ‘invested trust in a relationship’ approach that 
was shown in the Daktari Film Case1084 proves that the German approach, again 
relying on the idea of consistency, pushes the German system closer towards the 
consumer-welfarist approach than the English case.  
Chapters 5 and 6 exhibit a similar trend in that the German courts expect a 
minimum level of reasonable behaviour towards the other party (or in some cases 
                                                          
1084 BGH MDR 1979, 730 (Daktari Film Case) . 
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society, competitors or the other party to the transaction) which is simply not 
evidenced in the English cases. 
The conclusion that must be drawn from this investigation is that German law 
exhibits more tendencies towards a consumer-welfarist approach where the English 
system does not move quite as far away from the market-individualist approach. 
The overall assessment of which system strikes the correct balance will be left to 
the reader to decide and open up new directions of research in comparative 
contract law.   
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